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McLeod: Shareholders' Liability and Workers' Rights: Piercing the Corpora

SHAREHOLDERS' LIABILITY AND
WORKERS' RIGHTS: PIERCING THE
CORPORATE VEIL UNDER FEDERAL LABOR
LAW
Wilson McLeod*

Fundamental doctrine deems a corporation to be separate and
distinct from its owners, so that shareholders - whether they be
individual investors or a corporate parent - will not ordinarily be
held responsible for corporate obligations.' This "corporate veil" is
usually only "pierced," and shareholder liability imposed, when a
corporation's owners have abused the privilege of limited liability in
some manner. 2 Since the passage of the first federal labor laws,' fed* B.A., Haverford College; J.D., Harvard Law School; Member of the California Bar.
Thanks to Joe Vitale, Sue McCauley, and Gilbert & Sackman, Los Angeles, for their
assistance.
1. See infra notes 32-35, 43-44 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 24-25, 64 and accompanying text.
3. This article uses the term "federal labor law(s)" to refer to the panoply of federal
statutes that regulate the rights of workers in the private sector, particularly those that involve
unionization, employee benefits, and employment discrimination. The first major federal labor
statutes were the Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, § 1, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended
at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988)) [hereinafter "RLA"]; the Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 1,
47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1988))[hereinafter "Norris-LaGuardia
Act"]; and, most important, the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988)) [hereinafter "NLRA"]. The
subsequent laws that rapidly followed involving labor-management relations are considered in
this article. See, e.g., the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, tit. I, § 1, 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1988)) [hereinafter "LMRA"]
(amending the NLRA and establishing the legal enforceability of collective bargaining agreements); see also the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. 93-406, Title I, § 2,
88 Stat. 832 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461 (1988)) [hereinafter
"ERISA"] (addressing employee benefits); the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §
1, 52 Stat. 1060 (1937) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-62 (1988)) [hereinafter
"FLSA"] (addressing employee wages and hours); the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act Pub. L. 100-379, § 2, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09
(Supp. 1988)) [hereinafter "WARN"] (addressing plant closing notification); the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988)) [hereinafter "OSHA"] (addressing workplace
safety); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 701, 78 Stat.
253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988)) [hereinafter "Title
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eral courts and administrative agencies deciding labor cases have
confronted this fundamental yet mysterious principle of corporate
separateness in a broad variety of contexts, all of them substantially
different from the commercial disputes in which the doctrine
emerged.

Labor law veil-piercing questions may arise in a number of
ways. Labor claimants, including trade unions, individual employees,
and employee benefit trusts, have asserted for example, that parent
corporations should accept responsibility for their subsidiaries' unfair
labor practices or acts of employment discrimination, that individual
shareholders should be held personally liable for corporate obligations to pay employee benefit contributions, and that collective bargaining agreements covering the employees of one corporation should
be deemed to extend to other nominally separate, but commonly
owned, entities.4 The precise issues raised by these different labor
claims vary considerably according to the particular legal and factual context, but in every instance the competing values of labor law

and corporate law are paramount.
This article considers the numerous theoretical and doctrinal
tangles that are presented by these veil-piercing problems of federal
labor law.5 In confronting these tangles, federal courts and adminisVII"] (addressing employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or national
origin); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81 Stat. 602
(1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988)) [hereinafter "ADEA"] (addressing employment discrimination on the basis of age); the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336 (1990) [hereinafter "ADA"] (addressing discrimination on the
basis of handicap). The Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified
as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988)) [hereinafter "FELA"] and the Jones Act, ch. 153,
§ 20, 38 Stat. 1185 (1915) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988)) [hereinafter "Jones Act"] are
treated here only in passing, because these statutes provide tort recovery mechanisms for injured employees rather than regulating the employment relationship. The Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 2, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988)), is not considered here because it only governs intraunion matters
and thus does not give rise to veil-piercing problems; federal public-sector labor statutes, like
the Federal Labor-Management and Employee Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat.
378 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-903 (1988)), are excluded from discussion here because they do not involve private corporations in any way,
4. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1043 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that parent corporations should accept responsibility for their subsidiaries' unfair labor
practices or acts of employment discrimination); see also Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1,4 (1st
Cir. 1986) (holding that individual shareholders should be held personally liable for corporate
obligations to pay employee benefit contributions); see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
T.P. Property Corp., 583 F.2d 33,35 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that collective bargaining agreements covering employees of one corporation should be deemed to extend to other nominally
separate, but commonly owned entities).
5. This article uses the term "piercing the corporate veil" broadly, so as to include all
variations on the diverse common law theories by which courts have held shareholders liable
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trative agencies' have generally attempted to apply traditional prin-

ciples of corporate law while simultaneously purporting to develop an
appropriate body of federal labor law. The result has been an uneven

patchwork in which specialized labor law doctrines are juxtaposed
with rigid corporate law principles that rarely reflect the realities of
labor relations or the policies of labor law. More disturbingly, courts

and agencies have usually been reluctant to treat labor law questions
involving the corporate entity as problems that differ from ordinary

corporate law disputes, and they have consistently failed to consider
whether the rationales of corporate law make intellectual or policy

sense in the labor context.
The veil-piercing problem in labor law is also complicated by
substantial issues of federalism. Given their extraordinary impact on

interstate commerce, most of the federal labor statutes impose a
powerful preemptive force, and the federal courts have assumed the

task of formulating a federal common law of labor relations. This
task is an especially important one because preemption has left many
aspects of the employment relationship subject to exclusive federal
control and entirely immune from state regulation.8 Accordingly, the
for obligations of their corporations. But see Castleberry v. Baranscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272
(Tex. 1986) (criticizing the failure to distinguish between different bases for imposing shareholder liability).
6. The most important federal administrative agency in the labor arena is the National
Labor Relations Board [hereinafter "NLRB"]. The NLRB is only responsible for adjudicating
cases that arise under the NLRA, but because of the importance in the American labor law
schema of the NLRA and the NLRB's decisions thereunder, the NLRB is appropriately considered a major actor in the formation of all labor law veil-piercing doctrines. See infra note
103 and accompanying text. Other federal administrative agencies consider various problems
arising under different labor statutes; for example, the National Mediation Board [hereinafter
"NMB"] is empowered to resolve representational questions and certain other disputes involving the RLA, and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission [hereinafter
"OSHRC"] decides OSHA liability matters. See infra notes 194-206, 299-303 and accompanying text.
7. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). Several
federal labor laws, including the NLRA, the LMRA, and ERISA, have a broad preemptive
effect that almost completely forecloses state regulation. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959) (holding that the states are generally forbidden
from regulating acts "arguably protected" by Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1988), or "arguably prohibited" by Section 8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988)); Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55 (1987) (noting that the "LMRA displaced all state
actions for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization"); ERISA §
514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (providing that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan"); but see Civil
Rights Act of 1964 § 708, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988) (providing that Title VII does not
preclude imposition of liability under state law); ADEA § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1988)
(providing for concurrent federal and state jurisdiction over age discrimination claims).
8. Veil-piercing issues have also arisen under various state laws relating to employment,

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

3

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

(Vol. 9:i

veil-piercing doctrines developed under federal labor statutes can be
an important determinant of workers' rights.
When federal interests are substantial and reliance on state law
poses potentially serious risks, most courts have recognized that veilpiercing problems arising under federal statutes (both within and
without the labor context) properly call for the development and application of federal common law rather than reliance on analogous
principles of state corporate law.9 Corporations, after all, are creatures of state law, and corporate law, with its keystone principle of
limited shareholder liability, arises almost exclusively under state
statutes and state court statutory interpretation.10 Veil-piercing doctrines designed to effectuate federal labor policy, however, need not
necessarily share the same goals and values as state law doctrines
that seek to protect business investors rather than workers.11
This conflict is forced into particularly sharp relief in the federal courts' application of the long-established principle that the fiction of corporate separateness will not be permitted to frustrate the
policies of a statute. 12 Although a state-chartered corporation's
transgressions might be insufficient to permit shareholder liability
under the laws of the state of incorporation, the corporation's conduct could nevertheless offend federal statutory policy.' 3 When such
an affront is found, a federal court may apply this statutory frustration theory to disregard the corporate entity and impose shareholder
liability for the federal violation.' 4
To place these complex problems of federalism and labor policy
but these problems are not addressed here. See, e.g., Comment, Adopting an Economic Reality Test When Determining Parent Corporations'Status for Workers' Compensation Purposes, 12 J. CORP. L. 569 (1987); see also Piekarski v. Home Owners Say. Bank, 759 F. Supp.

542, 546 n.6 (D. Minn. 1991) (holding that parent corporations were not liable for the wrongful termination of a subsidiary's employee); Anderson v. Kennebec River Pulp & Paper Co.,
433 A.2d 752 (Me. 1981) (permitting a corporate subsidiary's employees to prosecute an ac-

tion for unpaid severance pay against the parent corporation); Reynolds v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 621 P.2d 1028 (Mont. 1980) (imposing on a parent corporation the duty to provide a
safe workplace for its subsidiary's employees).
9. See infra notes 49-79 and accompanying text.

10. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
11. Each of the principal federal labor laws is explicitly intended to rectify a perceived
imbalance in power between labor and management; in this sense the federal labor laws may

be considered as efforts to protect workers in one way or another. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. §
151 (1988); see also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 759 (1961)
(explaining that the RLA was intended to strengthen the position of employees and unions
covered under the Act as against their carriers).

12. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.
14.

See infra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.
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in its appropriate context, Part I, Section A of this article presents a
background discussion of the current state of the common law of
veil-piercing. Although this body of doctrine is notoriously confused
in theory and unpredictable in application, certain fundamental principles have been established, and the deadly sins - undercapitalization, disregard of corporate formalities, and misrepresentation of corporate status - have been identified and accepted.1"
Section B of Part I will consider the special veil-piercing
problems that arise in federal question cases. In many instances,
compelling federal interests demand that questions of shareholder liability for federal violations be determined through the application
of federal rather than state law. 16 Even when federal courts have
attempted to fashion federal common law in such cases, they have
differed sharply in their assessments of the proper role of state corporate law and the appropriate specificity of federal decisional
rules . 7 Most courts that purport to apply a federal rule invoke the
general federal common law of veil-piercing that is unvarying in different statutory contexts."8 Because the choice-of-law determination
is always a context-sensitive problem, however, and because statutory policies necessarily vary according to the statute at issue, the
federal courts should attempt to develop individualized veil-piercing
doctrines that are designed to effectuate particular statutory policies
and to resolve context-specific problems of corporate identity. In addition, the federal courts should adopt and expand the broad interpretation of the statutory frustration doctrine that has been adopted
in certain recent cases, so that shareholder liability may be imposed
whenever the fiction of corporate separateness would otherwise leave
a federal statutory violation unremedied.
Part II presents a doctrinal analysis of the present state of veilpiercing doctrine under federal labor law. Interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), as the seminal labor statute,
has been the most important source of this doctrine, and NLRA
principles have been widely accepted in other labor law contexts, although numerous statute-specific doctrines have also been developed.19 Despite the considerable homogeneity of the law, the range
of labor law veil-piercing problems has been substantial, including
questions concerning individual shareholders' liability for corporate
15. See infra notes 22-48 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.

17. See infra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
18.
19.

See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
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unfair labor practices or the applicability of the "single employer"
doctrine, by which nominally separate corporations are deemed one
for certain labor law purposes, given their common control and overlapping personnel management. Upon review of this body of law,
however, this section concludes that existing labor law veil-piercing
doctrines are excessively deferential to the common law notion of
corporate separateness, and that the federal courts have not fulfilled
their obligation to develop veil-piercing rules that advance congressional goals and prevent corporate fictions from frustrating the policies of federal labor statutes.
Accordingly, in Part III, this Article proposes a revised labor
law veil-piercing doctrine that seeks to vindicate specific federal labor policies rather than general state corporate law. In view of federal labor law's emphasis on protecting workers rather than assuaging corporate investors, a substantially broader rule of
shareholder liability would be appropriate in federal labor cases: that
parent corporations and shareholders of closely held corporations
should be liable for corporate violations of labor law as a matter of
course.

Because this proposal involves a substantial modification of existing law, Part III, Section A considers contemporary scholarship to
determine the appropriateness of such a shift. First, unlike most corporate creditors, labor claimants cannot be held to have assumed the
risk of corporate insolvency and shareholder immunity, because
these claimants lack bargaining power - a weakness imposed in
some instances by labor law itself - and are often precluded from
securing appropriate protections from shareholders. 20 Second, in assessing the current work of legal economists and other scholars, this
section concludes that the limited liability rule retains decidedly
modest policy importance in the context of close corporations and
subsidiaries, and that the rule may be substantially curtailed at least
for these classes of corporations, without incurring serious
consequences. 21
Given the importance of underlying federal labor policies and
the irrelevance of corporate form in labor matters, a major doctrinal
overhaul is warranted. Review of the policies of the specific labor
laws, in Section B of Part III, suggests that congressional purpose is
best advanced by less deferential veil-piercing doctrines.
20. See infra notes 309-336 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 337-373 and accompanying text.
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I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINE OF
CORPORATE IDENTITY

A.

The Common Law of Veil-Piercing

It is now a firmly rooted principle of corporate law that a corporation is deemed an entity separate from its owners, so that share-

holders will not be held accountable for the obligations of the corporation beyond the amount of their investment. 2 Almost as well

established, however, is the notion that this veil of corporate separateness may be pierced in certain unusual circumstances, so that

23
shareholders may be subjected to liability for corporate obligations.
The veil-piercing doctrine is justifiably renowned for its ambigu-

ity and uncertainty. According to one pair of commentators, veil-

piercing is "[1]ike lightning" -

"rare, severe, and unprincipled.

'24

Nonetheless, its basic paradigms are widely understood. An individ-

ual may form a corporation with insufficient capital and then run the
enterprise like an ordinary proprietorship, comingling personal and
corporate assets;2 5 a new, putatively distinct corporation may arise
22. See Kessler, With Limited Liability For All: Why Not A PartnershipCorporation?,
36 FORDHAM L. REV. 235, 238 (1967)(explaining that the principle of limited corporate liability has been traced as far back as 1440). Later English common law generally continued to
permit limited liability, and the doctrine was codified by statute in 1825. See, Hovenkamp,
The Classical Corporationin American Legal Thought, 76 GEo. L.J. 1593, 1651 (1988). The
rule has flourished in the United States since the eighteenth century, but has frequently been
controversial. Id.
23. See Comment, Limited Limited Liability: A Definitive Judicial Standardfor the
Inadequate CapitalizationProblem, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 321, 323 (1974) (noting that veil-piercing
may be traced back to the early nineteenth century) [hereinafter "Comment, Limited Limited
Liability"].
In appropriate circumstances, even individuals who do not actually own stock may be held
liable for corporate obligations. Courts "are concerned with reality and not form" in veilpiercing cases, and imposing liability upon a non-owner who maintains actual control of a
corporation, for example, could be appropriate in certain circumstances. Establissement Tomis
v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1355, 1366 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see Labadie
Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See also, Krendl & Krendl, Piercing the
Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DEN. L.J. 1, 24 (1978).
24. Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
89, 89 (1985).
25. In a widely cited decision, the Fourth Circuit summarized this basic principle in the
following manner:
[U]ndercapitalization, coupled with disregard of corporate formalities, lack of participation on the part of the other stockholders, and the failure to pay dividends
while paying substantial sums, whether by way of salary or otherwise, to the dominant stockholder, all fitting into a picture of basic unfairness, has been regarded
fairly uniformly to constitute a basis for an imposition of individual liability under
the [veil-piercing] doctrine.
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 687 (4th Cir.
1976).
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from the ashes of a substantially identical entity that had accumulated undesirable obligations; 26 and an established corporation may
form an empty new subsidiary to delve into a particularly risky ven27
ture, with the sole purpose of insulating the parent from liability.
In these paradigmatic circumstances, shareholder liability will usually be imposed fairly readily.
In considering veil-piercing problems, it is useful to divide corporations into three categories: those whose stock is publicly traded;
those whose stock is not publicly traded but closely held by individual owners; and those whose stock is not publicly traded but owned
by another corporation. Although veil-piercing doctrine does not actually establish formal distinctions between these different kinds of
entities, the differences are nonetheless of considerable importance in
both practical and theoretical terms. Courts are generally more reluctant to pierce the veil to impose liability upon individual than
upon corporate shareholders, particularly parent corporations called
to answer for their subsidiaries' obligations.28 In addition, because
the operation of a parent-subsidiary relationship is quite unlike that
of a unitary corporate structure, veil-piercing inquiries necessarily
emphasize different factors according to the type of corporation
involved.
26. See, e.g., Castleberry v. Baranscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 275 (Tex. 1986) (describing
the paradigm):
a closely held corporation owes unwanted obligations; it siphons off corporate revenues, sells off much of the corporate assets, or does other acts to hinder the on-going
business and its ability to pay off its debts; a new business then starts up that is
basically a continuation of the old business with many of the same shareholders,
officers, and directors.
Id. In the labor law context, such disguised continuances are generally known as "alter
egos." See infra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
27. See Note, Liability of Parent Corporationsfor Hazardous Waste Cleanup and
Damages, 99 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1986) [hereinafter "Note, Liability of Parent Corporations"]; United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110, 119 (D. Vt.), affd,
487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
28. See, e.g., Hackney & Benson, ShareholderLiabilityfor Inadequate Capital, 43 U.
PITT. L. REV. 837, 873 (1982); Hamilton, The CorporateEntity, 49 TEx. L. REv. 979, 992
(1971); but cf Gillespie, The Thin CorporateLine: Loss of Limited Liability Protections,45
N.D. L. REv. 363, 373 (1969) (suggesting the existence of a trend toward distinguishing between different kinds of shareholders). The shift toward imposing liability upon parent corporations has been justified on the ground that the parent's shareholders are "really seeking a
double insulation" through the use of the subsidiary mechanism. See Fuller, The Incorporated
Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1382 (1938).
Similarly, courts do not distinguish between the liability of parent corporations for the
obligations of their subsidiaries and the liability of two commonly owned corporations for each
other's acts (the so-called "brother-sister" situation). See Hamilton, supra, at 991. Brothersister liability is relatively rare, however, with the important exception of the "double-breasting" labor context described below. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
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More importantly, publicly traded corporations are essentially
irrelevant as far as veil-piercing is concerned. Case law reveals that
every pierced veil has been that of a closely held corporation or a
corporate subsidiary. 9 Further, as explained in Part III, contemporary scholarship suggests that, under existing joint and several liability principles, limited liability is only appropriate for publicly traded
corporations, and that modifying the limited liability rule for close
corporations and subsidiaries would not have serious negative
consequences.3"
1. Piercing the Veil Against Individual Shareholders
Courts have relied upon a panoply of factors in deciding
whether to impose liability upon individual shareholders, but their
analyses have usually failed to identify the criteria they consider
most important and explain the bases for this perceived importance.
Indeed, one scholar has observed that the typical laundry-list of justifications for piercing the corporate veil are "as if a patient died of
poisoning and the autopsy reported the cause of death as ingestion of
steak, carrots, arsenic, and squash. '31 Further, there is often little or
no connection between the corporate acts that are invoked to justify
veil-piercing and the acts that harm the plaintiff who thereby recovers from shareholders.32
This confusion notwithstanding, the basic principles are fairly
clear. Veil-piercing remains the exception, not the rule, and a creditor is not entitled to reach shareholder assets merely because a single
individual owns all the corporation's stock,3 3 or because the corporation cannot satisfy the creditor's claim 34 - even if the corporation
29. See, e.g., Epperson & Canny, The Capital Shareholder's Ultimate Calamity:
Pierced Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of Columbia, Maryland,
and Virginia, 37 CATH. L. REV. 605, 613 (1988); Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 371, 372 (1981).
30. See infra notes 360-73 and accompanying text. Cf.Manne, Our Two Corporation
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967) (proposing a "dual theory" of close
and publicly traded corporations).
31. Dobbyn, A PracticalApproach to Consistency in Veil-Piercing Cases, 19 U. KAN.
L. REV. 185, 189 (1971).
32. See Clark, The Duties of the CorporateDebtor To Its Creditors,90 HARV. L. REV.

505, 553 (1977).
33. See, e.g., I FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
41.10, at 398 (C. Van Swearingen ed. 1983 rev. vol.) [hereinafter "FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA"].
34. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Matthew R. White Investments, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1054, 1057

(D. Utah 1987):
[A] claimant's inability to collect a judgment from a corporation is not enough to
show that fraud or inequitable conduct resulted from the use of the corporate structure .... A decision to the contrary would totally eviscerate the doctrine of limited
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clearly was formed for the express purpose of limiting its owners'
liability.3 5 Rather, the corporate veil will usually be pierced only
when the shareholders have committed one or more particular kinds
of abuse. Although these violations are often fraudulent in nature, it
is now generally recognized that a veil may be pierced without evi38
dence of actual fraud.
First, the shareholders may have failed to treat the corporation
as a separate entity, by commingling corporate and personal assets
or by neglecting to observe the necessary procedural formalities,
such as the obligations to maintain formal records and to conduct
proper shareholders' and directors' meetings.37 Second, they may
have concealed the existence of the corporation as a distinct enterprise, or intimated that individual shareholders would be responsible
for obligations actually owed by the corporation. Third, and most
liability for corporate shareholders, and undermine a fundamental protection that
encourages business venture.
Id.
35. See, e.g., Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
988 (1968). The Zubik court noted an exception to this principle, however, where shareholders
manifest the "specific intent to escape liability for a specific tort or class of torts." Id.
36. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Rendezvous, Inc., 699 F.2d 676, 680 (4th Cir. 1983); see
also United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 786 F.2d 686, 692 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1014 (1986) (suggesting that evidence of fraud should be required in veil-piercing cases
involving contract creditors but not in those involving tort creditors).
37. For a detailed inventory of the specific improper acts that may permit veil-piercing
on these grounds, see Barber, supra note 29, at 374-75.
Courts and commentators have differed over the importance of observance of corporate
formalities in veil-piercing determinations. Those who favor directing attention to the formalities contend that attention to these rites provides "an excellent litmus of the extent to which
the individuals involved actually view the corporation as a separate being." Labadie Coal Co.
v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis deleted). Others have suggested that this
aspect of the veil-piercing doctrine is intended to create an incentive to comply fully with state
corporation laws. 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA § 41.10, at 167 (J. Reinholtz & C. Keating eds.
1989 Cum. Supp.). In some cases, moreover, the shareholders' failure to observe formalities
may directly harm a specific creditor. For example, the failure of a corporation's directors to
meet and discuss the corporation's lack of insurance might be relevant to the claim of an
accident victim whose injuries are not compensated by the insolvent corporation or by its unpurchased insurance policy. See Barber, supra note 29, at 378-79. Other commentators, in
contrast, have suggested that corporate formalities are largely irrelevant, especially in cases
involving tort creditors, and that courts invoke inattention to formalities as a " 'make-weight'
argument to support the general conclusion that justice requires the court to provide a remedy." Downs, Piercingthe Corporate Veil - Do CorporationsProvideLimited Liability?, 53
U. Mo. K.C. L. REv. 174, 177 (1985); see also Comment, Limited Limited Liability, supra
note 23, at 342 (suggesting that the corporate formalities are "essentially meaningless").
38. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 29, at 374-75. But cf., DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v.
W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 687 n.18 (4th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that veilpiercing was appropriate when shareholders indicated that they stood "personally behind the
corporation and would see that its indebtedness was paid"). Robert Clark describes these kinds
of misrepresentations as "'soft-core' fraud," presumably to be distinguished from "hard-core"
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the owners may not have endowed the corporation with

capital sufficient to sustain its business needs, or may otherwise have
failed to operate the corporation as a genuinely viable business enterprise. 40 Every veil-piercing inquiry is fact-specific, and all criteria
need not be satisfied in any particular case.4 ' Most courts require an
overall pattern of abuse and injustice before imposing liability on
individual shareholders, but others have pierced the corporate veil
solely on the ground of undercapitalization.4 2
2.

Piercing the Veil Against Corporate Shareholders

Even when a corporation is wholly owned by another corporation rather than individual shareholders, the basic rule of limited liacommon law fraud. Clark, supra note 32, at 544.
39. See, e.g., Douglas & Shanks, Insulationfrom Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 214 (1929) (parent-subsidiary context).
40. See Barber, supra note 29, at 374-75. In assessing the adequacy of a corporation's
capitalization, "the crucial factor is the sufficiency of the cushion provided creditors by means
of the portion of total assets represented by equity capital." Note, Liability of a Corporation
for Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1122, 1128 (1958); see also In re
Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 703 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Rembar, Claims Against Affiliated Companies in Reorganization, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 907, 915-16 (1939)) ("Capitalization
is inadequate if, in the opinion of a skilled financial analyst, it would definitely be insufficient
to support a business of the size and nature of the [corporation in question] in light of the
circumstances existing at the time the [corporation] was capitalized.").
Commentators have disagreed over the appropriateness of judicial scrutiny of the adequacy of capitalization. Compare Krendl & Krendl, supra note 23, at 37 (suggesting that such
an inquiry exceeds courts' competence) and Downs, supra note 37, at 186 n.62 (suggesting
that undercapitalization analysis presents too tempting an opportunity for excessively clear
hindsight) with Dobbyn, supra note 31, at 191-92 (arguing that the vagueness of the existing
standard encourages investors to err on the side of caution in capitalizing corporations). Commentators also differ as to whether the adequacy of a corporation's capitalization should be
measured only at the time of incorporation or throughout the life of the corporation. Compare
Downs, supra note 37, at 188 (suggesting that a continuing capitalization obligation would
impose an excessive disincentive to investment, given that the great majority of new businesses
fail) with Barber, supra note 29, at 396 (contending that a failure to require adequate ongoing
capitalization could permit a corporation to maintain a dangerously weak capital foundation,
even while it expanded rapidly, severely jeopardizing its creditors' interests). Finally, some
commentators have argued that shareholders should not be held liable for the full amount of
undercapitalized corporations' obligations, but rather, should only be required to compensate
creditors up to the amount that would constitute adequate capitalization. See Comment, Limited Limited Liability, supra note 23, at 321.

41.

See 1 FLETCHER

CYCLOPEDIA,

supra note 33, § 41.30, at 430.

42. Compare Barber, supra note 29, at 376 (quoting Automotriz del Golfo de California v. Resnick, 47 Cal.2d 792, 796 (1957)) (noting that most veil-piercing cases apply a twoprong test: "(I) that there be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual [shareholders] no longer exist; and (2) that, if the
acts [that lead to a creditor's successful veil-piercing claim] are treated as those of the corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow.") with Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d 576
(1961) (piercing a corporation's veil based solely on its undercapitalization).
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bility prevails, so that the stockholding corporation is immune from
liability except in unusual circumstances. 3 Accordingly, the mere
fact that a parent corporation owns all the stock of a subsidiary and
exercises the authority ordinarily incident to ownership
does not pro4
vide a basis for piercing the subsidiary's veil.
Under the traditional rule, rather, a creditor may only recover
from the parent by demonstrating that the parent has gone beyond
the normal exercise of ownership control over the subsidiary, by
preventing the subsidiary from operating as a genuinely independent
entity, for example, or by interfering in its decision-making structures and procedures. 5 In such circumstances, a subsidiary is considered a mere "instrumentality" of its parent.4 By the same token, a
subsidiary's veil may be pierced if the subsidiary is not organized
and managed to ensure that it maintains a realistic potential for
profitability - as when it sells all its output to the parent at belowmarket prices or pays the parent excessive rent or interest - or if
the opposite prevails, and the parent pays the subsidiary's rent or
other operating expenses. 47 Finally, acts and omissions that would
cause veil-piercing as against individual shareholders will also lead to
liability for parents: when the subsidiary is undercapitalized or neglects corporate formalities, for example, or when creditors are misled into believing that the parent will assume the subsidiary's
obligations.4
43. Application of the limited liability principle in the context of the subsidiary corporation has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups,
II J. CORP. L. 573, 605, 607 (1986) (arguing that limited liability for parent corporations
"emerged as a historical accident" and that the doctrine has been "applied unthinkingly and
automatically to the parent corporation").
44. This principle is a venerable one. See United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26,
62-63 (1920).
45. See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 39, at 218. Interference of this kind may be
wholesale in nature or may take place only in the particular transaction that gives rise to the
dispute in question. Id. at 214; see also Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 757 (7th Cir.
1989) (explaining the doctrine). For a litigation-oriented summary of parent-subsidiary veilpiercing law, see Berzon, Piercing the Corporate Veil: the Nuts and Bolts, LAB. LAW ExCHANGE

(AFL-CIO Lawyers Coordinating Comm.) No. 9, Workplace Closure Issues, at 7

(1991).

46. See, e.g., United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986). For detailed enumerations of the factors that will support
veil-piercing in the parent-subsidiary context, see United States v. Advance Machine Co., 547
F. Supp. 1085, 1093 (D. Minn. 1982); Krendl & Krendl, supra note 23, at 52-55.
47. See Landers, A Unified Approach To Parent,Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in
Bankruptcy, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 589, 621-22 (1975); see also Krendl & Krendl, supra note
23, at 52-55.

48. See, e.g., Krendl & Krendl, supra note 23, at 52-55 (noting that a subsidiary's veil
may be pierced when its creditors are misled concerning the subsidiary's solvency or its rela-
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B. Special Veil-Piercing Problems in Federal Question Cases
The great majority of veil-piercing cases arise under state contract or tort law, and veil-piercing determinations in these cases are
made through application of the basic common law doctrines summarized previously. When a plaintiff's claim arises under a federal
statute, however, the veil-piercing problem is complicated by substantial choice-of-law issues. As with other issues in federal question
cases, federal courts are required to determine whether they should
follow pertinent principles of state law or instead should, develop and
apply federal common law. In many instances, however, federal
courts have ignored the necessity of this determination and have applied state corporate law doctrine in their veil-piercing cases without
giving any attention to the choice-of-law question. Even when courts
have determined that a specific statutory context requires a federal
rule of decision, moreover, they have often turned to a generalized
mass of judge-made federal veil-piercing law rather than developing
a specific doctrine that is attuned to the particular statutory concerns
at issue.
The conflict between federal statutory policy and state corporate
law may also arise through the federal courts' refinement of the
long-established principle that the fiction of corporate separateness
will not be permitted to frustrate public policy.49 Under the prevailing federal modification of this principle, federal courts refuse to accept state law's deference to corporate form when doing so would
frustrate the principles or policies of a federal statute.50 Although
the traditional common law "public policy" rule is more honored in
the breach than in the observance,51 this federal corollary is far from
dormant, and federal courts have relied on it to impose shareholder
liability under a wide variety of federal statutes. In recent years,
tionship to the parent); Advance Machine, 547 F. Supp. at 1093 (suggesting that liability may
be imposed on a parent when "the subsidiary is described as a department or division of the
parent corporation, or its business or financial responsibility is referred to as the parent corporation's own.").
49. For a summary of the traditional doctrine, see, for example, Krendl & Krendl, supra
note 23 at 29-31.

50. See United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 89 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Normandy House Nursing Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (D. Mass. 1977).
51. But see, e.g., Sundaco, Inc. v. State, 463 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (pierc-

ing the corporate veil on the ground of statutory frustration). Unlike the federal statutory
frustration doctrine, however, the common law public policy exception does not ordinarily provide an independent basis for piercing the corporate veil. See Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Federal Courts: Is Circumvention of a Statute Enough?, 13 PAC. L.J. 1245, 1255
(1982) [hereinafter "Comment, Circumvention of a Statute"]. For examples of federal statu-

tory frustration cases, see infra note 80.
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moreover, several federal courts have broadened the doctrine, holding that any corporate failure to satisfy a federal statutory obligation
constitutes a frustration of the statute sufficient to permit the imposition of shareholder liability.
1. Choice of Law Problems
Federal courts have demonstrated considerable confusion in determining the law applicable to veil-piercing questions. In diversity
cases, state law properly provides the rule of decision,52 but even in
federal question cases, several courts have applied state law unquestioningly. 53 Other courts have avoided choice-of-law problems by asserting that state and federal veil-piercing law would produce an
identical result in the particular case.54 Indeed, many courts cite federal and state cases interchangeably, without explanation.5"
Nonetheless, the proper approach is relatively easy to discern.
The choice-of-law inquiry in federal question veil-piercing cases is a
straightforward matter of federal common law; basic post-Erie
choice-of-law principles apply.56 Under this regime, state law
"should apply when it is not inconsistent with federal interests for it
to do so, ''5 7 but it "is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision
52. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also United States v. Pefla,
731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (reversing a veil-piercing decision on the ground that the
district court had improperly applied federal precedents instead of considering the "distinct"
question of whether the "corporate veil ought to be pierced for purposes of allocating state tort
or contract liabilities"); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d
681, 687 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying South Carolina law in a diversity case). But see C.M.
Corp. v. Oberer Devel. Co., 631 F.2d 536, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1980) (applying federal veil-piercing law in a diversity case); Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 571
(7th Cir. 1985) (criticizing earlier Seventh Circuit diversity cases' reliance on federal law to
determine veil-piercing questions).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Daugherty, 599 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (applying state corporate law in a case arising under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-87, Title I, § 101, 91 Stat. 447 (1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201328 (1988)); Country Maid, Inc. v. Haseotes, 299 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (applying
state corporate law in a case arising under the Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13 (1988) [hereinafter "Robinson-Patman Act"].
54. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 268 (D. Del.
1989); United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985), cert,
denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
55. See Jon-T Chemicals, 768 F.2d at 690 n.6. For a discussion of federal courts' confusion concerning the choice-of-law problem in veil-piercing cases, see P. BLUMBERO, THE LAW
OF CORPORATE GRoups: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE

SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY GROUPS §§ 18.01-18.08 (1987).
56. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
57. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of FederalCommon Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881,
983 (1986) (emphasis deleted).
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within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of
federal statutes that legal relations which they affect must be
deemed governed by federal law having its source in those statutes,
rather than by local law." 58 As a number of courts have recognized,
the appropriate analytic framework is based on'the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,58 which established
a three-part test to determine whether state law should be followed
or federal law developed in cases involving federal programs.
Under Kimbell Foods, a federal court should first ascertain
whether a need for national consistency suggests the appropriateness
of a uniform federal rule; second, it should consider the degree to
which "application of state law would frustrate specific objectives"
of a federal statute; and third, it should assess "the extent to which
application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships
predicated on state law." 60 Applying these basic principles to the
problem of piercing the corporate veil, federal courts "must determine, as a matter of federal law, whether the federal interest at
stake requires a uniform national [veil-piercing] rule," "whether application of a state rule would frustrate specific objectives of federal
law," and whether application of a federal veil-piercing doctrine
would upset commercial relationships structured on state law. 61
Consideration of the first Kimbell Foods criterion in the veilpiercing context necessarily requires a different result according to
the nature of the federal program or statute at issue. Some statutes,
even though enacted at the federal level, may not necessarily require
national uniformity in the applicable rules of decision. On the other
hand, most federal statutes are responses to important nationwide
concerns, and in particular, as explained in Part III, Section B, the
58.

Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).

59. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
60. Id. at 728-29.
61.

Orloff v. Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Orloff court inexplicably failed to enumerate or consider the third Kimbell Foods criterion. Id.
Among the factors to be considered in making this determination are the extent to which:
(1)a need exists for national uniformity; (2) a federal rule would disrupt commer-

cial relationships predicated on state law; (3) application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program; (4) implementation of a particular
rule would cause administrative hardships or would aid in administrative conve-

niences; (5) the regulations lend weight to the application of a uniform rule; (6) the
action in question has a direct effect on financial obligations of the United States;
and (7) [a] substantial federal interest in the outcome of the litigation exists.
Id.; See Comment, Circumvention of a Statute, supra note 51, at 1249-50 (footnotes omitted);

see also Field, supra note 57, at 953-62.
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federal labor laws generally impose a strong preemptive effect and
consistently require uniform national rules, so as to render fluctuations between states intolerable.
The second Kimbell Foods criterion also varies in impact in different contexts. Some federal statutes may advance policies similar
to those of state corporate law, while others may have dramatically
different, even contrary, purposes. In considering whether state veilpiercing rules would interfere with federal policies, federal courts
should pay particular attention to whether the statute in question
places importance upon the corporate form.62 This inquiry involves
analysis of the statute's language concerning the significance of incorporation and the degree of strictness of liability imposed by the
statute.63
The third criterion is probably more constant. State interests in
toughening corporate veils are not especially strong, and differing
federal doctrines of shareholder liability cannot therefore be expected to disrupt important state commercial relationships. For veilpiercing does not implicate the heart of state corporate law, which
defines the very existence of corporate institutions through the regulation of corporate formation and dissolution and controls the ongoing operation of corporations with rules concerning ownership and
management structure. Although the states retain a substantial interest in matters relating to these internal corporate affairs, the limited liability principle is generally considered a peripheral doctrine
intended only
to buttress the basic corporate structure rather than
64
it.
define
More importantly, federal veil-piercing doctrines cause minimal
interference with state interests because imposing shareholder liability for the purposes of a particular federal statute does not necessarily lead to liability for other purposes.6 5 A federal court's veil-piercing determination in favor of a federal regulatory agency, for
example, would not redound to the benefit of the corporation's trade
62.

See Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1981).

63. See United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988).
64. See Note, Piercingthe Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal
Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 853, 862-63 (1982) [hereinafter "Note, Piercing the Veil"].

65. Id. at 865; see Corn Products Refining Corp. v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554, 565 (2d Cir.
1956); see also Amarillo Oil Co. v. Mapco, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 602, 603 (N.D. Tex. 1983).

"'The' corporate veil has become something of a misnomer in recent times. Since
the end accomplished by piercing a corporate veil has such an impact on whether to
pierce, and because the courts have recognized that a corporate veil may be pierced
for one purpose, but not another, today's corporation is multiveiled."
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creditors, who would still be required to demonstrate the appropriateness of shareholder liability under traditional state law doctrines.
As such, particularized federal veil-piercing doctrines cannot be said
to interfere with state law or state commercial relationships to any
substantial degree.
Although their holdings have not been expressed within the
framework of Kimbell Foods, some courts have expressed a substantially different perspective on the problem of interference with state
law. In this view, the limited liability principle must be considered a
basic feature of the legal background against which Congress legislates. 6 Accordingly, these courts have contended that unless Congress explicitly establishes specific grounds for piercing the corporate
veil within the text of a statute, federal courts must accord corporations and their owners the established privileges of state corporate
law, upon which they may reasonably have relied.6 7 However, upon
closer examination, this alternative inquiry merely represents a short
cut of the Kimbell Foods analysis: it implicitly preempts the first
Kimbell Foods criterion by holding that dominant federal interests
are only present when Congress expressly declares them, and obliterates the third by holding that federal veil-piercing doctrines will invariably and inevitably disrupt commercial relationships based on
state law.
In contrast, courts that interpret Kimbell Foods to require specifically federal veil-piercing standards in appropriate situations take
a less myopic view in shaping these federal rules of decision. If a
statute and its legislative history are silent with respect to the problem of corporate form, these courts analyze the federal interests and
policies underlying the statute to shape a veil-piercing standard. 8
66. See, e.g., Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. La. 1988)
(stating that "the corporate form, including limited liability for shareholders, is a doctrine
firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence that may not be disregarded absent a specific
congressional directive"), aff d, 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990); DeBreceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing,
Inc., 828 F.2d 877, 880 (Ist Cir. 1987) (stating that "the principle of limited liability for
corporate debts is longstanding enough and important enough to be considered a background
norm, against which Congress may act of course, but which is controlling in the absence of
such action."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988).
67. Cf. Gibraltor Amusements, Ltd. v. Wurlitzer Co. (In re Gibraltor Amusements,
Ltd.), 291 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 925 (1961) (stating that "[i]f Congress meant to alter ordinary judicial rules governing corporations, it should have so provided
specifically.").
68. See Note, Liability of Parent Corporations,supra note 27, at 1001; Note, Piercing
the Veil, supra note 64. When legislative history has addressed directly the matter of corporate
form, however, courts have been known to rely upon this history. See, e.g., Bruhn's Freezer
Meats v. United States Dep't of Agric., 438 F.2d 1332, 1343 (8th Cir. 1971) (invoking legislative history to impose an injunction upon individual shareholders under the Packers and Stock-
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This approach demonstrates a more realistic view of the legislative
process, for congressional enactments simply cannot be expected to
fill in every possible gap, and it is certainly more calculated to ensure
the fulfillment of federal statutory policy.69
The Kimbell Foods-based veil-piercing analysis has now been
applied in a wide variety of statutory contexts. In almost all instances, federal veil-piercing doctrines have accorded a lesser degree
70
of respect to the corporate form than would parallel state doctrines.
In considering the appropriateness of shareholder liability to the federal government for unreimbursed overpayments to corporate Medicare"1 providers, for example, the Third Circuit held that a uniform
federal veil-piercing rule was proper in light of Medicare's policy of
paying health care providers only for the reasonable cost of services
rendered, and the undesirability of subjecting the federal government's rights concerning Medicare to shifting state law doctrines. 72
An overly strict doctrine transferred from state law, the court of apfulfillment of Medicare's policy of
peals reasoned, could 7impede
3
prompt reimbursement.
Similarly, several courts have applied Kimbell Foods to determine that a uniform federal common law rule is required to resolve
veil-piercing problems arising under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA").7 4 These courts have observed that attempts to ensure the
cleanup of toxic sites should not depend on the vagaries of state corporate law or the domiciles of particular defendants, and that a fedyards Act, 1921, ch. 64, § 1, 42 Stat. 159 (1921) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229 (1988))

[hereinafter "Packers and Stockyards Act"].
69. See Note, Piercingthe Veil, supra note 64, at 857, 858 (suggesting that this conservative approach "ignores legal realities" because courts must necessarily close "unintentional loopholes" left by Congress).

70. See Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1981); but see Audit
Services, Inc. v. Rolfson, 641 F.2d 757, 764 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that shareholder liability
could not be imposed under the LMRA even when Montana corporate law would permit it).

71.

"Medicare" is the common name for the Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub.

L. 89-97, Title I, 79 Stat. 291 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988 and 1990 Supp.)).

72. See United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 86-87 (3d Cir. 1981). Having announced
its intention to fashion a federal rule, however, the Pisani court proceeded to place heavy

reliance upon DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 687
(4th Cir. 1976), a diversity case in which South Carolina law was applied. See Pisani, 646
F.2d at 88; see also United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690 n.6 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986) (noting the Pisani court's error).
73. See Pisani,646 F.2d at 86.
74. Pub. L. 96-510, Title I, § 101, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 960175 (1988)). In the same manner, federal decisional rules have also been found applicable in

the admiralty context. See, e.g., Bergesen d.y. A/S v. Lindholm, 760 F. Supp. 976, 986-87 (D.
Conn. 1991).
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eral rule would not disrupt commercial relationships based on state
law because shareholder reliance on state law properly involves only
internal affairs, rather than its dealings with third
the corporation's
75
parties.
Even among the courts that recognize the appropriateness of
federal veil-piercing rules in federal question cases, however, there
are substantial differences in approach. Some courts attempt to fashion a general body of federal veil-piercing law, whose principles are
to be applied in all shareholder liability cases involving federal statutes, no matter what the actual federal statute at issue.76 Others
have attempted to devise more particularized legal tests that take
into account the specific policies of the particular statutes in
question.77
The former approach seems to misconstrue Kimbell Foods and
upset its balance of federal and state interests. Without attention to
the distinctions between different statutory contexts, federal courts
will necessarily ignore the nature and significance of state interests
in different areas of the law, thereby abdicating their obligation to
fulfill the policies of federal statutes and to carefully assess the impact of federal decisional rules upon commercial relationships that
rely on state law.7 8 More important, if a court determines that application of a state rule might undermine the specific policies of a particular federal statute, or that a particular federal statute places no
importance on the corporate form, it does not follow that a generic
federal veil-piercing rule will necessarily assuage those concerns. A
generic rule, after all, could be tailored to fit federal statutes that
lack these exceptional characteristics. Such insensitivity might also
eviscerate the crucial principle that piercing the veil in one context
does not eliminate its protections in other situations; imposition of
shareholder liability for one isolated federal violation could lead au75. See In re Acushnet River Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987); see
also United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); United States v.
Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988). For a careful discussion of recent developments in

the law of shareholder CERCLA liability, see Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F.
Supp. 345, 352-54 (D.N.J. 1991).

76. See, e.g., Orloff v. Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying a veilpiercing test developed in federal labor cases in the securities fraud context); see also Nicolet,
712 F. Supp. at 1202 (analyzing CERCLA liability under "general" federal common law, but

then proceeding to state a CERCLA-specific test as well).
77. See, e.g., Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1542-44 (W.D. Mich.
1989); Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1202 (suggesting a CERCLA-specific test); Acushnet, 675 F.
Supp. at 31 (same).

78. See Note, Piercing the Veil, supra note 64, at 864; see generally United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
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tomatically to liability for all federal violations, because the rule of
decision would be constant. 9
The better approach, therefore, is to fashion specific veil-piercing doctrines that pay attention to the particular federal statutory
policies involved. A veil might thus be pierced under one federal
statute but not under another; the shape of the rule would likely
depend on the importance of corporate form within a particular statutory framework. Part III, Section B, will develop this argument in
the labor context and contend that a strict veil-piercing doctrine that
seeks to protect corporate investors is especially inappropriate in the
context of the labor laws, which, unlike state corporations laws, are
not expressly designed to satisfy the needs of corporate investors.
2.

The Statutory FrustrationDoctrine

Problems of federalism also arise in the statutory frustration
doctrine, which holds that the fiction of corporate separateness must
not be permitted to frustrate the principles or policies of federal statutes, even in circumstances that would lead a court applying state
law to defer to the corporate form. The statutory frustration doctrine
has been applied in a wide variety of circumstances and under a panoply of federal statutes,80 most commonly through the extension of
79. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
80. For applications of the doctrine, see, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 795 F.2d 1040
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987) (applied to Department of
Energy regulations); West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 587 (W.D. Va. 1983) (applied to to
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. 90-321, Title VIII, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-6920 (1988)); United States v. Thomas, 515 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Tex.
1981) (applied to Medicare); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn.
1974), modified, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (applied to Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1151)) [hereinafter "Federal
Water Pollution Control Act"]; Zale Corp. v. FTC, 473 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1973) (applied to
Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. 90-321, Title I, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1600-667e) (1988)); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc.,
363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt.), affid, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974) (applied to Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988)); Casanova Guns, Inc. v.
Connolly, 454 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1972) (applied to Gun Control Act, Pub. L. 90-351, Title
IV, § 902, 82 Stat. 226 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-30 (1988)); Bruhn's Freezer
Meats v. Dep't of Agric. 438 F.2d 1332 (8th Cir. 1971) (applied to Packers and Stockyards
Act); H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of Treasury, 354 F.2d 819 (Ist Cir. 1965) (applied to the
Tariff Act of 1930, codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-654 (1988)); Kavanaugh v. Ford Motor Co.,
353 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1965) (applied to the Automobile Dealers' Franchise Act, ch. 1038, §
1, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1988)) [hereinafter "Automobile
Dealers' Franchise Act"]; Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (applied to the Robinson-Patman Act); Sell v. United States, 336 F.2d 467 (10th Cir.
1964) (applied to the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, ch. 704, § 2, 62 Stat. 1070
(1948) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1988)); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Benson, 232 F.2d
554 (2d Cir. 1956) (applied to the Commodity Exchange Act, Ch. 369, § 1, 42 Stat. 998
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injunctions to the owners of offending corporations, so as to bar
shareholders from simply incorporating new entities and continuing
8
unlawful conduct.
Federal courts have justified the statutory frustration doctrine
on the ground that state law protections of the corporate shield

should not necessarily stand in the way of veil-piercing under federal
3
law."2 As the Supreme Court announced in Anderson v. Abbott,

the lead case, a state "may choose such rules of limitation on the
liability of stockholders of her corporations as she desires ... [b]ut
no State may endow its corporate creatures with the power to place

themselves above the Congress of the United States and defeat the

federal policy .. . which Congress has announced." 84 Because the

states charter corporations, though, and deliberately shroud them
with limited liability for the purpose of encouraging business investment, the states do retain an interest in protecting the corporate entity when its integrity is challenged in state court.8 5 But federal
courts are obliged to enforce and vindicate federal statutes, not state

corporate law, and therefore need not defer to the states' attempts to
protect their corporations, if doing so would jeopardize the federal
86
courts' mission to enforce federal laws.
In its practical application, the statutory frustration doctrine

consistently involves a lesser degree of deference to the principle of
limited liability than does state corporate law. When federal courts
pierce the corporate veil on the ground of statutory frustration,
(1936) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1988)); Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326
U.S. 432 (1946) (per curiam) (applied to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 309
(1988)); Alabama Power Co. v. McNinch, 94 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (applied to the Federal Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1077 (1920) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 797
(1988)); FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112 (1937) (applied to the Federal
Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-77 (1988)).
For an interesting illustration of the genesis of the statutory frustration doctrine, see Linn
& Lane Timber Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 574 (1914) (Holmes, J.).
81. See, e.g., Bruhn's Freezer Meats, 438 F.2d at 1343 (extending an injunction to individual shareholders); H.P. Lambert, 354 F.2d at 822 (extending an injunction to a corporate
affiliate).
82. See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
83. 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
84. Id. at 365.
85. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085, 1093 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983) (arising in the ERISA context); Sebastopol Meat Co.
v. Secretary of Agric. 440 F.2d 983, 985 (9th Cir. 1971).
86. See Ouimet, 711 F.2d at 1093. However, some courts have failed to distinguish between these separate spheres. See, e.g., Connors v. P & M Coal Co., 801 F.2d 1373, 1377
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (referring to the principle of limited liability as a feature of "our" corporate
law and neglecting to observe that corporate law is a matter of state rather than federal law).
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therefore, the plaintiff's burden of proof may be substantially decreased, so that the veil will be pierced in cases where state common
law would almost certainly leave it intact.87
Although the statutory frustration doctrine has been developed
as a distinct ground for piercing the corporate veil, separate and
apart from application of the basic rule of decision that emerges
from choice-of-law analysis, the necessary inquiry is probably not
substantially different from that required under Kimbell Foods.88 In
practical terms, after all, there should be little difference between a
rule designed to advance certain statutory policies and a rule
designed to prevent their frustration. The statutory frustration doctrine may nonetheless permit shareholder liability more easily: several federal courts have interpreted the doctrine to allow veil-piercing whenever deference to the fiction of corporate separateness would
cause a statutory violation to go unremedied. A corporation's inability to pay a particular debt, therefore, might justify shareholder liability in and of itself.89 Courts engaging in choice-of-law analysis to
shape appropriate federal veil-piercing doctrines, in contrast, have
not yet expressed their willingness to enforce federal statutes with
comparable vigor.
On the other hand, some commentators have attempted to confine the statutory frustration doctrine by distinguishing "between the
situations in which a corporation is used in an attempt to evade a
federal policy and those in which it is used merely to take best advantage of legal options available to it." 90 In this more restrictive
view, courts should impose shareholder liability when "a violation of
federal law has resulted from an abuse of the corporate form," but
should not "use the violation as an excuse to justify piercing the corporate veil." 9' 1
87. See Comment, Circumvention of a Statute, supra note 51, at 1255; Contractors,
Laborers, Teamsters & Engineers Health & Welfare Plan v. Hroch, 757 F.2d 184, 191 (8th
Cir. 1985). Federal courts frequently refer to the inapplicability of "common law" principles
when they explain the statutory frustration doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (N.D. Ohio 1981); P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC,
427 F.2d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1971).
88. 440 U.S. 715 (1979); see United States v. Golden Acres, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1097,
1108 n.6 (D. Del. 1988), affd, 879 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that the statutory frustration "doctrine collapses to some extent into the Kimbell Foods choice-of-law analysis").
89. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 515 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (W.D. Tex. 1981);
United States v. Normandy House Nursing Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421, 425 (D. Mass.
1977).
90. Note, Piercingthe Veil, supra note 64, at 868.
91. Id. at 870; see United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021,
1039-40 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (suggesting that veil-piercing on the basis of statutory frustration is
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The case law does not present a coherent definition of statutory
frustration or a determinate analysis of when shareholder liability
should be imposed on this basis. At one extreme, shareholders have
been held accountable for corporate statutory violations when they
construct an artificial corporate structure that is deliberately and obviously designed for the express purpose of avoiding particular statutory obligations or prohibitions.9 2 But the doctrine is clearly not limited to these extreme cases; courts have repeatedly held that a veil
may be pierced to protect federal statutory policy even when the record contains no evidence of actual intent to circumvent the statute."
Although its theoretical underpinnings are clear, the doctrine itself is
not well defined, and, like many other veil-piercing doctrines, it often
appears as a rationalization rather than an explanation for the imposition of shareholder liability.
Other cases appear to have taken a substantially broader view
of the statutory frustration principle, holding that a corporation's
mere inability to satisfy obligations imposed by statute is sufficient to
permit a creditor to turn to the defaulting corporation's shareholders.
Such a principle modifies the common law rather substantially, for
the traditional rule is firm that insolvency alone does not provide a
ground for veil-piercing.94
This broader interpretation of the statutory frustration doctrine
has been adopted in a number of recent cases, arising under a variety of federal statutes. Several decisions have held that when a corporate health care provider's insolvency renders it unable to reimburse the federal government for Medicare services for which the
only appropriate where the corporate form is used to indirectly accomplish what otherwise
would be prohibited and illegal).
92. See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. Ford Motor Co., 353 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1965). In Kavanaugh, Ford structured a dealer franchise agreement with the plaintiff dealer so that the
franchise was actually held by a dummy intermediate corporation controlled by Ford. When
the plaintiff later brought suit alleging violations of the Automobile Dealers' Franchise Act,
Ford contended that the intermediate corporation was the actual franchisee and that the plaintiff therefore lacked standing to sue under the Act. The Seventh Circuit rejected Ford's argument, holding that "the totality of facts reasonably supports the inference that the corporate
format was deliberately adopted in order to defeat the legislative purpose" of the Act. Id. at
717. Ford's liability was proper because, regardless of intent, the format, if given recognition,
would effectively insulate Ford from liability under the Act, insofar as the Ford-controlled
intermediary would obviously never sue Ford. Id.
93. Id. at 717 ("[i]ntention is not controlling when the fiction of corporate entity defeats
a legislative purpose"); but see Note, Piercing the Veil, supra note 64, at 868 (proposing a
more intent-oriented test that considers "whether the corporation was created for a legitimate
business purpose or primarily for evasion of a federal policy or statute").
94. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Matthew R. White Invs. Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1054, 1057 (D.
Utah 1987).
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corporation had previously overcharged, this failure to pay constitutes a frustration of one of Medicare's central policies - that the
government is not overcharged for services rendered - such that
shareholder liability is appropriate.95 Similarly, it has been held that
a corporation's failure to pay back a government-sponsored mortgage
for the construction of low-income housing improperly diverts federal
assets and frustrates the federal housing laws, which were adopted to
benefit inadequately housed citizens, not real estate developers.96 Finally, courts have imposed sweeping shareholder liability under federal environmental statutes, suggesting that insolvency alone may
corporate veil under the Fedprovide a sufficient basis to pierce 9the
7
Act.
Control
Pollution
eral Water
Although the Medicare cases have been most explicit in characterizing a corporation's mere failure to pay what it owes as a frustration of statutory policy, Medicare is not distinguishable from the
panoply of federal programs that may require reimbursement or
other payments to the federal government.9" Nor is there a significant policy justification for limiting the doctrine to cases in which
insolvent corporations leave the federal government out of pocket,
while ignoring other situations in which payment is required to satisfy clear federal objectives, such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's ("ERISA") goal of assuring adequately funded
95. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 515 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (W.D. Tex. 1981);
United States v. Normandy House Nursing Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421, 425 (D. Mass.

1977). Other similar Medicare cases have relied on state corporate law and have thus not
developed the statutory frustration doctrine, although they have pierced the veil of particular

corporate defendants. See Woodland Nursing Home v. Harris, 514 F. Supp. !10 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp. & Rehabilitation Ctr., Inc.,
511 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal. 1981).

96. See United States v. Golden Acres, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1097, 1107-08 (D. Del.
1988), affd, 879 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1989) (contending that a diversion of federal housing funds

to the shareholders of insolvent corporate debtors would "result[] in a diminution of assets that
would otherwise have been available to pay other

. . .

claims, make emergency repairs, and

advance funds to protect other [federal] projects" and "would fly in the face of

.

. . clear

legislative policy"). The Golden Acres court noted, however, that the broadly interpreted stat-

utory frustration doctrine has not generally provided the exclusive basis for veil-piercing decisions. 702 F. Supp. at 1108 n.6.

97. See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 28 (D. Minn.
1974), modified, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting the insolvency of the offending subsidiary as one of several reasons to pierce its parent's veil and impose liability under the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act); see also Valley Finance Co. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162,
171-72 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that "the [federal] Government's inability otherwise to satisfy legitimate tax debts clearly may form a sound basis for . . . disregard of corporate
form."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981).
98. See Comment, Circumvention of a Statute, supra note 51, at 1263.
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pensions. 99 Accordingly, this article contends in Part III, Section B
that the federal labor laws should be protected from frustration by

the imposition of liability on certain classes of shareholders whenever
a labor law violation would otherwise go unremedied.
II.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW: LABOR LAW VEIL
PIERCING DOCTRINES

The problem of limited corporate liability has arisen in a wide
range of labor contexts. Although the fiction of corporate separateness is generally respected in labor cases, specialized veil-piercing
doctrines have been developed under each of the various federal labor laws to tackle the diverse legal problems that arise in different
statutory contexts.1 0 In most cases, however, courts have adapted to
all federal labor statutes the veil-piercing doctrines developed under
the NLRA, applying principles developed by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and by courts deciding NLRA cases. The
NLRA doctrines have therefore been widely used to resolve veilpiercing problems arising under both other statutes that implicate
collective bargaining, such as ERISA and the Labor Management
Relations Act ("LMRA"), and laws that involve individual employment rights, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Ti99. However, certain commentators have suggested such a limitation. Id. at 1270.
100. Individual shareholder liability has also been imposed under most of the federal
labor statutes on the ground that a particular individual falls within the statutory definition of
"employer" and thus shares statutory obligations with the corporation itself. See, e.g., Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1983) (imposing liability for FLSA violations upon an
individual shareholder as an "employer" within the meaning of FLSA Section 3(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(d) (1988)). In these circumstances, liability is imposed without evidence of abuse of
corporate form, as would be required in a traditional veil-piercing analysis based on corporate
law principles. Here, rather, the "corporate veil [i]s,
in effect, pierced by Congress" when the
legislature enacts statutes containing such broad definitions. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085, 1093 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983) (ERISA
context). Although the application and interpretation of these definitions is of considerable
importance, the inquiry tends to focus upon close statutory analysis rather than the nexus of
labor law and corporate law, and accordingly falls outside the scope of this article.
See P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUP PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION § 1.01.4 (1989)

(describing such interpretations as examples of "enterprise law," by which courts follow statutory instruction to consider the reality of economic relationships, rather than pursuing traditional "entity law" and deferring to formal distinctions, such as the fiction of separateness
between corporations and their owners). Although Blumberg is appropriately critical of the
judiciary's inordinate deference to notions of "entity law," id. at 13, he overstates the degree to
which existing labor law veil-piercing doctrines have followed an alternative course, guided by
"enterprise law" principles. Id. As shown below, almost all such existing doctrines proceed
from traditional assumptions and demonstrate an overwhelming degree of deference to the
common law conception of the corporation.
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tle VII") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA").
As this pattern of deference to the NLRA would suggest, the
federal courts have not properly fulfilled their responsibility to develop veil-piercing doctrines that are sensitive to the purposes and
policies of the different federal labor statutes. Although all the federal labor laws involve workers' rights of one kind or another, their
purposes and policies are rather less than identical, and doctrines
that vindicate one statute might not necessarily serve another. Moreover, when courts have chosen not to apply specialized NLRA doctrines, most of them have failed to analyze the relationship between
corporate law principles and labor law policy, and have relied instead
on generic veil-piercing doctrines, either derived from state law or
from an undifferentiated mass of federal common law.
More important, neither the NLRB nor the federal courts have
ever taken their veil-piercing inquiries back to its foundation by considering whether the limited liability doctrine makes any real sense
in the labor context. Instead, serious analysis of the function of limited shareholder liability is almost nonexistent, and the underlying
principle of corporate separateness is consistently accepted without
question, despite the apparent irrelevance of state corporate law and
the persuasiveness of academic arguments concerning the doctrine's
limited usefulness. These omissions are especially inappropriate in
view of the special role of federal labor law in the American legal
system: to some extent at least, this body of law is one that operates
as a challenge to the ordinary rules of capitalism, for which unthinking deference to capitalist legal rules - such as corporate law doctrine - is inappropriate. 10 1
A.

The National Labor Relations Act

The NLRA, which defines the rights of workers to organize and
fixes the entitlements of their unions, is America's central labor
law.102 Largely because of this historical and political primacy,
NLRA veil-piercing doctrines have become widely accepted in other
labor law contexts.
101. See Klare, Judicial Deradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 285 (1978) (suggesting that the
NLRA's "plain language was susceptible to an overtly anticapitalist interpretation" and that
the NLRA "by its terms apparently accorded a governmental blessing to powerful workers'
organizations that were to acquire equal bargaining power with corporations, accomplish a
redistribution of income, and subject the workplace to a regime of participatory democracy.").
102. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol9/iss1/3

26

McLeod: Shareholders' Liability and Workers' Rights: Piercing the Corpora
Piercingthe Corporate Veil

1991]

Almost immediately upon the passage of the NLRA in 1935,
the NLRB and the federal courts reviewing its decisions began to
fashion doctrines by which individual shareholders or nominally separate enterprises could be held responsible for corporate NLRA violations.1"3 Imposition of individual shareholder liability under the
NLRA has nevertheless been relatively rare, and the applicable legal
principles have not been exhaustively considered. Over time, however, and especially in the last two decades, doctrines that regulate
intercorporate NLRA liability - by which liability is imposed upon
parent corporations or other enterprises linked to an offending corporation by common ownership - have received substantial attention
and ignited serious controversy.
1. IntercorporateLiability
Under the NLRA, liability for a corporation's obligations is
generally imposed upon an affiliated enterprise through the operation
of two related but nonetheless distinct theories, the "single employer" and "alter ego" doctrines. Although both these doctrines
may be traced back to the early years of the NLRA, their importance has grown dramatically in recent years with the rapid rise of
the practice known as "double-breasting," by which employers, particularly construction contractors, divide their operations into two
nominally separate business enterprises, one unionized and the other
non-union, for the announced purpose of competing in different markets, but often with the intent of defeating unionization.'0 Largely
103. The NLRA was originally passed in 1935 as the Wagner Act and was amended in
1947, 1959, and 1974. As used in this article, the term "NLRA" includes the original Wagner

Act and all amendments thereto.
All cases involving violations of the NLRA pass through the NLRB in the first instance,
but NLRB orders are only enforced with the concurrence of the courts of appeals and, through

the exercise of its ordinary discretionary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court. See NLRA § 10, 29
U.S.C. § 160 (1988). Although NLRB cases thus provide the foundation of NLRA law, court
decisions are often of considerable importance as well. Pursuant to its general power to interpret and enforce the NLRA, "the NLRB has been vested with primary authority to determine

those situations in which 'piercing the corporate veil' to hold [shareholders] liable for [their
corporations'] misdeeds is necessary and appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the federal

labor laws." Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 753 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing NLRB v.
Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 403 (1960)); but see NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer &
Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 343 (6th Cir. 1990) (Engel, J., concurring) (suggesting that the
NLRB's rulings concerning shareholder liability are not entitled to the same judicial deference

as its rulings concerning NLRA interpretation).
See also P. BLUMBERG, supra note 100, at sections 13.01-13.18 (discussing generally the
veil-piercing doctrine under the NLRA and the LMRA).
104. See Comment, Dual Companies - When Does a Union Have the Right to Expanded Representation?, 12 U.S.F. L. REv. 89, 89 (1977)(advancing a management-oriented
explanation of double-breasting); see also Pleasure & Gorman, Extension of Bargaining
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because the NLRB and reviewing courts have proceeded from common law assumptions about the sanctity of corporate form, doublebreasting is not inherently illegal under existing NLRA doctrine. Intercorporate NLRA liability is instead only imposed when the two
enterprises become overwhelmingly integrated - something that
may be easily avoided with a modicum of employer care. Similarly,
although existing NLRA law purports to protect workers from manipulations of corporate form that transform unionized employers
into non-union enterprises, the present doctrines incorporate common
law assumptions so systematically that proper legal advice may easily facilitate such improper machinations.
a.

The "Single Employer" Doctrine

The long-established NLRA "single employer" doctrine seeks to
determine whether two or more nominally independent enterprises
are sufficiently intertwined that they should be considered a single
"employer" for NLRA purposes. In applying this doctrine, the
NLRB and reviewing courts consider four basic factors: interrelation
of the enterprises' operations; common management; centralized control of labor relations; and common ownership. 105 No one factor is
10 8
determinative, however, and not all need necessarily be shown.
Centralized control of labor relations is usually deemed the most important criterion; 0 7 indeed, it has sometimes been held that a showing of such centralized control is an absolutely necessary element of
a "single employer" finding. 0 8
Rights and Contracts to Single Employer and Alter Ego Entities in the Construction Industry, 1984 LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 213, 213-14 (advancing a union-oriented explanation).
Double-breasting generally involves the formation of a "brother" and a "sister" corporation,
each owned by the same individual shareholders. See generally Befort, Labor Law and the
Double-BreastedEmployer: A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter Ego Doctrines and
a Proposed Reformulation, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 67, 68. The following discussion assumes this
structure, but legal analysis is unaffected if the double-breasting scheme is actually designed
with the two companies as subsidiaries of a common parent, or with one breast as the parent of
the other. The "single employer" doctrine does not pay attention to the fact of corporate form,
and may be applied against unincorporated and incorporated enterprises alike. In the vast
majority of cases, however, the enterprises in question are in fact corporations, and the operation of the doctrine therefore usually involves substantial veil-piercing issues.
105. See Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam); see also Befort, supra note 104,
at 75 (describing the history of the "single employer" doctrine).
106. See, e.g., NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 384 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979).
107. See, e.g., J.M. Tanaka Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir.
1982).
108. Cf. Drukker Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that to impose liability under an "integrated enterprise [i.e. "single employer"] theory, the
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The "single employer" doctrine is ordinarily used to hold employers liable for the unfair labor practices of other, nominally inde-

pendent enterprises, but it has also been invoked to determine
whether or not union picketing is directed at a neutral "secondary"

employer, 10 9 whether a union may properly seek to represent the employees of two enterprises in a single bargaining unit,1 0 or whether

an employer charged with an unfair labor practice employs enough
workers to satisfy the NLRB's jurisdictional limits."' Application of
the doctrine is similar in each of these different situations." 2
In most unfair labor practice contexts, application of the "single
employer" doctrine to impose liability upon a second enterprise is
relatively straightforward. The second employer, for example, may
easily be required to pay back wages to employees improperly dis-

charged because of union activity. 3 However, when the unfair labor
practice involves the second entity's failure to bargain with the union
in good faith - the posture of the typical double-breasting case the situation is more complex." 4 Even when the NLRB finds that
two entities constitute a "single employer," they will not necessarily

be bound to each other's collective bargaining agreements. Rather,
before the NLRB orders the second company to bargain with the

first company's union and accept its labor contracts, the NLRB is
required to consider the sentiments of the second company's

employees."

5

[NLRB] must find that the parent involved itself in the labor relations of its subsidiary.")
(emphasis added). Id. at 735.
109. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 764 F.2d 234 (4th Cir.
1985) (holding that two entities were not a "single employer" and that a union's picketing of
the second company therefore constituted a secondary boycott in violation of NLRA Section
8(b)(4)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(d) (1988)); UFCW Local 1439, 271 N.L.R.B. 754, 756
(1984) (same).
110. See, e.g., Safety Elec. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 40 (1978).
111. See, e.g., Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam); Sakrete, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d
902 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
112. But see Befort, supra note 104, at 76 (contending that the NLRB has often demanded a stronger showing of commonly controlled labor relations in its secondary boycott
"single employer" cases).
113. Such discrimination in hiring and firing is prohibited by NLRA Section 8(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988), and may be remedied by, among other things, an award of
backpay, as offset by interim earnings from other employment.
114. This obligation is imposed by NLRA Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1988). NLRA cases involving double-breasting typically proceed from an allegation that a
non-union breast violated Section 8(a)(5) by failing to hire employees from a union hiring hall
or to pay certain wages and benefits, and thus deviated from the terms and conditions of
employment fixed by the union breast's collective bargaining agreement with the union.
115. See, e.g., Carpenters Local 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 507 (5th
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Instead of conducting an election, however, the NLRB considers
these sentiments indirectly, by inquiring as to whether the employees
of the two entities together constitute a single appropriate bargaining
unit.116 If and only if such a single unit is found will the non-union
entity be required to bargain with the union and accept its affiliate's
collective bargaining agreement. In making this bargaining unit determination, the NLRB considers a variety of factors, including the
various parties' bargaining history, the functional integration of the
two entities' operations, the differences in the employees' work and
skills, the extent of contact between the two groups of employees,
and the degree of centralization of management and supervision particularly with respect to day-to-day operations and labor and personnel relations.' 17 Through this inquiry, the NLRB seeks to determine the similarity of concerns between the two companies' employees - so as to protect their right to choose or decline union
representation" 8 - while the initial "single employer" analysis only
seeks to determine the interrelatedness of the employers.'"
Despite the complexity of the "single employer" theory, and its
substantial deviation from common law veil-piercing analysis,
neither the NLRB nor the courts reviewing its decisions has ever
properly considered whether the doctrine provides an appropriate
mechanism for resolving problems of intercorporate liability under
the NLRA. Indeed, examination of NLRB and court "single employer" cases reveals that problems of federalism and the necessity
of preventing statutory frustration have been ignored entirely. The
NLRB has never recognized that its power to fashion appropriate
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983).

116. See South Prairie Const. Co. v. Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425
U.S. 800, 805-06 (1976) (per curiam). This determination must be made by the NLRB in the
first instance, rather than by a reviewing court. Id.
117. See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 76, 77 (1977), enforced sub nom., Local
627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Prior to the
seminal Kiewit decision, the NLRB's bargaining unit inquiry in "single employer" cases was
usually fairly perfunctory, such that a "single employer" determination was almost certain to
result in a finding of a single appropriate bargaining unit. See Comment, Double-Breasted
Operationsin the ConstructionIndustry: A Search For Concrete Guidelines,6 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 45, 56 (1981). Since Kiewit, however, "[t]he unit question [has been] approached as if
the [NLRB] were dealing with a pristine, run-of-the-mill representation case rather than viewing it against the documented backdrop of an employer 'running' from his contract." King &
LaVaute, Current Trends in Construction Industry Labor Relations - The Double-Breasted
Contractor and the Prehire Contract, 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 901, 916 (1978).
118. The original Wagner Act only guaranteed employees the right to choose unioniza-

tion. The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments provided the additional "right" to decline unionization. See NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
119. See Carpenters Local Union 1846, 690 F.2d at 505-07.
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veil-piercing doctrines need not be restricted by state law limitations,
or that veil-piercing doctrines developed for NLRA purposes have no
bearing on veil-piercing in other circumstances. The early formulations of the "single employer" doctrine, which have never been substantially modified, evidenced overwhelming reliance on traditional
common law conceptions of the corporation, and when the NLRB
has looked beyond NLRA precedent for guidance in subsequent
cases, it has relied solely upon state corporate law doctrines and
scholarly analysis of those doctrines. 120 Accordingly, the "single employer" doctrine is best considered an application of common law
principles in the labor context, rather than a measured development
of an NLRA-specific veil-piercing doctrine.12
Because the NLRB has accepted rigid common law constraints
in fashioning its "single employer" doctrine, it has never seriously
considered developing a rule that would hold all commonly owned
corporations liable for each other's unfair labor practices. 22 Indeed,
the NLRB has gone so far as to state that the fact that two nominally independent entities share common ownership - and, concomitantly, hold the ability to control each other's day-to-day affairs is not even "a factor to be accorded weight" in considering the imposition of liability upon the putatively separate affiliate. 23 As argued
below, the NLRB and federal courts should reject these false constraints and undertake a more sophisticated veil-piercing analysis
that looks to protect the policies of the NLRA rather than deferring
to irrelevant state law interests.
These inadequacies would be of merely academic concern if the
"single employer" doctrine were nonetheless sufficient to protect
NLRA policies. In fact, however, the doctrine is now of very limited
practical use, because the NLRB's rigid four-part "single employer"
inquiry and unrealistic bargaining unit analysis exalt form over sub120.

See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 597, 614 (1973) (stating, "Both

legal scholars and state courts have

. . .

noted when considering the basic rationale behind

[veil-piercing] determinations that sole or dominant ownership, without more, will not warrant

a determination that one business entity should be held liable for conduct arguably chargeable
to another.").
121. See, e.g., Sargent v. McGrath, 685 F. Supp. 1087, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (Title
VII context) (noting that the "single employer" doctrine is based on "ordinary principles of

corporate law").
122. See, e.g., Western Union Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 274, 275 (1976), enforced sub nom.,
United Tel. Workers v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827 (1978);

see also Drukker Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 727, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that NLRB findings of common ownership and management between a parent and subsidi-

ary "are inadequate to sustain the conclusion of liability" for the parent).
123.

UFCW Local No. 1439, 271 N.L.R.B. 754, 756 (1984).
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stance to such a degree that an employer seeking to escape its union
obligations may easily do so with the aid of elementary legal advice.124 If the two "breasts" maintain separate financial records,

charge each other market prices for services, and assure that separate individuals are assigned responsibility for each breast's labor relations and general management, the NLRB is overwhelmingly
likely to find that the entities are separate employers, even when the
circumstances manifest a deliberate and obvious attempt by the employer to circumvent its union obligations. 12 And even when "single
employer" status is found, so as to prompt a bargaining unit inquiry,
almost any distinction between the two employee groups will lead the
NLRB to hold that separate bargaining units are appropriate, 2 '
even if the distinction is the consequence of attorney-instigated manipulation or a reflection of the inherent differences between union
and non-union employees.1 27 As a result, the collective bargaining
124. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 104, at 71. As a result of this manipulability, union
advocates have argued that the formalistic "single employer" analysis should be jettisoned in
favor of the somewhat more flexible and realistic "alter ego" analysis. See, e.g., ORGANIZER'S
HANDBOOK 152 (Bldg. & Const. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO) (E. Gorman & M. Gittler eds.
1991). In contrast, this article contends that a broader doctrine of per se liability is warranted
to ensure that NLRA policies are not frustrated. See infra Part III. See infra Part III.
See NLRB v. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d 608, 609 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming an NLRB
"alter ego" finding and refusing to "waste ink on a boring recitation of [the respondent's]
sophomoric attempt to use a corporate shell to avoid contractual liability.").
125. See, e.g., Frank N. Smith Assoc's. 194 N.L.R.B. 212, 218-19 (1971); Gerace Constr., Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 645, 645-46 (1971); see also Befort, supra note 104, at 86 (explaining
the defects of the existing "single employer" doctrine).
126. See, e.g., Alabama Metal Prods., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 1090, 1097 (1986) (finding
substantial integration of operations between two enterprises, but dismissing an unfair labor
practice complaint because the physical distance between them rendered separate bargaining
units appropriate); Gerace, 193 N.L.R.B. at 646 (refusing to find "single employer" status
because of the absence of employee interchange).
127. For example, the NLRB and courts have held that "[t]he frequency of employee
interchange" is "a 'critical factor' in ascertaining a community of interest among employees."
NLRB v. Carson Cable TV, 795 F.2d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Spring City Knitting
Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1981)). If interchange is artificially minimized,
the NLRB will likely designate separate bargaining units. See Gerace, 193 N.L.R.B. at 646.
More disturbingly, separate bargaining units may be found appropriate based on differences in
the complexity of the work performed by the two employee groups, even when these differences
are necessary concomitants of the difference between the higher-skill unionized construction
market and the lower-skill non-union market. See, e.g., Edenwald Constr. Co., 294 N.L.R.B.
No. 22, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1732, 1733 (1989) (finding two separate bargaining units appropriate, despite a "single employer" finding, when the union company's employees did "complicated" work on heavy equipment and the non-union employees did less demanding work on
smaller equipment); NLRB v. DMR Corp., 699 F.2d 788, 792 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 852 (1983) (suggesting that separate bargaining units would be appropriate when one
company's employees worked on (high-skill) industrial electrical projects and the other's on
(low-skill) residential projects). The NLRB has even found a single bargaining unit inappropriate because the non-union employees received lesser wages and benefits than the union em-
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agreement will not be applied to the non-union breast, thus rendering the underlying "single employer" finding essentially meaningless,

and the employer will achieve its objective of avoiding unionization.
Workers'

rights under

the NLRA, meanwhile, are

seriously

frustrated.
b.

The "Alter Ego" Doctrine

The "alter ego" doctrine is substantially similar in form to the

"single employer" doctrine, but its purpose is fundamentally differ-

ent. Where the "single employer" doctrine considers the functional
integration of operations between different entities, "the focus of the
alter ego doctrine ... is on the existence of a disguised continuance

or an attempt to avoid the obligations of a collective bargaining
agreement through a sham transaction or technical change in opera-

tions." 128 As a result of this focus, "alter ego" analysis tends to assess the totality of the relationship between different entities rather

than follow the 29formalistic, checklist approach of the "single em1
ployer" inquiry.
In determining whether a second corporation is the "alter ego"
of another, the NLRB and reviewing courts consider whether the

two entities share substantially identical ownership, business purposes, operation, equipment, customers, and managerial and supervisory structure.1 30 Although these criteria are akin to those consid-

ered in "single employer" cases, the NLRB has generally been
careful to distinguish between the "single employer" and "alter ego"

doctrines, even if reviewing courts have sometimes been less
precise."'
ployees - presumably the precise purpose of setting up the non-union breast. See Image Convention Servs., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 1036, 1038 (1988); see also ORGANIZER's HANDBOOK,
supra note 124, at 148.
128. Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 508
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983); see also Southport Petroleum Co. v.
NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942) (approving the imposition of "alter ego" liability upon a
new corporation that was the "disguised continuance of the old employer" rather than the
result of "a bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership.").
129. See ORGANIZER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 124, at 153-57.
130. See, e.g., Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1310 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984); NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 553-54 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984); Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1144,
1144 (1976).
The "alter ego" doctrine may be applied when the business entities in question are not
incorporated, and may also be applied to hold individuals liable if they establish unincorporated businesses in a manner that suggests "alter ego" status. See NLRB v. Dane County
Dairy, 795 F.2d 1313, 1322 (7th Cir. 1986).
131. Compare, e.g., Alabama Metal Prods., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 1090, 1095 (1986) (not-
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However, both the NLRB and the courts consistently recognize
one key difference between the two doctrines: unlike a "single employer," an "alter ego" is automatically bound to the other entity's

collective bargaining agreements, without the need for a full-scale
bargaining unit determination. 13 2 Because of this important consequence of an "alter ego" finding, the NLRB has occasionally suggested that a stronger showing is required for the imposition of "alter ego" liability than for a determination of "single employer"
status. 133
Although "alter ego" cases typically arise when one corporation
completely ceases operations and a new corporation appears in its
place, 34 the NLRB and most courts have held that the doctrine
should not be restricted to this factual context.13 5 In particular,
double-breasts may be considered "alter egos" in appropriate circumstances, as when both companies coexist and perform similar
ing that the most important "single employer" criterion - centralized control of labor relations - is generally inapplicable in the "alter ego" context, because in most "alter ego" situations "there are no simultaneously existing entities over which centralized control of labor
relations may be exercised") with Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 754 (7th Cir. 1989)
(suggesting that "one corporation is the alter ego of another where the factors necessary to
support a 'single employer' finding are met and, in addition, the [NLRB] finds that the second
corporation was a 'disguised continuance' of the employing enterprise. . . ."). But cf., A.

Dariano & Sons, Inc. v. District Council of Painters No. 33, 869 F.2d 514, 519 (9th Cir.
1989) (LMRA context) (holding that the "alter ego" and "single employer" inquiries are
sufficiently similar and that an "alter ego" finding may not be sustained where the NLRB has
previously decided that no "single employer" relationship exists). The NLRB may be shifting
its analysis somewhat, however, and beginning to consider the "alter ego" doctrine an "extension" of the "single employer" doctrine. See Befort, supra note 104, at 92.
132. See, e.g., Al Bryant, 711 F.2d at 550; Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d
18, 26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983). In the "alter ego" context, the NLRB
need only determine that the bargaining unit that results from merging the two companies'
employees is not "repugnant to any policy embodied in the NLRA." Carpenters Local Union
No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc,, 690 F.2d 489, 509 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
932 (1983). This distinction between the two doctrines has been explained on the ground that
an "alter ego" "is in reality the same employer." Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local, Hotel
& Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (1974).
133. See, e.g., Victor Valley Heating & Air Conditioning, 267 N.L.R.B. 1292, 1296
(1983); but see Befort, supra note 104, at 93 (suggesting that despite the NLRB's stated
position that "alter ego" status is more difficult to establish than a "single employer" relationship, "the alter ego doctrine as applied in practice is clearly the less rigorous of the two
standards.").
134. See Alabama Metal Products, 280 N.L.R.B. at 1095.
135. See Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 238 (8th Cir.
1986) (LMRA context) (stating that "[t]o limit the ["alter ego"] doctrine's applicability to
companies which have shut down entirely would allow anti-union employers a complete escape
from alter ego liability, simply by keeping a small aspect of the predecessor operation alive.").
The "single employer" doctrine, however, is normally applied against companies that operate
simultaneously. See Gilroy Sheet Metal, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1075 n.l (1986).
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services, but fail to deal with each other at arms' length, such as by
maintaining below-market rental agreements and other unrealistic

business arrangements. 136 In the most common of these alternative
scenarios, an existing union operation will be kept137alive but slowly

starved to death by a parasitic non-union affiliate.
A more substantial difference of opinion has developed with respect to the problem of employer intent: several courts have suggested that an "alter ego" finding is only valid when the NLRB
demonstrates that the employer formed the alleged "alter ego" with

an anti-union motivation. 8 The NLRB itself has wavered on this
point.139 The Fourth Circuit has taken the most restrictive position,
136. See Dist. 23, United Mine Workers, 271 N.L.R.B. 461, 461 n.1 (1984).
137. In this context, courts have disagreed as to whether evidence that work was transferred from the union breast to the non-union breast is required before liability can be imposed. See, e.g., NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 553 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1039 (1984) (holding that such evidence is not necessarily required).
138. Compare Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1310 (8th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984) and Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18,
26 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983) (showing of anti-union animus required)
with NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986) and Goodman Piping Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (no such showing
necessary); see also Comment, Bargaining Obligations After Corporate Transformations, 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 639 (1979) ("for an alter ego finding ... the employer must act from
anti-union animus").
The "substantially identical ownership" criterion of the "alter ego" inquiry has also
proved controversial. Some courts have held that the NLRB need not necessarily demonstrate
common ownership, while others have refused to enforce Board orders when common ownership is absent. Compare Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1420 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (per curiam) (stating that "common ownership is not an absolute prerequisite to a finding of alter ego status") and J.M. Tanaka Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029, 1035 (9th
Cir. 1982) (same) with Haley & Haley, Inc. v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam) (holding that consideration of common ownership is "a threshold determination"
that "must be made in every alter ego case") and Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 576 v.
NLRB, 663 F.2d 223, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same). The NLRB has held that overlapping
ownership of just under twenty percent is not substantial enough to sustain an "alter ego"
finding, but it does not require complete identity of ownership between the old and new entities. See Oklahoma City Eastern Express, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 921, 925 (1986). Although insistence on a showing of common ownership makes superficial sense in that a successor employer
that acquires another company through a legitimate, arms' length transaction is not generally
bound to a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, see Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit
Local Joint Executive Board, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249
(1974). It makes no sense at all where unlawful motivation is found. Moreover, even a genuinely independent successor is required to bargain with its predecessor's union, even when it is
not bound by the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, whereas a failure to find common ownership in an "alter ego" case will generally permit the new entity to escape bargaining
obligations altogether. Even if an alternative claim of successorship were made, see NLRB v.
Burns Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), the new entity would probably avoid the
bargaining obligation if, as is usually the case, it did not hire the predecessor's employees after
it jettisoned the unionized workforce.
139. Compare Kenton Transfer Co., 298 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) I 111,
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demanding evidence that "the transfer [of the old company's operations to the new company] resulted in an expected or reasonably
foreseeable benefit to the old employer related to the elimination of
its labor obligations" before the court would prevent the old employer "from arranging its affairs as it sees fit."' 140
Even if an employer is found to have acted with an anti-union
motivation, an "alter ego" determination will not necessarily result if
the new entity effects sufficient separation under the remaining "alter ego" criteria.1 41 Therefore, as with the "single employer" doctrine, management lawyers may avoid "alter ego" liability for their
clients through careful structuring of the two operations, even when
the resulting differences are the natural consequences of the 142
new
company's deliberate strategy to operate on a non-union basis.
Moreover, as in its "single employer" cases, the NLRB has
failed to develop a broad rule of intercorporate "alter ego" liability,
and relying on principles of state corporate law, has expressly held
that shared ownership of predecessor and successor corporations will
not, in and of itself, permit an "alter ego" finding. 43 Once again, the
NLRB's refusal to impose a per se rule of intercorporate liability is
the unfortunate consequence of the agency's failure to consider the
range of its discretion in fashioning veil-piercing rules for the exclusive purpose of NLRA enforcement, and its unjustified deference to
irrelevant state corporate law doctrines. 4
1112

(1990) (suggesting that in "alter ego" cases the NLRB "often" considers "whether there

was an unlawful motivation for establishing the second entity,") with 0. Voorhees Painting
Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 779, 780 (1985) (contending that "the Board must consider the purpose
behind the creation of the alleged alter ego.")(emphasis added).

140.

Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1020-21 (4th Cir. 1983). More recently, however,

the Fourth Circuit appears to have modified its interpretation of Alkire. See NLRB v. McAl-

lister Bros., Inc., 819 F.2d 439, 445 n.14 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[tihe imposition of
alter-ego status . . . does not hinge on proof that the employer intended to evade the labor
laws.").
141. See Image Convention Servs. Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 1036, 1039 n.10 (1988) (refusing
to impose "alter ego" liability on a company that acquired the assets of a predecessor through

a suspicious insider transaction, because there were sufficient distinctions between the two enterprises' operations).

142. For example, employers have argued that two companies are not "substantially
identical" if one does business in the high dollar volume, high-skill union construction market
and the other in the low dollar volume, low-skill non-union sector. But see Haley & Haley,
Inc. v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (rejecting this argument and
holding that "[a]chievement of the proscribed purpose of an alter ego transfer cannot be used

to support a finding that the two companies are distinct.").
143.

See Parklane Hosiery Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 597, 614 (1973).

144. To a certain extent, of course, the "alter ego" doctrine does constitute a limited
application of the statutory frustration doctrine, in that it prohibits a wrongdoer from continuing in the same business under a different corporate name. See Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d
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c. Common Law Theories
Despite the development of the specialized "single employer"
and "alter ego" doctrines, a variety of more traditional veil-piercing
theories also remain available under the NLRA, and the NLRB has
been granted wide latitude to apply these theories. These modifications of common law doctrine are particularly appropriate in the
context of parent-subsidiary relationships, especially when the entities in question are large-scale enterprises that are unlikely to
achieve the overwhelming degree of functional integration required
to support a "single employer" or "alter ego" determination, but
when the parent may nonetheless have controlled certain operations
of the subsidiary or interfered in particular transactions.
In NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 45 the Supreme Court held

that the NLRB may properly impose liability upon a parent based
on common law veil-piercing principles. Citing familiar corporate
law doctrines, the Court ruled that intercorporate liability would be
appropriate when a parent's "'dominion'" over the subsidiary is
"'complete'" or its "'interference... obtrusive,'" when the subsidiary is "operated as a division of" the parent, when the subsidiary is
"only a shell, inadequately financed," or when "the affairs of the
[corporate] group [are] so intermingled that no distinct corporate
lines are maintained.' 46
Unfortunately, the underlying NLRB order that the Court affirmed in Deena Artware was a fairly traditional application of corporate law doctrine. In enforcing this order and approving the
NLRB's authority to pierce corporate veils in such circumstances,
the Court did not have occasion to consider the extent of the
NLRB's authority to fashion more innovative doctrines specifically
tailored to the NLRA and designed to uphold its policies. Similarly,
although other Supreme Court veil-piercing cases have relied upon
the principle of statutory frustration as a basis for piercing the corporate veil,' 47 the Deena Artware Court merely invoked an amalgam
of state and federal precedents and basic corporate law treatises, and
did not itself undertake any consideration of the NLRA's particular
policies and their impact upon the common law doctrine of corporate
1014, 1018 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that "easy evasion of [NLRA] obligations" through the
creation of "alter ego" corporations "would frustrate [the NLRA's] objectives and render its

protections illusory indeed.").
145. 361 U.S. 398 (1960).
146. Id. at 403 (quoting Berkley v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 95 (1926) (Cardozo, J.))(footnotes omitted).
147. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
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Unfortunately, no subsequent Supreme Court opin-

ion has filled in Deena Artware's gaps.

The "direct involvement" theory of parent-subsidiary liability
has probably been more significant than the panoply of corporate
law doctrines cataloged in Deena Artware.149 Under this "direct involvement" theory, a parent will be held responsible for its subsidiary's NLRA unfair labor practices, even if the two enterprises generally maintain proper separation in their affairs, when the parent
interferes in the particular transactions that led to the unfair labor
practices in question. 150 Accordingly, "where a parent disregards the
separate legal personality of its subsidiary (and the subsidiary's own
decisionmaking 'paraphernalia'), and exercises direct control over a
specific transaction . . . liability for the subsidiary's unfair labor

practices will be imposed" upon the parent. 5 This theory is particularly notable because it confines its attention to dealings directly relating to the NLRA, rather than straying into irrelevant matters

such as business strategy or observation of corporate formalities.
2.

Individual Liability

Individual NLRA liability has rarely been imposed and doctrinal development is accordingly somewhat unsophisticated. 52 Al148. See Deena Artware, 361 U.S. at 403.
149. The "direct involvement" theory would likely be a more prominent fixture in
NLRA cases if not for the existence of the "joint employer" doctrine, which holds that two or
more employers are considered jointly to employ a particular group of employees if they share
control of the terms and conditions of the employees' employment. See, e.g., NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122-23 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Hobbs & Eberg Mining
Co., 297 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1251, 1252-53 (1990) (imposing "joint employer" liability upon a parent corporation that directly participated in controlling the employment terms of its subsidiary's employees). In the great majority of cases, however, "joint employer" liability is imposed upon genuinely separate companies whose only point of contact is
their shared control over a certain group of employees; as such, this doctrine generally has
little to do with corporate law principles.
150. See, e.g., Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 757 (7th Cir. 1989); see also
Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1043 (8th Cir. 1976) (imposing liability upon
a parent on the ground that it "possessed the present and apparent means to exercise its clout
in matters of labor negotiations by its divisions or subsidiaries and whether its course of conduct encouraged or permitted the [subsidiaries'] negotiators to so represent the situation to
union negotiators for the purpose of achieving a tactical or strategic objective."). A parent's
interference in its subsidiaries' labor negotiations has also been taken into account in certain
cases analyzed under the "single employer" rubric rather than the "direct involvement" theory. See Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1075 (1st Cir. 1981).
151. Esmark, 887 F.2d at 757.
152. Imposition of individual NLRA liability was considerably more common prior to
the passage of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA in 1947, when the statutory definition of the term "employer" was changed from "any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly" to the more restrictive "any person acting as an agent of an
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though individual liability for NLRA violations has been found ap-

propriate under a variety of theories, most of them are only
refinements of conservative and long-established common law doc-

trines, without any discernible modification for the NLRA context.
As in the context of intercorporate NLRA liability, neither the

NLRB nor the reviewing federal courts has made any attempt to
reconcile the policies of the NLRA with the state law doctrine of

limited liability, and the NLRB has apparently never even recognized that such reconciliation is required. 153 Common law principles
are instead accepted without question.

Most NLRB individual liability cases have therefore invoked
the dusty common law formula of "unity of interest, ownership, and

control" between corporation and shareholder to decide whether in-

dividual liability is appropriate. 51T In its lead case, Riley Aeronautics

Corporation,5 5 the NLRB relied upon a number of state corporate
law cases and general corporate law articles to hold that "the corporate veil will be pierced whenever it is employed to perpetrate fraud,
evade existing obligations, or circumvent a statute," or when the
shareholder "was in active concert .... in a scheme or plan of eva-

sion; or siphoned off assets for the purpose of rendering insolvent and
frustrating a monetary obligation such as backpay; 56 or so inteemployer, directly or indirectly." Compare NLRA § 2(2) with LMRA § 101(2), 29 U.S.C. §
152(2) (1988). The amendment was not made as a result of congressional antipathy to shareholder liability, but because the NLRB had "on numerous occasions held an employer responsible for the acts of subordinate employees and others although not acting within the scope of
any authority from the employer." H.R. CONF. REP.No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1947).
Even after this amendment, however, liability has occasionally been imposed upon individual
statutory "employers," particularly if the person acts as the "agent of an employer" in the
commission of an unfair labor practice. See, e.g., J.D. Jewell, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 61, 64 (1952)
(imposing liability upon individual supervisors who assaulted union agents). Liability is generally imposed on such "agents" only for the purpose of assuring employer compliance with
cease-and-desist orders, not monetary awards. See Carpet City Mechanical Co., 244 N.L.R.B.
1031, 1034 (1979) (citing Bon Hennings Logging Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 97 (1961)). Because
these statutory "employers" are not necessarily shareholders, however, corporate law issues are
not implicated in these cases.
153. Cf. Esmark, 887 F.2d at 755 n.26 (noting that the NLRB has not determined
whether imposition of liability upon a parent is properly a matter of state or federal law, or, if
federal, whether the question is governed by general federal common law or NLRA-specific
doctrine).
154. Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937, 965 (1940), enfd as modified, 116 F.2d
281 (8th Cir. 1940). At least one appellate court has instead applied the "general" federal
veil-piercing test that has been developed in LMRA and ERISA cases. See NLRB v. Fullerton
Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 340 (6th Cir. 1990); see also infra notes 170-81 and
216-22 and accompanying text (describing LMRA and ERISA veil-piercing doctrine).
155. 178 N.L.R.B. 495 (1969).
156. See, e.g., Concrete Mfg. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 727, 729 (1982) (holding individual
shareholders liable when they "acted to frustrate [the NLRB's] directions by rendering Re-
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grated or intermingled his assets and affairs that 'no distinct corporate lines are maintained.'

"17

Although Riley was only the decision

of an administrative law judge, its holding has been consistently
cited in subsequent cases as the definitive test for individual NLRA
liability, 158 and neither the NLRB nor the federal courts has ever
conducted a more sophisticated analysis that seeks to fashion an
NLRA-specific rule designed to advance NLRA policies. 159 Indeed,
some decisions suggest that the NLRB remains unaware of its authority to develop NLRA veil-piercing doctrines that are distinct
from state common law rules. 60
The absence of precision and sophistication in NLRA individual
liability decisions means that, as with common law rulings, the cases
can be difficult to reconcile: shareholders may or may not be subjected to personal liability despite maintaining substantially identical
relationships to their corporations. 6' Indeed, individual liability has
sometimes been imposed without evidence of the types of misbehavior suggested in Riley, but these decisions do not state their rationale
clearly.16 2 At the very least, such inconsistency does not promote
spondent Company insolvent [by terminating its pension plan] and thus incapable of satisfying
the [NLRB]-ordered backpay relief.").
157. Riley, 178 N.L.R.B. at 501 (citations omitted). For a typical case imposing liability upon individual shareholders on the basis enumerated in Riley, see D & I Trucking, Inc.,
237 N.L.R.B. 55, 64 (1978).
158. See, e.g., Redway Carriers, Inc., 301 NLRB No. 139, 137 L.L.R.M. 1368 (1991);
Air Vac Indus. Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 703, 711 (1987); Contris Packing Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 193,
194 (1983).
159. At least one appellate court has even relied on state law in making a NLRA veilpiercing determination. See NLRB v. Better Bldg. Supply Corp., 837 F.2d 377, 379-80 (9th
Cir. 1988).
160. See Las Villas Produce, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 883, 885 (1986) (suggesting that imposing individual liability for NLRA backpay obligations only involves "gentle probing of the
corporate veil," rather than full-scale piercing, because the individual shareholders in question
are not "exposed" by such an order "to the full panoply of corporate liability, as they would be
in a true piercing situation"). However, it is of course a fundamental rule that piercing the veil
for one particular purpose does not mean wholesale piercing. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
161. Compare Carpet City Mechanical Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 1031, 1034 (1979) (imposing
liability on an individual who served as chief executive officer, ordered materials, controlled
labor and customer relations, and orchestrated the corporate unfair labor practices in question)
and Ski Craft Sales Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 122, 122 (1978) (imposing liability upon the individual who "solely owned, managed, and controlled the corporations involved" and who "personally refused to bargain with the Union,") with Chef Nathan Sez Eat Here, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B.
343, 343 (1973) (refusing to impose liability on a sole shareholder who served as president,
controlled corporate assets, business operations, and labor relations, and participated in the
commission of the pertinent unfair labor practices).
162. See, e.g., Certified Bldg. Prods., Inc., 208 N.L.R.B. 515, 518 (1974) (imposing
liability upon an individual whose company admitted that he was the sole shareholder and
president of the offending corporation and who failed to rebut evidence that he personally ran

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol9/iss1/3

40

1991]

McLeod: Shareholders'
Liability
and Workers'
Rights: Piercing the Corpora
Piercing
the Corporate
Veil

statutory policy.
Despite the NLRB's suggestion in Riley that individual liability
may be imposed to prevent circumvention of a statute, the reference
seems to have been made merely for the sake of reciting common
law doctrine, because the NLRB has never undertaken an analysis
of what this principle might mean in the NLRA context - such as
whether the NLRA is frustrated when shareholders of insolvent corporations rely on the fiction of corporate separateness to avoid liability for their corporations' unremedied unfair labor practices. Rather,
the NLRB has accepted, without conducting its own independent
analysis, the traditional but now-questionable rationale that imposing broader shareholder liability "would defeat one of the principal
purposes of creating corporations - to shield stockholders from the
debts and obligations of the corporation."16 3
Instead, the NLRB's artificially constrained and unreasonably
simplistic analysis has led the NLRB to resist imposing a more
sweeping liability upon shareholders. Relying on unquestioned state
common law principles, and without assessing the matter independently, for example, the NLRB has stated that the fact "[tihat a
closed corporation loses money, has insufficient assets to pay its obligations, and ceases to operate is insufficient to impose personal liability" on its shareholders.' The agency has even gone so far as to
declare that an individual's sole ownership of a corporation is of
"minimal consequence" in an NLRA veil-piercing analysis. 1 5
Neither of these sweeping pronouncements was explained in terms of
the policies of the NLRA.
Indeed, in some cases the NLRB has even gone beyond the
common law's traditionally bitter antipathy to veil-piercing. In one
unusually hostile decision, for example, the NLRB held that the fact
that a shareholder personally decided to commit the corporate unfair
labor practices in question was of no importance, because as president "he would be the only logical official to decide," and that a
the corporation and made its policy decisions); But cf., Carpet City Mechanical, 244 N.L.R.B.
at 1034 (imposing individual liability with no more than an "inference" that the individual

respondent was in fact a shareholder).
163. Commercial Cartage Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 1036, 1041 (1984); see also NLRB v.
Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 338 (6th Cir. 1990) (contending that a
shareholder's "desire to limit liability" does not justify a more liberal veil-piercing rule because

"[v]irtually all corporations are formed for the purpose of limiting liability."). For an analysis
of the theoretical weakness of the limited liability doctrine, see infra notes 337-73 and accompanying text.
164. Commercial Cartage, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1041.
165. Contris Packing Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 193, 194 (1983).
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second, non-shareholding individual should also be immune from lia-

bility, even though the corporate respondent had clearly siphoned off
assets to another corporation affiliated with the second individual,
because the "precise" relationship between the corporation and that
individual was unclear.16 Once again, this parsimonious decision
was not justified or explained in terms of NLRA purposes and
policies.
B.

The Labor Management Relations Act

Among other provisions, the LMRA establishes federal jurisdiction for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements between
unions and employers. 67 Because almost all collective bargaining
agreements provide that substantive disputes arising under the
agreement are to be resolved through arbitration, and because the
federal courts have assigned overwhelming importance to the arbitration process, the great majority of LMRA cases involve the application of contractual arbitration provisions.16 8 LMRA veil-piercing
cases therefore usually arise from arbitration disputes, including
union attempts to force parent corporations or "double-breasts" to
arbitrate grievances or accept arbitration awards under collective
bargaining agreements signed by subsidiaries or "sister" corporations.16 9 In addition, several cases involving individual LMRA liability have also appeared in recent years, principally when shareholders
have been called to account for corporate failures to pay contractually required employee benefit contributions.
166. Id. at 195.
167. See LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988). The LMRA also establishes
mechanisms for mediating labor disputes and avoiding national emergencies; see LMRA §§
201-13, 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-83 (1988), prohibitions on certain interactions between labor and
management; see LMRA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1988), and jurisdiction for suits against
unions to recover damages caused by their unfair labor practices, see LMRA § 303, 29 U.S.C.
§ 187 (1988). Veil-piercing issues have apparently only arisen in the Section 301 context,
however.
168. See 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 51:5
(1990) (indicating that 98% of surveyed collective bargaining agreements contained an arbitration provision). For an explanation of the LMRA's emphasis on arbitration, see United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See also Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law,
90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) (explaining the centrality of arbitration in the American labor law
schema).
169. These cases often represent affirmative efforts by unions to extend collective bar-

gaining agreements to signatory employers' nonunion affiliates, such as claims that a nonunion
affiliate's failure to pay contract-scale wages or to hire employees from the union's hiring hall
constitutes a breach of contract.
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In the LMRA context, the federal courts have sometimes applied NLRA principles and sometimes relied on veil-piercing doctrines developed under general federal common law. Certain cases,
moreover, discuss these veil-piercing doctrines with attention to
LMRA policies. In almost all instances, however, these analyses
have been superficial and unduly deferential to common law principles, so that the LMRA itself has not been protected.
1. IntercorporateLiability
Most courts deciding LMRA intercorporate liability cases rely
on analogous NLRA veil-piercing principles, and both the "single
employer" and "alter ego" doctrines have therefore been widely applied in LMRA cases. 170 The borrowing is usually justified on the
grounds that the two statutes share a similar purpose - the regulation of union-management relations - and that judicial economy is
well served by reliance on the large body of labor law developed by
the NLRB, an agency with experience and expertise in labor
matters. 1
In the LMRA context, however, the "single employer" doctrine
is applied in a slightly different manner than in NLRA cases. Once
again, two nominally separate entities must first be found to constitute a "single employer" on the basis of their interrelated operations,
common management, centralized control of labor relations, and
common ownership. In addition, both entities' employees must then
form a single appropriate bargaining unit. 172 In the LMRA context,
however, a district court is permitted to conduct its own bargaining
unit determination rather than refer the matter to the NLRB.7l a
170.

See, e.g., International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150 v. Centor Con-

tractors, Inc., 831 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting the applicability of the NLRA
"single employer" and "alter ego" doctrines in the LMRA context); Carpenters Local Union

No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 932 (1983) (same). Some courts appear to bungle their analogies to NLRA law, however.
In Carpenters' Dist. Council v. W.O. Kessel Co., 487 F. Supp. 54, 58 (W.D. Pa. 1980), for

example, the court applied ordinary NLRA successorship doctrine to an "alter ego" situation,
and failed to mention either "single employer" or "alter ego" principles.

171.

See, e.g., Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d at 510-11.

172. See, e.g., Cuyahoga Wrecking Corp. v. Laborers Local Union #210, 644 F. Supp.
878, 882 (W.D.N.Y. 1986).
173. See Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d at 514-17. The Pratt-Farnsworthcourt rejected

the contention that the Supreme Court's decision in South Prairie Const. Co. v. Local No. 627,
Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per curiam), vested exclusive jurisdiction in the NLRB over any and all bargaining unit determinations. Id. at 514. Prior to the

Fifth Circuit's seminal Pratt-Farnsworthdecision, other courts had held that district courts
were completely precluded from making bargaining unit determinations in LMRA cases. See,

e.g., Teamsters Local No. 70 v. California Consolidators, Inc., 693 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir.
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In some instances, however, courts have failed or refused to apply NLRA principles to LMRA veil-piercing problems. The Fourth
Circuit has held, for example, that a union's attempt to force a parent corporation to arbitrate a grievance under its subsidiary's collective bargaining agreement should not be resolved by application of
NLRA "single employer" principles, but instead by considering
whether the subsidiary acted as a common law agent of the parent in
negotiating the contract.17 4 Similarly, in determining whether parent
corporations should be held liable for subsidiaries' LMRA violations,
several courts have relied on common law understandings of the parent-subsidiary relationship, 1 5 and some cases have even based their
holdings on principles of state corporate law. 178
Although the federal courts have almost never undertaken the
appropriate veil-piercing analysis - that is, considering what federal
policies embedded in the LMRA impact on the principle of corporate identity and what veil-piercing doctrines would best effectuate
those policies - certain cases' efforts appear sharply restrictive. For
example, in assessing a union's attempt to require a parent to arbitrate a grievance arising under a subsidiary's collective bargaining
agreement, the First Circuit considered "whether any major federal
policy required piercing . . . to bind the parent to its subsidiary's
1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 887 (1984). Even after Pratt-Farnsworth, courts deciding
LMRA cases continue to defer to prior NLRB bargaining unit determinations, if unit determinations have been made, even if such deference requires that otherwise-valid arbitration
awards will be vacated. See, e.g., Local One, Amalgamated Lithographers v. Stearns & Beale,
Inc., 812 F.2d 763, 771 (2d Cir. 1987); Carpenters' Local Union No. 1478 v. Stevens, 743
F.2d 1271, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985).
174. See A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 799 F.2d
142, 147 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1033 (1987).
175. See, e.g., Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 64-65 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying
standard federal veil-piercing law in the LMRA context); United Steelworkers v. Connors
Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989) (applying general Fifth Circuit veil-piercing law in the LMRA context); United Rubber Workers
v. Great Am. Indus. Inc., 479 F. Supp. 216, 242-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding parent corporation liable for its subsidiary's LMRA violations based on the corporations' common ownership,
the parent's involvement in the subsidiary's labor relations, the subsidiary's undercapitalization, uneven observance of corporate formalities, and evidence suggesting that the parent had
not dealt with the subsidiary at arm's length but had used it as a "mere instrumentality").
Prior to the passage of ERISA, a similar common-law test was used to determine a doublebreast's liability for contractually required employee benefit contributions. See Plumbers Local
Union No. 519 v. Service Plumbing Co., 401 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
176. See, e.g., Carpenters' Dist. Council v. W.O. Kessel Co., 487 F. Supp. 54, 57 (W.D.
Pa. 1980) (relying in part on Pennsylvania law in an LMRA case); Tishman Const. Corp. v.
Elevator Constructors, Local No. 1, 80 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 111,960, at 22,749 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(applying New York law); see also, e.g., Directors Guild v. Garrison Productions, Inc., 733 F.
Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying New York law to impose LMRA liability upon an individual shareholder).
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agreement.' 1 The First Circuit found that an order requiring the
parent to arbitrate "could only be based on a policy that a holding
parent corporation should be bound to the arbitration agreement of
its subsidiary whenever it controls the subsidiary's stock and participates in its management" - a policy the court claimed had not
"been adopted by Congress or the courts. ' 17 8 The court of appeals
justified its holding on the basis of various non-labor precedents, and
did not continue to decide whether a more liberal
veil-piercing policy
17 9
should be adopted to effectuate the LMRA.
The Third Circuit has adopted as its own these statements by
the First Circuit and, in doing so, concluded rather simplistically
that "[a] court may not disregard at will the formal differences between affiliated corporations." 180 According to the Third Circuit, the
existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship "is not enough," in and
of itself, to permit imposition of LMRA liability upon a parent.181
The court of appeals did not consider, however, whether these formal
differences could be disregarded in service of LMRA policy rather than arbitrarily or "at will."
2. Individual Liability
Numerous cases have considered the circumstances under which
individual shareholders may be held liable for corporate LMRA violations. 8 21 Although many of these cases purport to develop a federal
common law for this purpose, most of them have relied on a general
federal common law of veil-piercing rather than fashioning an
LMRA-specific doctrine that is sensitive to the statute's particular
177.

United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. T.P. Property Corp., 583 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir.

1978).

178. Id. at 35-36.
179. Id. at 36.
180.

American Bell, Inc. v. Federation of Telephone Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 887 (3d

Cir. 1984); see Laborers' Intl. Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 868 F.2d 573, 576-77 (3d Cir.
1989) (per curiam).
181. American Bell, 736 F.2d at 887. The American Bell court indicated that it would
require evidence of common law impropriety before piercing the veil. Id.

182. The great majority of these cases involve liability for unpaid employee benefit contributions. Prior to the 1980 amendment of ERISA to establish an ERISA cause of action to
collect these delinquencies, see ERISA §§ 502(g), 515, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g), 1145 (1988),

this contribution obligation was only enforceable through an LMRA Section 301 action, on the
ground that such failures to pay violate a collective bargaining agreement. Most of the cases
subsequent to this amendment have been brought under both ERISA and the LMRA. The
following discussion therefore considers only those cases that expressly arose under the LMRA

rather than ERISA, but the body of ERISA individual liability case law, discussed in Section
D below, may be considered largely an extension of LMRA doctrine rather than an entirely
independent body of law.
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purposes and policies. The statutory frustration doctrine has been almost completely ignored. Moreover, even though the federal law of
veil-piercing is generally considered more liberal than state common
law, some LMRA individual liability cases actually appear more
restrictive. 183
Although no doctrinal formula has become universally accepted,
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Engineering has been widely influential."" Under Seymour, an attempt
to impose LMRA liability on an individual shareholder involves a
three-part inquiry into "the amount of respect given to the separate
identity of the corporation by its shareholders, the degree of injustice
visited upon the litigants by recognition of the corporate entity, and
the fraudulent intent of the incorporators."' 185 Although described as
a statement of "a sort of generalized federal substantive law,"' 186 this
test essentially restates traditional corporate law principles, specifically those developed in California: the first criterion is satisfied
when the corporation fails to observe proper formalities or when the
shareholders commingle funds; the second primarily involves undercapitalization; 8 7 and the third provides a vessel of equity. Several
other circuits have followed a similar approach. 88
In determining whether an LMRA plaintiff had been subjected
to "injustice," the Seymour court held that an employee benefit
fund's inability to collect required contributions from the corporation
did not constitute an "inequitable result" sufficient to permit pierc183.

See, e.g., Audit Services, Inc. v. Rolfson, 641 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1981). In Rolfson,

the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's imposition of individual shareholder liability under
the LMRA, holding that the district court had erred in applying Montana law and that federal
law as expressed in Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Engineering, 605 F.2d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir.

1979), would not permit personal liability. See Rolfson, 641 F.2d at 764.
184. 605 F.2d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 1979). See, e.g., Trustees of UIU Health & Welfare
Fund v. New York Flame Proofing Co., 649 F. Supp. 843, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (relying also

on formulations of New York corporate law); NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd.,
910 F.2d 331, 340 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying Seymour in the NLRA context).
185. Seymour, 605 F.2d at 1111.

186.
187.
Mfg. Co.,
the Ninth

Id.
Board of Trustees of the Mill Cabinet Pension Trust Fund v. Valley Cabinet &
877 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1989). In this ERISA case applying the Seymour doctrine,
Circuit clarified Seymour's holding on this point by indicating that the incorpora-

tors' fraudulent intent need not necessarily have existed at the time the corporation was
formed. Id. at 774. In reaching this result, the Valley Cabinet court made an explicit reference
to ERISA policy, suggesting that this rule would "better promote[] the purposes of labor law
and employee protection." Id.

188. The Third Circuit, for example, has chosen to apply a version of general federal
veil-piercing doctrine that is itself taken wholesale from traditional state corporate law. See

Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 284
(3d Cir. 1984).
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ing the corporate veil. 189 This interpretation of the term "injustice"
stands in sharp contrast to certain recent Medicare cases, in which
the courts have held that a corporation's mere inability to reimburse
the government for overpayments constitutes a frustration of Medicare's statutory policy requiring reimbursement, and that the defaulting corporation's veil may be pierced accordingly.
Indeed, the Seymour court did not consider the statutory frustration doctrine at all, and appeared to dismiss the Supreme Court's
application of that doctrine in Anderson v. Abbott' 90 as an overbroad
holding from which subsequent cases had retreated.' 9 Rather, the
Seymour court expressed its view that the "paramount policy" of the
LMRA is "consistency in the enforcement of labor contracts" so as
to achieve "industrial peace and productivity," and that state corporate law could properly be used except in those isolated circumstances where it might prove inconsistent with this policy. 92 Meanwhile, the Third Circuit has suggested that the LMRA contains a
policy of maintaining limited liability for corporate officers as the
quid pro quo "for the parallel insulation of officers and members of
local unions from liability for [LMRA] violations."'19 3 As explained
below, however, the purposes and policies of the LMRA are actually
much broader than these decisions suggest, and are best served by a
more realistic veil-piercing doctrine.
C. The Railway Labor Act
The Railway Labor Act ("RLA") was enacted in 1926 to regulate labor relations matters involving railroads, and was extended to
airlines eight years later. 94 Surprisingly, given the statute's longevity, no cases appear to have imposed shareholder liability for RLA
violations, although certain cryptic decisions involving corporate entity have emerged over the years. One court seems to have suggested
that a subsidiary's mere inability to satisfy an RLA obligation does
not provide a sufficient basis to impose liability upon its parent, 195
189. See Seymour, 605 F.2d at 1113.
190. 321 U.S. 394 (1944).
191. See Seymour, 605 F.2d at 1111 n.6.
192. Id. at 1109, 1110.
193. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279,
284 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Combs v. Indyk, 554 F. Supp. 573, 575 (W.D. Pa. 1982)). The

analogy is imperfect: a more appropriate quid pro quo for the insulation of corporations' owners would be the insulation of international unions for their locals' acts -

something not guar-

anteed in the LMRA, although established by other doctrines. See, United Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).

194. See RLA § 201, 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1988).
195.

See Local Union 808 v. P & W R. Co., 576 F. Supp. 693, 704 (D. Conn. 1983)
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and it has also been held that a parent corporation is not a necessary
or proper party in a union's action to compel a subsidiary to bargain
in good faith under the RLA. 196 Neither of these decisions considered choice-of-law problems, however, or explained its reliance on
traditional conceptions of corporate entity in terms of RLA policy.
In contrast, veil-piercing questions have arisen frequently in the
context of RLA representational disputes. For example, the National
Mediation Board ("NMB") has often been called upon to determine
whether a particular employer, even though not obviously involved in
the transportation industry, is nonetheless a "carrier" subject to
RLA jurisdiction for representational purposes. To be deemed such a
"carrier," an employer must satisfy two tests: first, it must be directly or indirectly owned or controlled by another "carrier;" and
19 7
second, it must provide services that relate to transportation.
In ascertaining whether or not an alleged "carrier" is under the
control of another statutory "carrier," the NMB generally considers
factors based on traditional intercorporate veil-piercing law. "Carrier" status has thus been found for a subsidiary when the subsidiary
and its parent share common officers and facilities, consolidate their
tax returns, interchange their employees, combine their payroll, and
make financial and personnel decisions on a unified basis. 198 As in
the NLRA context, centralization of labor relations and personnel
matters appears the most important factor in determinations of "carrier" status, 9 and entities will be considered separate if their managerial and financial structures are kept distinct and labor relations
matters are handled separately. 0
Beginning in the 1930s, but especially during the 1980s, which
witnessed a spate of mergers in the airline industry, the NMB has
(granting a parent's motion to dismiss on the ground that although a subsidiary "may not be
able to pay" for the consequences of an RLA violation, "the mere existence of a deeper pocket

[in the form of a wealthier parent] is not a reason to make the owner of that pocket a party
defendant.").
196. See Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, Lodge 886 v. Long Island R. Co., 267 F.
Supp. 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
More recently, the Sixth Circuit has found the NLRA "alter ego" doctrine applicable in
the RLA context, although the Court of Appeals found such liability inappropriate on the
facts of the case. See International Longshoremen's Assn., Local Union No. 1937 v. Norfolk
Southern Corp., 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2746 (6th Cir. 1991).
197. See Cybernetics & Systems, Inc., 10 N.M.B. 334, 339 (1983) (interpreting RLA §
1, First, 45 U.S.C. § 152, First (1988)); see also Delpro Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, 676 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1982).
198. See, e.g., DHL Corp., 9 N.M.B. 67, 68 (1981); Air Cleveland, Inc., 8 N.M.B. 64,
64 (1980).
199. See, e.g., DHL Corp., 9 N.M.B. at 68.
200. See Mercury Services, Inc., 9 N.M.B. 104, 109-11 (1981).
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also confronted a number of cases in which two or more entities are
alleged to have integrated their operations and become a "single car-

rier" for purposes of the RLA.2 01 The NMB's approach to these
claims has been somewhat similar to that of the NLRB in its "single

employer" cases, but unlike the "double-breasting" context, these
cases usually involve contentions by the acquiring employer and its

employees' union that the acquired employer has been absorbed and
no longer exists as an independent entity; the acquired employer's
union understandably tends to resist these efforts.20 2

In its seminal "single carrier" decision, the NMB announced
that it considered proliferation of bargaining units undesirable and
detrimental to the RLA's policy of minimizing disruptions in interstate commerce. 0 3 Accordingly, it determined that two airlines had

become a "single transportation system" because they held themselves out to the public and the government as a single entity, com-

bined their schedules and route systems, interlocked their officers
and directors, assigned all maintenance and labor relations matters
to the acquiring airline, and planned to integrate their payroll and

reservations systems.20 4 A finding that the acquired entity remained
a separate carrier, the NMB concluded, "would exalt form over substance."205 In more recent cases developing the "single carrier" doc201. The NMB's first discussion of the veil-piercing problem came in its First Annual
Report in 1935:
The Board has ruled generally that where a subsidiary corporation reports separately to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and keeps its own payroll and seniority rosters, it is a carrier as defined in the act, and its employees are entitled to
representation separate from other carriers who may be connected with the same
railroad system. If the operations of a subsidiary are jointly managed with operations of other carriers and the employees have also been merged and are subject to
the direction of a single management, then the larger unit of management is taken
to be the carrier rather than the individual subsidiary companies.
NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD FIRsT ANNUAL REPORT

(1935), quoted in Seaboard System

Railroad-Clinchfield Line, 11 N.M.B. 217, 224 (1984). The NMB has indicated its belief that
these traditional principles "remain sound" although "ritualistic adherence to past determinations" is not required. SeaboardSystem, 11 N.M.B. at 225.
For an account of recent developments in the airline industry, see Stone, Labor Relations
on the Airlines: The Railway Labor Act in the Era of Deregulation, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1485,
1489-94 (1990).
202. See In re Trans World Airlines/Ozark Airlines, 14 N.M.B. 218, 236 (1987) (illustrating such three-way representation disputes in merger cases); In re Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
13 N.M.B. 399 (1986) (illustrating similar three-way representation). Compare with In re
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., N.M.B. CR-6053 (illustrating a "single carrier" case more similar to
the double-breasting context, in which the union contends that two entities have been merged
but management denies it).
203. See Republic Airlines, Inc., 8 N.M.B. 49, 54 (1980).
204. See id. at 55, 52-53.
205. See id. at 56.
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trine, the NMB has established a two-part inquiry: first, it considers
whether the two entities "are held out to the public as a single carrier;" and second, it seeks to "determine if the carriers have comfrom a managerial and labor relations
bined their operations
20 6
perspective."
Despite its careful analysis of these jurisdictional questions, the
NMB has never considered the appropriate role for corporate law in
RLA doctrine, although it has recognized that it retains the power to
"pierce the corporate veil for purposes of rational labor-management
relations," even if the veil were kept intact for other purposes, such
as regulation by the (now-defunct) Civil Aeronautics Board.20 7 Nevertheless, the NMB's insistence that formally separate entities will
ordinarily be permitted to rely on the fiction of corporate entity suggests an excessively traditional approach. As discussed in Part III,
Section B, a more flexible understanding, attentive to employee free
choice and RLA policy, is warranted.
D.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act creates a "comprehensive and reticulated" scheme that governs all matters relating
to employee benefit plans.20 8 Although several aspects of ERISA
have little or nothing to do with labor relations, labor law veil-piercing questions arise in a wide variety of ERISA contexts. Several
courts have imposed shareholder liability to remedy breaches of fiduciary duty, 20 9 but most ERISA veil-piercing cases arise from the
failure of corporate employers to make payments to employee benefit
plans.2 10 These cases include attempts to hold corporate and individual shareholders responsible both for benefit contributions required
under collective bargaining agreements 211 and for so-called "with206. Trans World Airlines, 14 N.M.B. at 236.
207. Republic Airlines, 8 N.M.B. at 55.
208. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980); see
ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (providing that ERISA "shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan").

209. See, e.g., Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, 829 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1987); see
also ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988) (establishing penalties for breaches of fiduciary
duty under ERISA).
210. See supra note 207 and accompanying text; see infra notes 212, 218-223 and accompanying text.

211.

This obligation became enforceable under ERISA with the incorporation of Sec-

tions 501 and 502(a) into ERISA with the passage of the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980 [hereinafter "MPPAA"]. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1135 and 1132(a)

(1988).
For a general discussion of ERISA veil-piercing law, see P. BLUMBERG, supra note 100, at
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drawal liability," the statutory obligation of employers to pay their

share of unfunded pension liabilities when they abandon multiemployer pension plans. 212 These different problems are considered

sequentially.
1. Shareholder Responsibility for Benefits Contributions
a. IntercorporateLiability
The NLRA "single employer" and "alter ego" doctrines have
been adopted wholesale in the ERISA contributions context, so that

double-breasts or disguised continuances may be held responsible for
contribution obligations in appropriate circumstances.213 As in
LMRA cases, however, certain NLRA problems are irrelevant: for
example, courts deciding ERISA "single employer" cases are empowered to make their own determinations as to whether two compa-

nies' employees form a single appropriate bargaining unit.214 Unlike
the LMRA context, however, a prior NLRB determination that a

single bargaining unit is inappropriate will not bind a court that
seeks to determine whether both breasts of a "single employer"
should be bound to a collective bargaining agreement's benefits contributions provisions. This is due to the fact that the plaintiff benefit
fund is not considered to stand in privity with the union that was
§§ 14.01-14.15.
212. ERISA Section 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. §1002(2)(A) (1988), defines a "pension plan"
as follows:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or both, to the extent
that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund
or program (i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral
of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating the benefits under the plan
or method of distributing benefits from the plan.

Id.
Under ERISA Section 3(2) (37)(a), 29 U.S.C. §1002(37)(A) (1988), a multiemployer
plan is "a plan. . .(i) to which more than one employer is required to contribute, (ii) which is
maintained pursuant to one or more employee organizations and more than one employer, and
(iii) which satisfies such other requirements as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe by
regulation."
213. See, e.g., Central States, S.E. and S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Sloan, 902 F.2d
593 (7th Cir. 1990) (illustrating the "alter ego" doctrine); Operating Engineers Pension Trust
v. Moulder Bros., Inc., 717 F. Supp. 697, 699 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (illustrating the "alter ego"
doctrine); Plumbers Local No. 519 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Garcia, 677 F. Supp.
1554 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (discussing the "single employer" doctrine); see also Plumbers Local
No. 519, 677 F. Supp. at 1558 (explaining ERISA courts' reliance on NLRA doctrine).
214. See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489,
509, 519 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983).
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party to the earlier representation proceeding.215 Not surprisingly,
application of these veil-piercing doctrines in the ERISA context has
created problems similar to those encountered in NLRA cases. Because attentive employer planning can so easily prevent liability,
their utility is decidedly questionable, and statutory frustration may
easily result.2 16
Although most courts do not discuss bases for intercorporate
ERISA contributions liability other than the NLRA-derived "single
employer" and "alter ego" theories, at least one court has applied a
version of the statutory frustration doctrine to hold a nominally separate corporation liable for delinquent contributions. 1 7 In that case,
however, the defendants had devised a complex corporate structure
that deliberately kept all valuable assets under the control of a
dummy third-party corporation, and piercing the veil was therefore a
fairly traditional application of the statutory frustration doctrine. In
contrast, no court has ever considered whether a corporation's mere
inability to pay benefit contributions constitutes a frustration of
ERISA policy sufficient to permit imposition of liability upon parents and other corporate affiliates, or whether the appropriate veilpiercing rule in the ERISA contributions context would require such
an element to fulfill statutory objectives.
215. See Board of Trustees, Container Mechanics Welfare/Pension Fund v. Universal
Enterprises, Inc., 751 F.2d 1177, 1183 (lth Cir. 1985). ERISA trust funds are considered
legally independent from both participating unions and participating employers. See NLRB v.
Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 334 (1981).
216. As in the NLRA context, an employer may sometimes defeat a "single employer"
finding by the mere success of its artifice. See, e.g., Brick Masons Pension Trust v. Industrial
Fence & Supply, 839 F.2d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that two companies were not
an ERISA "single employer" because one breast worked on larger, high-skill (and therefore
union-staffed) projects and the other breast on small, lower-skill (and thus non-union)
projects). But see Plumbers Local No. 519, 677 F. Supp. at 1560-61 (finding a single bargaining unit appropriate because both breasts employed "plumbers installing irrigation systems,"
even though project size and skill levels differed and there was no interchange of employees
between the two companies).
217. See Baker v. Caravan Moving Corp., 561 F. Supp. 337, 340 (N.D. III. 1983) (imposing ERISA liability upon a holding corporation that had no apparent function other than
its ownership of the real estate upon which a nominally separate and otherwise assetless delinquent corporation conducted its operations). The Baker court held that "[w]hen an affiliated
corporate structure is used as a shield to circumvent the intended purpose of legislation, courts
will disregard the corporate entity and find a corporation liable for the debts of its affiliate,"
and that therefore a "sham corporation used to escape obligations under collective bargaining
agreements and ERISA may be held liable for such contributions." Id. at 340-41.
More recently, the Seventh Circuit appears to have held, implicitly relying on personal
ERISA liability decisions from that court, that state law should determine intercorporate veilpiercing questions in ERISA cases. See Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449,
460 (7th Cir. 1991); see also infra note 240 and accompanying text (discussing recent Seventh
Circuit personal ERISA liability decisions).
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b. Individual Liability

Of the existing labor law veil-piercing doctrines, judicial treatment of individual ERISA liability questions probably contains the
most sophisticated analysis. The courts of appeals have taken widely
divergent approaches to this problem, however, with some suggesting
the appropriateness of a relatively broad liability rule designed to

fulfill ERISA policy, some applying nominally federal but nonetheless traditional doctrines, and some relying on principles of state corporate law.

The First Circuit has undertaken the most sensitive analysis of
individual ERISA liability. In Alman v. Danin,218 the First Circuit
applied the basic principle that "federal courts will look closely at
the purpose of the federal statute to determine whether the statute

places importance on the corporate form,

' 219

and held that ERISA

"cannot be said to attach great weight to corporate form.

'220

Indeed,

the Alman court observed that "deferring too readily to the corporate identity may run contrary to the explicit purposes" of
ERISA.221 Three other circuits have cited Alman favorably.222
The Alman court further held that ERISA's key statutory policy with respect to payment of employee benefit contributions was

"to ensure that employees were not deprived of promised benefits
which they both expected and deserved" -

that is, that contribu-

tions should simply be paid. 223 The court also suggested that under218. 801 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1986).
219. Id. at 3 (quoting Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (Ist Cir.
1981)).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., 933 F.2d 449, 460-61 (7th Cir. 1991)(discussing Alman's interpretation of ERISA policy); Laborers Pension Trust Fund v. Sidney Weinberger Homes, Inc., 872 F.2d 702, 705 (6th Cir. 1988)(per curiam)(relying on Alman to impose personal ERISA liability); Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209,
1220-21 (2d Cir. 1987)(relying on Alman in a case involving breach of fiduciary duty).
223. Alman, 801 F.2d at 4. The Seventh Circuit has recently outlined an additional
ERISA policy that is relevant to the veil-piercing problem: the unfair burden-shifting that will
result if a delinquent employer is allowed to escape contribution obligations and thus force
other participating employers to "bear the burden" of the delinquent employer's "failure to
pay its share." Upholsterers' Int'l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture, 920 F.2d 1323,
1328 (7th Cir. 1990). In Artistic Furniture,liability was imposed upon a successor employer
that acquired a delinquent employer's operations, rather than upon a shareholder. Id. Curiously, the Seventh Circuit's decisions in the veil-piercing context show a great deal less sensitivity to the policies underlying ERISA. Compare Artistic Furniturewith Plumbers' Pension
Fund v. Niedrich, 891 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2169
(1990) and Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). Cf.Mitzner,
The Art of Collection, in 30 EMPLOYEE BENEITS ISSUES - THE MULTIEMPLOYER PERSPECTiVE 368-69 (J. Lehman & D. Lyne eds. 1988) ("One of the major problems [unions and
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capitalization alone might provide a sufficient basis to impose individual shareholder liability, because shareholders' interposition of an
undercapitalized corporation would
"tend to defeat ERISA's pur224
poses and work a clear injustice."
Other appellate courts have echoed Alman's assertion that a
corporation's inability to pay may constitute a form of shareholder
"fraud" sufficient to impose personal liability under ERISA. 225 In
addition an Illinois district court suggested that a corporation's insolvency and inability to pay ERISA contributions might be enough, in
and of itself, to impose individual liability upon its shareholders. 22 6
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has held individual shareholders liable
for ERISA contributions in circumstances in which the shareholder's
abuses of the corporation would not be sufficient to permit "at com-

mon law" veil-piercing. 227 In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit relied on the congressional policy expressed in ERISA "that employers make all of their required contributions to pension and
health and welfare plans. 228 In other words, the court of appeals
implied that mere nonpayment may constitute frustration of statu-

tory policy, as has been held in the Medicare cases. 229 The Second
Circuit has also invoked ERISA policy in its veil-piercing cases, relying on ERISA's basic purpose "to promote the interests of employees
and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans and to protect contractually defined benefits" 230 to hold that individual liability may be
imposed under ERISA "even if the traditional conditions for pierc'231
ing the corporate veil are not met.
ERISA benefit funds] face today is that judges across the United States often come from
corporate America, and they are extremely reluctant to impose personal liability on individuals
or to pierce the corporate veil and hold one corporation accountable for the debts of
another.").
224. Alman, 801 F.2d at 4. Despite these holdings, the Alman court also appeared to
endorse the district court's reliance on narrower, LMRA-based veil-piercing principles, and the
shareholders in question had committed a number of common-law transgressions. Id. (citing
Laborers Clean-Up Contract Admin. Trust Fund v. Uriarte Clean-Up Serv., Inc., 736 F.2d
516, 524 (9th Cir. 1984)).
225. See Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Engineers Health & Welfare Plan v.
Hroch, 757 F.2d 184, 191 (8th Cir. 1985).
226. See Laborers' Pension Fund v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., 709 F.
Supp. 140, 144 (N.D. Ill.
1989). The Litgen court also held, however, that individual ERISA
liability may not be imposed merely because one individual owns all the insolvent corporation's
stock. Id.
227. See Hroch, 757 F.2d at 191.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Leddy v. Standard Drywall, Inc., 875 F.2d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989)).
231. Leddy, 875 F.2d at 388. The Leddy court indicated that such liability would be
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Other courts of appeals, however, have taken a less careful and
flexible approach. Several courts, for example, have relied on LMRA
veil-piercing principles in the ERISA context.23 2 Unfortunately,
these LMRA doctrines have been adopted without analysis of

whether or not the two statutes actually share common purposes and
policies that should be reflected in the body of veil-piercing law developed to fulfill them. 233 Limiting shareholders' LMRA liability, for
example, has sometimes been justified as the quid pro quo for limiting union officers' LMRA liability - a rationale that clearly makes
no sense in the ERISA context.23 4
Various courts have chosen to apply "general" veil-piercing
principles developed under other federal statutes instead of fashioning an ERISA-specific doctrine, again without justifying the maneuver.235 The Third Circuit's "general" federal test, for example, considers such traditional factors as failure to observe corporate
formalities, corporate insolvency, siphoning of corporate assets, and
the status of the corporation as sham or facade.236 In addition, one
Sixth Circuit panel decision indicated that "a showing of fraud or
injustice" would be required before an individual shareholder could
be held liable for delinquent contributions, emphasizing that the corporation's mere inability to pay would not constitute such a showing. 231 This
23 8 conclusion has also been expressed by at least two other
circuits.

appropriate "at least to the extent that a controlling corporate official defrauds or conspires to
defraud a benefit fund of required contributions." Id.
232. See, e.g., Solomon v. Klein, 770 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1985); Audit Serv., Inc. v. Rolfson, 641 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1981). In addition, the NLRA "alter ego" doctrine has also been
applied to impose individual ERISA liability. See Laborers' Pension Trust Fund v. Family
Cement Co., 677 F. Supp. 896, 898 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
233. This is partially the case because ERISA jurisdiction to collect delinquent contributions did not exist prior to the passage of the MPPAA. Before the MPPAA, ERISA trust
funds were required to file suit under LMRA Section 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988), to
collect such delinquencies. See supra note 182.
234. See supra note 193.
235. See, e.g., Litgen, 709 F.Supp. at 143. The differences between these various conservative approaches may be more apparent than real. See also P. BLUMBERG, supra note 100
§ 13.11, at 440, 441-45 (contending that "[c]onventional state law notions of 'piercing the
[corporate] veil' are, in fact, supreme" in the individual ERISA liability context, and that
these conventional "doctrines may be regarded as virtually interchangeable.").
236. See Solomon v. Klein, 770 F.2d at 353-54.
237. Scarbrough v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1079, 1084 (6th Cir. 1989). Other Sixth Circuit
decisions, however, have taken a substantially different view. See, e.g., Laborers' Pension Trust
Fund v. Sidney Weinberger Homes, Inc., 872 F.2d 702, 705 (6th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam)(stating that the corporate veil may be pierced without clear evidence of fraud).
238. See Rockney v. Blohorn, 877 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1989); International Bhd. of
Painters v. George A. Kracher, Inc., 856 F.2d 1546 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Litgen, 709 F.
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Other appellate cases - including panel decisions from circuits
that have rendered more favorable holdings in other cases - suggest
an even more limited ERISA veil-piercing doctrine based on state
corporate law. These intimations have generally emerged in cases
holding that the pertinent ERISA definition of "employer" does not
encompass individual corporate shareholders or officers and that
shareholder liability may therefore only be imposed by veil-piercing. 239 Because these cases primarily involve close statutory interpretation, courts have apparently not devoted great attention to the secondary problem of shaping an appropriate veil-piercing doctrine. As
a result, two circuits have reached the dubious conclusion that state
corporate law should control. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has
held that shareholders are liable for delinquent contributions only
"to the extent [they are] liable for general corporate debts under
state corporate law,' 24 0 and the First Circuit, having originally also
held that state corporate law determines individual ERISA liability,
modified its position by suggesting that the law in this area is only
"technically"41 federal and "takes its content in part from related
2
state law.1
Supp. at 144 ("The fact that [an ERISA defendant] is a closely held corporation is insufficient
evidence standing alone to warrant piercing of [its] corporate veil.").
239. ERISA § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (1988), defines "employer" as "any person
acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an
employee benefit plan." Individual owners of unincorporated enterprises have been held liable
for delinquent contributions as "employers" within the meaning of Section 3(5). See Painters
Pension Fund v. Howard Painting Co., 8 E.B.C. (BNA) 2497, 2499 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per
curiam). Cases that have (quite inexplicably) refused to issue similar holdings against the
owners of incorporated enterprises have generally analyzed the problem by considering
ERISA's relationship to the FLSA, which contains a substantially identical definition of "employer" that has routinely been held sufficient to impose liability upon controlling officers and
shareholders. See infra text accompanying notes 292-98.
240. Plumbers' Pension Fund Local 130 v. Niedrich, 891 F.2d 1297, 1300-01 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -,110 S.Ct. 2169 (1990); Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874
F.2d 1186, 1193 (7th Cir. 1989); see Cornick v. Hi Grade Cleaners, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 718,
721 (N.D. II. 1984) (applying Illinois law in making an ERISA veil-piercing determination).
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit's perplexing decision in Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus.,
Inc., 933 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1991), a case involving inter-corporate ERISA liability, suggests
both that state law should apply and that "the protection afforded by the corporate form might
be undercut by the overriding federal legislative policy reflecting in ERISA." Compare id. at
462-63 with id. at 460-61.
241. Massachusetts Laborers' Health & Welfare Fund v. Starrett Paving Corp., 845
F.2d 23, 27, (Ist Cir. 1988).
In reaching their decisions about the scope of individual liability for delinquent ERISA
contributions, several courts have relied upon an opinion letter of the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation [hereinafter "PBGC"] concerning the question of shareholder responsibility for
withdrawal liability. See, e.g., Levit, 874 F.2d at 1193; Solomon v. R.E.K. Dress, 670 F. Supp.
96, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In that opinion letter, the PBGC opined that "ERISA has no special
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Although the more conservative courts of appeals have not analyzed individual ERISA liability problems through the lens of the

statutory frustration doctrine, and although ERISA would appear to
point toward a broad veil-piercing rule,24 2 some of these courts have

suggested that a broad rule of liability would actually tend to work
against the purposes of ERISA, because the threat of individual
shareholder liability for delinquent contributions would discourage
employers from participating in multiemployer trust funds.24a
2. Shareholder Responsibility for Withdrawal Liability

Congress added the withdrawal liability provisions to ERISA in
1980. Under this withdrawal liability scheme, if an employer ceases
to be obligated to contribute to a multi-employer ERISA pension
plan, the employer is required to pay the plan an amount equal to its

share of the plan's unfunded liability.244 Determining whether such a
withdrawal has taken place and calculating the amount of any such

liability involves application of an unusually complex set of statutory
and regulatory rules,2

45

but these matters do not raise veil-piercing

issues. If withdrawal liability is found to be owing, however, shareholders and corporate affiliates may sometimes be required to satisfy
the obligation.
a. IntercorporateLiability

A maze-like series of provisions imposes joint and several
ERISA withdrawal liability upon all members of a commonly owned
rules regarding shareholder or officer liability. Accordingly, this issue is usually determined by
state law, which generally provides that shareholders are not liable for the debts of a corporation." PBGC Opinion Letter 82-38 (December 14, 1982), as quoted in Levit, 874 F.2d at
1193. Judicial reliance on this opinion letter is extremely questionable, however, because the
PBGC has no role whatsoever in the enforcement of employer contribution obligations. See
ERISA §§ 4001-09, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-09 (1988) (establishing the powers of the PBGC);
ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988) (listing the parties who are entitled to initiate civil
actions to enforce ERISA contribution obligations). Moreover, reliance on this opinion letter to
resolve the choice-of-law question appears to flout the mandate of Kimbell Foods.
242. See S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1973) ("It is intended that the
coverage of [ERISA] be construed liberally to provide the maximum degree of protection to
working men and women covered by private retirement programs. Conversely, exemptions
should be confined to their narrow purpose.").
243. See Scarbrough, 870 F.2d at 1084 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Rockney v. Blohorn,
877 F.2d 637, 642-43 (8th Cir. 1989); see infra text accompanying note 408 (critiquing this
argument).
244. See ERISA § 4201(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (1988) ("If an employer withdraws
from a multiemployer [pension] plan ... then the employer is liable to the plan in the amount
determined ... to be the withdrawal liability.").
245. See ERISA §§ 4201-25, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-405 (1988).
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"controlled group" of corporations. 246 Several courts have applied
these provisions to require "controlled group" members to satisfy
other members' withdrawal liability obligations.247 On the other
hand, courts have disagreed as to whether this statutory framework
provides the exclusive means of imposing intercorporate withdrawal
liability or whether such liability may also be assessed against related corporate entities by application of the NLRA "single employer" doctrine or other veil-piercing principles. 48
b. Individual Liability

As in the delinquent contributions context, several courts have
refused to hold corporate officers or shareholders responsible for corporate withdrawal liability obligations as statutory "employers. 2 49
These courts have held further that the principle of limited corporate
246. ERISA Section 4001(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(l) (1988), provides that "all employees of trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated) which are under common control
shall be treated as employed by a single employer and all such trades and businesses as a
single employer." Section 4001(b)(1) further provides that the existence of "common control"
is determined by reference to regulations promulgated under Section 414(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 414(c) (1988). These regulations provide that "common control"
will be found, for example, where a single shareholder or group of shareholders owns at least
80% of two or more corporations. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(c)-2(b)-(c) (1991). Accordingly, all
members of the "controlled group" are jointly and severally liable for withdrawal liability
obligations of other members.
247. See, e.g., DeBreceni v. Bru-Jell Leasing Corp., 710 F. Supp. 15, 22 (D. Mass.
1989); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118 (3d Cir.
1986); United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. Progressive Supermarkets, Inc., 644 F.
Supp. 633 (D.N.J. 1986); Connors v. Calvert Dev. Co., 622 F. Supp. 877 (D.D.C. 1985).
248. Compare Connors v. Peles, 724 F. Supp. 1538, 1575 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (suggesting
that "[tihe 'single employer' doctrine... is quite simply a creature of labor and the NLRB
and has no application in an ERISA setting.") with In re Consolidated Litigation Concerning
Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wisconsin Steel, 681 F. Supp. 512, 519 (N.D. I11.1988) (suggesting that traditional veil-piercing principles may apply in intercorporate withdrawal liability
cases).

Other courts have suggested that withdrawal liability may be imposed through application
of the NLRA "joint employer" doctrine. See Refined Sugars, Inc., v. Local 807 Labor-Management Pension Fund, 632 F. Supp. 630, 634 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Central Penn. Teamster's
Pension Fund v. Service Group, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Pa. 1985); see also supra note
149 (explaining the "joint employer" doctrine).
The availability of the "alter ego" doctrine has apparently not been tested in the withdrawal liability context. However, the absence of such cases may be explained on the ground
that any alleged "alter ego" would probably share sufficient common ownership with the withdrawing employer as to fall within the statutory "controlled group."
249. See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1989); DeBreceni v. Graf
Bros. Leasing, Inc., 828 F.2d 877 (Ist Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988); Connors
v. P & M Coal Co., 801 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Subchapter III of ERISA, Subtitle E,
which governs withdrawal liability, does not contain a definition of the term "employer," and
several courts have refused to adopt the definition provided in Subchapter I. See DeBrecenl,
828 F.2d at 879-80.
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liability constitutes a "background norm," so that congressional silence on the question of shareholder liability requires a determination that a limited, common law doctrine of veil-piercing - attentive
to standard corporate law factors like undercapitalization, disregard
of formalities, and commingling of assets250 - should prevail in this
context.2 51 As in the delinquent contributions context, some courts
have even suggested, without careful analysis, that state corporate
law should be applied to determine these problems.252
On the other hand, none of these courts has proceeded to conduct the next step of the inquiry: to determine the importance that
ERISA's withdrawal liability provisions place upon the corporate
form, and the extent to which nonpayment of withdrawal liability
would undermine statutory purpose and policy. Although ERISA
clearly expresses a policy that withdrawal liability should be paid to
prevent the undermining of multiemployer pension plans,25 3 the more
conservative courts have suggested that a broad rule of shareholder
liability would actually undermine a key purpose of the withdrawal
liability system by discouraging employers from participating in
multiemployer pension plans in the future.254 Imposing individual
shareholder liability would obviously have no effect upon employers
already obligated to participate, however, because such employers
would not be permitted to abandon the plan without risking the imposition of liability upon their shareholders.255
E. The Norris-LaGuardiaAct
The Norris-LaGuardia Act, enacted in 1932 to remedy perceived abuses of the federal courts' power to enjoin strikes, prohibits
federal courts from issuing labor injunctions unless strict safeguards
are satisfied. 256' Because the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits rather
250. See Peles, 724 F. Supp. at 1557-58 (citing Solomon v. Klein, 770 F.2d 353, 354
(3d Cir. 1985)).
251. DeBreceni, 828 F.2d at 880; see P & M Coal, 801 F.2d at 1376-77.
252. See Connors v. B.M.C. Coal Co., 634 F. Supp. 74 (D.D.C. 1986) (applying both

Kentucky and federal law to determine whether an individual shareholder should be held responsible for a corporate withdrawal liability obligation).
253. See supra note 242.
254. See DeBreceni, 828 F.2d at 880; P & M Coal, 801 F.2d at 1376.
255. See DeBreceni, 828 F.2d at 880; see infra text accompanying note 407 (discussing
this argument further).
256. Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a federal court may only issue an injunction in
specifically enumerated classes of labor disputes, and then only when the court provides strict
due process guarantees and makes detailed factual findings. See Norris-LaGuardia Act §§ 4,
7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 107 (1988). In addition, the Act prohibits federal courts from enforcing
"yellow-dog contracts," under which an employee agrees to refrain from union membership as
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than authorizes federal court action, litigation under the Act has
been fairly limited, and veil-piercing questions have almost never
been raised.
In an unusually sensitive 1962 decision, however, the Second
Circuit indicated that state corporate law should not be applied to
Norris-LaGuardia Act veil-piercing problems, and that statutory
policy required a more liberal rule in this context.257 The court of
appeals held that even if two corporations would be considered separate "in [state] contract or tort litigation," "it d[id] not follow that
they ought to be so regarded for application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."2 58 The court explained that all veil-piercing questions
"must be resolved in the light of the policy underlying the applicable
legal rule," 259 and that the strong anti-injunction policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not "to be defeated by the fragmentation of
an integrated business into a congeries of corporate entities. ' 260 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that a strike could not be enjoined when two nominally separate corporations were actually one
employer engaged in a single industry for purposes of the Act, so
that picketing conducted at the second corporation was considered
part of a "labor dispute" and immune from injunction. 61
F. Title VII
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, sex, color, religion, or national origin.26 2 Although this purpose
is somewhat different from those of labor relations statutes like the
NLRA,263 NLRA veil-piercing law has been widely applied to resolve intercorporate veil-piercing questions under Title VII. On the
other hand, problems of individual Title VII liability have been consistently determined through application of Title VII's definition26 4of
the term "employer" rather than through veil-piercing doctrine.
a condition of employment. See Norris-LaGuardia Act § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
257. Bowater Steamship Co. v. Patterson, 303 F.2d 369, 372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 860 (1962).
258. 303 F.2d at 372.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 373.
261. See id. (citing Norris-LaGuardia Act § 13(a), 29 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1988)).
262. See Civil Rights Act § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
263. The NLRA does, of course, prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of
union activity. See NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). Indeed, the great majority of cases involving individual NLRA shareholder liability arise from corporate failures to
satisfy back pay obligations to victims of such discrimination.
264. Title VII defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce.., and any agent of such a person." Civil Rights Act § 701e(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
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Accordingly, in considering whether two or more nominally separate enterprises should be considered an "integrated enterprise" or

a "single employer" for Title VII purposes, most courts have accepted and applied the NLRA "single employer" test.2 65 As in the
NLRA context, courts determining the appropriateness of intercorporate Title VII liability consider whether two entities share com-

mon ownership, management, and integrated operations,266 and
devote particular attention to the existence of centralized control

over labor and personnel relations. 267 In the Title VII context, how(1988). Courts have considered individuals to be Title VII "employers" when they "'participate[] in the decision-making process that forms the basis of the discrimination,'" Hamilton v.
Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Jones v. Metropolitan Denver Sewage
Disposal Dist., 537 F. Supp. 966, 970 (D. Colo. 1982)), or "'control some aspect of an individual's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.'" Bostick v. Rappleyea,
629 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting Spirt v. TIAA, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1308
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984)). Insofar as these statutory "employers" are not necessarily
shareholders of corporate defendants, imposition of individual Title VII liability does not involve corporate law principles. See, e.g., Hallquist v. Max Fish Plumbing & Heating Co., 46
F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1855, 1859 (D. Mass. 1987) (imposing Title VII liability on a job site
superintendent). In most cases in which the corporate defendant is a small business, of course,
the responsible individual "employer" will be a shareholder. See, e.g., Burns v. Terre Haute
Regional Hosp., 581 F. Supp. 1301 (S.D. Ind. 1983). Courts have disagreed as to whether
individual Title VII "employers" may be held personally responsible for monetary obligations,
or, as in the NLRA context, may only be subject to injunctive orders. See House v. Cannon
Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 160 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
265. As in the NLRA context, the "single employer" doctrine has been applied for both
liability and jurisdictional purposes. See EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees Relief Ass'n,
727 F.2d 566, 571 n.1 (6th Cir. 1984).
The NLRA-based "single employer"/"integrated enterprise" doctrine has also been accepted in the context of Section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), a federal statute which can
also relate to racial discrimination in employment but cannot properly be deemed a "labor
law." See Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 1985)(distinguishing Section 1981 from labor laws like the NLRA and Title V 11). For examples of such Section 1981
cases, see Sargent v. McGrath, 685 F. Supp. 1087, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1988) and Greason v.
Southeastern R.R. Assoc. Bureaus, 650 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
266. See, e.g., Childs v. Local 18, IBEW, 719 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1983); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir. 1983); Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d
397, 404 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 707 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1983); Mas Marques v.
Digital Equip. Corp., 490 F. Supp. 56, 58 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 637 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1980);
Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977). In the Sixth Circuit, however, the "common ownership" criterion has sometimes been interpreted as demanding "an
inquiry into the legitimacy of the entities," so that single employer status will not be found
unless one of the entities is revealed as a "sham." Wooster Brush, 727 F,2d at 572. Title VII
intercorporate liability cases almost always involve parent-subsidiary relationships; brother-sister liability is much more rare, largely because double-breasting is not a feature of discrimination cases. Similarly, because employers have apparently not established new enterprises to
escape liability for employment discrimination, no cognate of the NLRA "alter ego" doctrine
has developed in Title VII or ADEA cases.
267. See Trevino, 701 F.2d at 404. Liability may nonetheless be imposed in the absence
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ever, consideration of the centralization of labor relations frequently
becomes an inquiry concerning the source of the key decisions relating to the plaintiff's employment, rather than an assessment of the
entities' general structure. 68
Despite this widespread acceptance of the "single employer"
doctrine, several courts have suggested that various refinements of
common law veil-piercing precepts are also appropriately invoked in
Title VII cases. 269 Accordingly, nominally distinct entities, especially
parents and subsidiaries, may be considered to form a single Title
VII "employer" when one is shown to be "merely the agent or instrumentality of the other," 270 or when a separate entity interferes in
particular transactions.27 '
On the other hand, courts have refused to hold parent corporations liable for their subsidiaries' Title VII violations "in the absence
of special circumstances, 272 suggesting that neither the text nor the
legislative history of Title VII supports such a maneuver. 3 However, no court has attempted to fashion a specific veil-piercing rule
for Title VII cases that would seek to protect Title VII policy or
prevent its frustration, and traditional corporate law doctrine invariably provides the benchmark for analysis.
G. The Age Discriminationin Employment Act
The ADEA imposes liability upon employers who discriminate
in employment on the basis of age.2 74 The statute is similar in purpose and policy to Title VII, and its veil-piercing doctrines are subof such centralized control. See Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1337-38.

268.

See Trevino, 701 F.2d at 404 (citing Odriozola v. Superior Cosmetic Distrib., 531

F. Supp. 1070, 1076 (D.P.R. 1982)).
269. Some courts have also suggested that Title VII's "single employer" test actually

only involves "ordinary principles of corporate law." Sargent v. McGrath, 685 F. Supp. 1087,
1089 (E.D. Wis. 1988).

270.

EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees Relief Ass'n, 727 F.2d 566, 571 (6th Cir.

1984); see also Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1184 (E.D.N.Y.

1979).
271.

See Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 44 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1119, 1124 (N.D. Ill.

1987) (holding a parent corporation liable for its subsidiary's acts of sexual harassment because the subsidiary's sexual harassment policy was distributed on the parent's letterhead and

the parent "actively participated in determining how to handle the discrimination charges").
272.

Watson v. Gulf & Western Indus., 650 F.2d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1981). The Watson

court suggested that such special circumstances might be found where the parent "participated
in or influenced the employment policies" of the subsidiary, or undercapitalized the subsidiary
"in a way that defeated potential recovery by a Title VII plaintiff." Id.
273. See, e.g., Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 432, 433 (W.D. Tenn.
1971), affid, 454 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1972).
274. See ADEA §4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988). The ADEA's prohibitions only protect employees over forty years of age. See ADEA § 12(a), 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988).
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stantially identical. Once again, however, no court has endeavored to

develop an ADEA-specific veil-piercing doctrine that is designed to
advance the statute's purpose and policies and to prevent their

frustration.
By analogy to Title VII -

and thus, derivatively, to the NLRA

the four-part "single employer"/integrated enterprise" test has

been widely adopted in the ADEA context." 5 Here too, centralized
control of labor relations provides the most important determinant,

and courts usually emphasize the degree of parental involvement in
the key decisions concerning the plaintiff's employment.

7

As in the

Title VII context, though, traditional veil-piercing theories also remain viable, so that a parent corporation may be held liable for its
subsidiary's ADEA violations if the parent "dominates" the subsidi-

ary,27 if the subsidiary is shown to be a mere "agent" or "instrumentality" of the parent,278 or if basic common law corporate transgressions are found.27 9 Because each of these inquiries assesses the
"degree of integration" between parent and subsidiary, however,
they may not properly constitute distinct tests. 80
275. See, e.g., Wood v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 725 F. Supp. 1244, 1248-49
(N.D. Ga. 1989); EEOC v. KWMT, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1425, 1427 (N.D. Iowa 1988) (applying the "single employer" test in the brother-sister context); Beckwith v. International Mill
Serv., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 187, 189 & n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (applying the "single employer" test
in the parent-subsidiary context and noting that application of Title VII doctrine is appropriate in ADEA cases pursuant to Oscar Meyer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979)).
Individual ADEA liability has also been analyzed in a manner similar to Title VII: individuals have only been found liable on the ground that they are statutory "employers," usually
supervisory employees to whom employment decisions have been delegated. See House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 161-62 (M.D.N.C. 1988); York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone
Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982); see also ADEA § 11(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988)
(defining "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce" and "any
agent of such a person").
276. See Johnson v. Flowers Indus., 814 F.2d 978, 981 (4th Cir. 1987)(suggesting that a
parent corporation may be liable under the ADEA if it "hired and fired the subsidiary employees, routinely shifted them between the two companies, and supervised their daily operations");
Leichihman v. Pickwick Int'l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1268 (8th Cir. 1987)(refusing to hold a parent
corporation liable for its subsidiary's alleged ADEA violation in the absence of "evidence linking [the parent] to any of [the subsidiary's] individual employment decisions" concerning the
plaintiff).
277. Johnson, 814 F.2d at 980.
278. See Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 324, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Linskey v.Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1184 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
279. See Johnson, 814 F.2d at 981 (suggesting that a parent corporation may be liable
for a subsidiary's ADEA violations if finances are commingled, corporate formalities are ignored, or the subsidiary is undercapitalized); Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968)(holding that parental ADEA liability is appropriate
if "recognition of the corporate entity would defeat public policy or shield someone from liability for a crime.").
280. Berkowitz v. Allied Stores, 541 F. Supp. 1215 (E.D.Pa. 1982); but see Wood v.
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H. The Fair Labor Standards Act
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA") which regulates the payment of minimum and overtime wages, contains several
rather unusual statutory definitions that have led to the development
of equally unusual veil-piercing doctrines. 81 In most instances, however, liability is imposed on grounds unrelated to stock ownership,
and to that extent veil-piercing concerns are not directly implicated.
When veil-piercing is actually considered, traditional, restrictive doctrines appear to apply.
1. IntercorporateLiability
The FLSA contains a complex provision that establishes the
Act's jurisdiction over particular employers. FLSA jurisdiction lies
over any "enterprise" - "the related activities performed (either
through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, [including] all such activities
whether performed in one or more establishments or by one or more
corporate or other organizational units" 28 2 - that maintains a sufficient volume of business.283 Although corporate lines are not
respected, common ownership between entities is not sufficient in itself to create a single FLSA "enterprise," so that commonly held
corporations will be considered independent under the FLSA if they
maintain distinct business purposes.2 84
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 725 F. Supp. 1244, 1248-49 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (suggesting the

existence of four distinct tests for intercorporate ADEA liability).
The recently enacted ADA, which prohibits private employers from discriminating on the

basis of disability, has not yet generated veil-piercing doctrines but it is likely that such doctrines will develop in a fashion similar to Title VII and the ADEA. The ADA is substantially
identical in purpose to other anti-discrimination statutes like Title VII and the ADEA, and it

contains a similar definition of the term "employer." See ADA § 101(5)(A) (defining "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees ... and any agent of such person").
281. See generally P. BLUMBERG, supra note 100, at § 15.02 (discussing FLSA veilpiercing law).
282. FLSA § 3(r), 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1982); see Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d
965, 969 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1124 (1985) (holding that an FLSA "enter-

prise" exists "despite corporate fragmentation in operation," when "(A) the corporations perform related activities, (B) through unified operation or common control, (C) for a common
business purpose.").

283. See, e.g., Donovan v. Sideris, 688 F.2d 74, 75 (8th Cir. 1982).
284.

See Donovan v. Shteiwi, 563 F. Supp. 118, 122 (S.D. Ohio 1983), afid, 738 F.2d

438 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Donovan v. Breaker of America, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1016, 1021
(E.D. Ark. 1983) (finding that "[tihe fact of stock ownership by . . . [a single individual] in
one or more [entities] . . . does not by itself demonstrate unified ownership or common
control").
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But this "enterprise" analysis is designed only to determine
whether an offending entity falls under the coverage of the FLSA; it
appears to have no bearing on actual FLSA liability for other mem-

bers of the "enterprise." Accordingly, one court of appeals has concluded that assessment of intercorporate FLSA liability should differ

from the jurisdictional analysis.28 5 Although the court did not set
forth the veil-piercing standard it considered appropriate, it refused

to impose liability on one member of an "enterprise" for another
member's FLSA violations because the first entity had no responsibility for the other corporation's labor relations or day-to-day af-

fairs.286 Similarly, another court has indicated that parent corporations are not automatically liable for their subsidiaries' FLSA
violations but may be held liable only in appropriate (but not enumerated) circumstances.2 8 7 In one early case, though, a parent was
found to be an FLSA "employer" when its grip over a subsidiary's
board allowed it to direct the subsidiary's management and control

the terms and conditions of employment for its subsidiary's
employees.2 s8
In addition to the statutory "enterprise" theory, the "single em-

ployer" test may be applicable in the FLSA context. One district
court invoked the doctrine in a case involving alleged violations of

both the FLSA and the ADEA, 289 and several courts have held that
two corporations are FLSA "joint employers" based on evidence of
operational integration - evidence that is more appropriately used
to sustain a "single employer" finding. 290 The "alter ego" doctrine
does not yet seem to have been adapted to the FLSA context, al-

though liability has been imposed under the related NLRA successorship doctrine.29 1 Most important, no FLSA case has tried to for285. See Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 635-36 (11th Cir. 1986).
286. See id. at 637. The Patel court's attention to operational control and labor relations
suggests the application of the NLRA-derived "single employer" doctrine, but the court did
not make its reliance explicit.
287. See Gottschall v. Pennsylvania Hardwood Prods., 28 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA)
620, 621 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1987) (denying a parent corporation's motion to dismiss an FLSA
action involving its subsidiary's wage and hour violations, on the ground that the "precise
relationship" between the parent and subsidiary "must be further examined after discovery is
completed"). However, the Gottschall court did not indicate what standards it would apply to
determine the parent's FLSA liability upon completion of discovery. Id.
288. See Dolan v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mass. 1946).
289. See Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 324, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
290. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Lunde Truck Sales, 714 F. Supp. 920, 924 (N.D. Il1.
1989); Brennan v. P.W.D. Mining Co., 76 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 33,215, at 46,890 (E.D. Ky.
July 3, 1974).
291. See Brock v. LaGrange Equip. Co., 28 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 780, 781-82 (D.
Neb. July 14, 1987). The NLRA successorship doctrines provide that an employer that takes
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mulate an FLSA veil-piercing rule that seeks to advance the
particular statutory policies of the FLSA, and the specter of traditional corporate law appears to haunt judicial analysis.
2. Individual Liability

The FLSA contains an exceptionally broad definition of the
term "employer" that has been interpreted to permit imposition of
liability upon any individual that would be the likely object of a veilpiercing action.2 92 Under this definition, individual FLSA liability

may be imposed without evidence of common law transgressions;
rather, any "corporate officer with operational control of a corporation's covered enterprise is an employer along with the corporation,
jointly and severally liable under the FLSA. '2 9 3 On the other hand,
controlling shareholders are not automatically liable for corporate
FLSA violations.294
As with other interpretations of statutory definitions of the term
"employer," however, FLSA individual liability decisions do not necessarily implicate corporate law principles, and veil-piercing doctrine
is thus almost never considered in the cases. 29 5 Even if they hold no
over an existing business will inherit certain NLRA obligations from its predecessor if it maintains a substantially identical business operation and hires a majority of the predecessor's
workforce. See, e.g., NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (setting forth
the parameters of a successor's obligation to bargain with a predecessor's union); Golden State
Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973) (setting forth the parameters of a successor's
liability for its predecessor's unfair labor practices).
292. FLSA Section 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1988), defines "employer" as "any person
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee." Under
this definition, nominally separate corporate entities may also be considered "employers" if
they exercise the same kinds of operational control that would result in "employer" status for
individuals. See Brock v. Hutto, 27 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 573, 577 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 30,
1985); see also Hodgson v. Servomation-Ajax Co., 323 F. Supp. 1047 (N.D. Miss. 1971)
(holding that a parent corporation was the "employer" of its subsidiary's employees for FLSA
purposes, because the subsidiary was under the parent's domination and the parent maintained
control of the subsidiary's books and accounts).
293. Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511-12 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Donovan v.
Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 965, 969 (5th Cir. 1984)(imposing individual FLSA liability
through application of the Agnew test).
294. The FLSA's definition of "employer" will not be applied to hold liable every "corporate officer or other employee with ultimate operational control over payroll matters." Agnew, 712 F.2d at 1513. Similarly, courts have held that "mere common stock ownership and
common directors is [not] sufficient to justify a ruling that a holding company is the employer
of the [employees] employed by its subsidiary." Torres Romero v. American R. Co., 12 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 1 63,690, at 70,824 (D.P.R. Mar. 28, 1947).
295. But see Miller v. Tony and Susan Alamo Found., 924 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1991)
(affirming the imposition of liability on individual shareholders for corporate violations of the
FLSA and federal prevailing-wage law, based on district court findings of traditional corporate
law transgressions).
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ownership interest in the offending corporation, for example, dominant officers29 6 or fellow employees a 7 may be held liable as FLSA
"employers" if the individual upon whom liability is imposed "had
supervisory authority over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or in part for the alleged violation."2 8
I.

The OccupationalSafety and Health Act of 1970

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA"),
which regulates workplace safety, has not generated a substantial
body of veil-piercing law, although various problems of shareholder
liability have been raised. 299 Several decisions of the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission ("OSHRC") have adapted
the NLRA "single employer" doctrine to the OSHA context, holding that two companies will be considered one when they integrate
their business operations, labor relations, management, and ownership.30 0 In this context, however, the OSHRC focuses its attention on
the particular location at which safety violations occur, by considering whether the two entities' employees share a common worksite
and are exposed to the same hazardous conditions. 30 ' The OSHRC
has also considered problems of individual OSHA liability, but it has
neither expressed a willingness to impose automatic shareholder liability nor devised a clear alternative test.3 0 2 Certain decisions indi296. See Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 194-95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1249 (1983). The Sabine court specifically held
that "neither the [FLSA] nor jurisprudence designates stock ownership in a corporate employer as the sine qua non of employer status where other forms of control of the employment
relationship have been proven." Id. at 195.
297. See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987).
298. Id.
299. See P. BLUMBERG.supra note 100, at § 15.03 (discussing OSHA veil-piercing law).
300. See, e.g., Advance Specialty Co., 1975-76 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) T 20,490, at 24,484
(Mar. 5, 1976); Home Supply Co., 1973-74 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) T 17,521, at 21,978 (Mar. 28,
1974) (holding that three companies formed a "joint enterprise" on a work project when they
integrated their work, shifted employees between entities, and assigned responsibility for all
employees to a single supervisor); see also Lassiter Excavation, Inc., 13 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)
1315, 1316 (April 2, 1987) (finding two entities to be separate, despite common ownership and
control, because they did not interchange employees or equipment or work on the same
projects); Bob McCaslin Steel Erection Co., 1974-75 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1 19,755, at 23,568
(June 23, 1975) (affirming, in a decision without precedential weight, a commissioner's ruling
that the purposes of OSHA were best effectuated by treating two companies as one when they
worked on a single worksite, integrated their work and employees, and shared common ownership, management, and supervision). Recently, the OSHRC has held that a parent corporation
will not be held liable for its subsidiary's OSHA violations simply because the two corporations
share management personnel. See Hills Dept. Stores, 1989-90 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1 29,075,
at 38,853 (Aug. 13, 1990).
301. See Advance Specialty Co., 1975-76 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 24,484.
302. See Life Science Products Co., 1977-78 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1 22,313 (Nov. 11,
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cate, however, that the matter is considered a problem of federal
law, and will be resolved in a manner that prevents the frustration of
OSHA. 303
J. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
("WARN") imposes penalties upon employers that fail to provide
their employees with advance notice of plant closings or mass layoffs.30 4 Because WARN only became effective in early 1989, no
body of veil-piercing law has developed so far. In the only case yet to
address veil-piercing questions, however, a New Jersey district court,
acting through a magistrate, applied generic federal veil-piercing
principles to hold that a parent corporation and a shareholder could
be added as appropriate defendants in a WARN action.30 5 The court
made no attempt to consider the veil-piercing question in the light of
WARN's particular purposes and policies.
Future WARN veil-piercing analysis will probably involve some
degree of reliance on interpretive regulations issued by the Department of Labor. 06 However, these regulations indicate that existing
labor law veil-piercing principles should be adopted in the WARN
context. The regulations therefore provide that a parent and subsidiary should be considered a single "employer" for WARN purposes
"depending upon the degree of [the subsidiary's] independence from
1977), affd sub nom. Moore v. OSHRC, 1979 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 123,306 (4th Cir. Feb. 1,
1977) (imposing individual liability upon corporate officers based on a state statute relating to

dissolved corporations and based on their status as OSHA "employers"); Vincent Rizzo, 197475 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)

18,708, at 22,606 (Sept. 25, 1974) (holding that a corporate presi-

dent was not an OSHA "employer" despite his power to sign contracts and paychecks and to
exercise direction and control over employees). In Life Science, however, the OSHRC chairman's opinion noted that the holding in that case did not represent a decision to pierce the
corporate veil. See id., 1977-78 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 26,876.
303. See Life Science, 1977-78 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 26,874 n.12 (opinion of Commissioner Cleary).

In addition, a version of the "joint employer" theory has been applied in numerous OSHA
cases, so that liability is imposed on companies that share a common worksite in such a way
that work done by one company endangers the employees of another. See, e.g., Beatty Equip.

Leasing v. Secretary of Labor, 577 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1978). Once again, however, corporate
law principles do not come into play in cases of this kind, because these entities generally share
no ownership connection or any link other than their presence on a single worksite.
304. See WARN § 5(a), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (Supp. 1990).
305. Finkler v. Elsinore Shore Assocs., Civ. Case No. 89-2330 (D.N.J. filed March 14,

1990).
306. See WARN § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (1990 Supp.). The mandate is especially
unusual in that the Department of Labor apparently has no role in WARN enforcement. See

54 Fed. Reg. 16,043 (1989) ("all [WARN] enforcement will occur in the context of private
civil lawsuits").
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the parent," and based upon examination of whether the two entities
share common ownership, common directors or officers, de facto exercise of control, unity of personnel policies emanating from a common source, and interdependent operations.3 07 This provision is, of
course, essentially a statement of the NLRA-derived "single employer" doctrine. Although the regulations themselves do not address

the problem of individual shareholder liability for WARN violations,
the Department of Labor's introductory analysis notes the Department's view that principles of state corporation law and federal labor
law "adequately cover" veil-piercing issues under WARN and that
no specialized body of WARN veil-piercing law is necessary.30 8
III.

VINDICATING THE LABOR LAWS: TOWARD

AN

EFFECTIVE

VEIL-PIERCING DOCTRINE

Review of existing labor law veil-piercing doctrine demonstrates
that the federal courts have shown undue loyalty to traditional common law principles and have generally ignored their obligation to
fashion veil-piercing rules that are designed to advance the policies
of the federal labor laws. In most cases, courts have instead relied on
theories developed in extraneous contexts, whether it be state corporate law doctrine or an undifferentiated mass of federal common
law. The few labor-specific principles that have emerged, moreover,
307. 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2) (1991).
308. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,045 (1989). Several other federal statutes involve workers' rights
but only implicate the employment relationship in a tangential manner. The FELA permits
tort recoveries from railroads by workers who are injured in the course of their employment.
There have been few veil-piercing decisions under the FELA, but one Fifth Circuit case applied a decidedly unusual analysis to a plaintiff's attempt to impose FELA liability on a parent
corporation. See Selser v. Pacific Motor Trucking Co., 770 F.2d 551, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1985).
The court of appeals noted that liability could not be imposed under the prevailing legal rule
which it derived from Alabama corporate law - and that liability was only possible if
limited liability could be considered a "'rule'" or "'device'" whose purpose was the avoidance of FELA liability. See id. at 554 (quoting FELA § 5, 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1988)). The
FELA nullifies such "rules" and "devices." See FELA § 5, 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1988). Because
the subsidiary tortfeasor had not been formed with the purpose of avoiding FELA liability,
however, and because the parent had not committed common law transgressions such as subjecting the subsidiary to its "domination," liability was not imposed. See Selser, 770 F.2d at
554-55. As examples of other cases that discuss FELA veil-piercing problems, see Eddings v.
Collins Pine Co., 140 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Cal. 1956), and Southern R. Co. v. Crosby, 201
F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1953).
The Jones Act establishes a tort recovery scheme for employees injured in maritime employment. There has been little Jones Act veil-piercing litigation, but in one case, the Ninth
Circuit applied traditional corporate law principles to hold that a parent could not be held
liable for its subsidiary's Jones Act violations in the absence of "total domination" of the
subsidiary. See Kilkenny v. Arco Marine, Inc., 800 F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987).
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have also assumed the restrictions imposed by traditional corporate
law and have failed to take into account the effect of limited liability
on the purposes and policies of the labor laws. As a result, federal
labor laws are widely frustrated through unjustified deference to corporate law principles that are entirely irrelevant to labor policy. This
article proposes that courts and administrative agencies abandon
their current approach and begin to develop a body of labor-specific
doctrine that seeks to vindicate federal labor policy rather than state
corporate law.
Accordingly, I suggest a simple new rule: that corporate affiliates and shareholders of closely held corporations should be held responsible for all unsatisfied corporate labor law obligations. In the
great majority of cases, such a rule would mean imposing liability
for unpaid monetary obligations, such as back pay to victims of discrimination or contribution payments to employee benefit trusts. In
other instances, it would involve binding commonly owned corporations to each other's collective bargaining agreements. Below, I analyze the purposes and policies of the various federal labor laws and
argue that such a broad rule of shareholder liability would better
serve those goals.
Because the principle of limited liability is so firmly established
in American law, however, its erasure in any context, even a narrow
and exceptional area such as labor relations, should not be undertaken lightly. Before embarking on an analysis of the appropriate
contours of a revised labor law veil-piercing doctrine, therefore, I
will consider the principal theoretical barriers to more worker-protective veil-piercing rules. I conclude that such revised rules make
sense in light of contemporary corporate law scholarship, because
workers are essentially involuntary creditors with little power to secure protections against corporate defaults, and because limited liability is of little value, except perhaps to corporations whose shares
are publicly traded and widely diffused among different owners.
A.

Potential Barriers to a Broader Rule of Shareholder Liability

Although the universal acceptance of the limited liability doctrine tends to induce recitation rather than explanation, the rule has
been justified on a variety of grounds. First, numerous commentators
have suggested that a change in the limited liability rule is unwarranted because corporations' creditors should protect themselves
from the possibility of a corporate default by negotiating appropriate
guarantees from shareholders. Creditors that fail to do so, the argument goes, should be considered to have assumed the risk of corpo-
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rate insolvency. This position makes some sense with respect to sophisticated business creditors who have sufficient expertise and
bargaining power to demand and receive shareholder guarantees or
similar protections. For tort creditors, however, who have no opportunity to negotiate with the corporation before incurring their
claims, or creditors whose lack of bargaining power effectively precludes such negotiation, the argument is unpersuasive. I consider
these contentions in more detail below, and conclude that because
employees generally lack bargaining power, and because many labor
claims, such as those based on discrimination in employment, are
tort-like in nature, this assumption of risk argument presents no obstacle to a more liberal labor law veil-piercing doctrine.
Second, the limited liability doctrine is frequently presented as
an essential business incentive, such that modification or abrogation
of the traditional rule would discourage investment. As explained below, however, scholarly analysis suggests that the importance of limited corporate liability is greatly exaggerated, because capitalist
economies may flourish without such a regime and because most
creditors -those with adequate bargaining power - can and do negotiate around the rule. On the other hand, because of its role in
facilitating passive investment and stock markets, the limited liability principle may hold considerable importance for corporations
whose shares are publicly traded. In contrast, eliminating limited liability for corporations whose stock is not publicly traded should not
have a deleterious effect.
1. Classes of Creditors and the Assu'mption of Risk
The great majority of corporate creditors deal by contract,
whether the contract takes the form of a complex, carefully negotiated financing agreement or a standard preprinted invoice. Because
contracts are voluntary arrangements, creditors are theoretically able
to determine the corporation's solvency in advance and to take appropriate protective measures, such as securing shareholder guarantees of the corporation's obligations or demanding a high rate of interest to compensate for the risk of default.309 If a contract creditor
309.

See Hackney & Benson, supra note 28, at 861-62; Downs, supra note 37, at 197

(suggesting that contract creditors "may demand corporate financial statements so that the
corporation's financial condition may be evaluated"). But cf. Blumberg, Limited Liability,
supra note 43, at 622 (noting that in assessing the appropriateness of a veil-piercing rule based

on assumption of risk, it is necessary to consider whether the transaction costs involved in
securing sufficiently complete and accurate information about a corporation would render such

a rule inefficient).
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fails to take advantage of these opportunities, many commentators
argue, she may be said to have assumed the risk that the corporation
10

3
will fail to repay the loan.
In contrast, most tort creditors - such as pedestrians injured
by corporate trucks - have no dealings with the corporation before
incurring their claims, let alone an opportunity to investigate the
corporation's solvency and obtain appropriate protections.3 11 Accordingly, most commentators have suggested that a more liberal veilpiercing doctrine is appropriate in tort cases,312 and some have proposed eliminating the limited liability rule with respect to most tort
31 3
creditors.
In practice, however, tort creditors have not actually achieved a
more favorable position, because courts deciding veil-piercing cases
have generally ignored the scholars' distinction between tort and
contract claimants.3 14 Indeed, judicial indifference may actually have

310. See, e.g., Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also
Comment, Disregardingthe Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 458-59
(1967). Such a rule could not be applicable to all cases. See, e.g., Downs, supra note 37, at
197 (suggesting exceptions in circumstances that preclude effective credit negotiations, as
when the existence of the corporation is concealed, creating the impression that the contract is
made on behalf of individual shareholders, or when the corporation commits fraudulent acts
such as misrepresenting its corporate status or its relationship to its parent).
311. See Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 274 n.17 (3d Cir. 1967)(stating that "[a] person who travels on the river, like a person who travels on the highway, does not evaluate the
financial responsibility or structure of each person who may collide with him."), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 988 (1968). Tort claimants are not the only group of involuntary creditors. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1014 (1986) (noting that the federal government is essentially an involuntary creditor
when it is required to extend subsidies to all financially qualified applicants, including undercapitalized, fraudulently mismanaged corporations).
312. See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 28, at 392.
313. See, e.g., Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 145 (1980); Hansmann & Kraakman,
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liabilityfor Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991).
314. See Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Epperson & Canny, supra note 29, at 633 (contending that "[d]espite extensive scholarship on the
issue, however, most courts have failed to distinguish between tort and contract in deciding
whether to disregard the corporate entity"); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 146, at 348 (1983) (noting that "[c]ourts usually cite indiscriminately contract and tort cases as precedents."). Robert Clark has contended,
however, that distinctions between contract and tort creditors, "in their essence, have been
accepted by judges for decades," as seen in the actual outcomes of different veil-piercing cases.
Clark, supra note 32, at 542 n.98. Indeed, some courts have accepted the contract-tort distinction. See, e.g., West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 586 (W.D. Va. 1983) (stating that "a victim
of a statutory illegality or tort may be more entitled to pierce [a corporate veil] because, unlike
a contractual creditor, the former's dealings with the corporation are involuntary and uninformed"); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610, 618
(D. Me. 1977), affd sub nom. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. T.P. Property Corp., 583
F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1978) (suggesting that a contract creditor should only be able to reach a
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placed tort creditors in a worse position than contract creditors:
when a business is first incorporated, for example, many business
creditors do in fact manage to secure shareholder guarantees, so that
the limited liability principle is left to shield the corporation against
315

tort claims alone.

On closer examination, moreover, the rigid distinction between

contract and tort claimants is a questionable one, because it assumes
that all contract creditors' claims arise from genuinely consensual
transactions and ignores the important variations in bargaining
power between different kinds of contract creditors. °1 6 For example,
many commentators group financial creditors and ordinary trade
creditors together, even though a commercial lender that provides
the lifeblood of a business is far more capable of investigating a corporate debtor's solvency and securing advantageous loan terms than
is a small supply company. 1 7 When the creditor is an unskilled employee, the imbalance becomes a great deal more severe. Accordingly, most commentators suggest that the corporate veil should not
be strictly protected in every case involving a facially "voluntary"

transaction, but only in those involving claims by contract creditors
with sufficient bargaining power to permit them successfully to ob-

tain shareholder guarantees or similar protections.318
parent corporation's assets when it can demonstrate actual fraud, "because contracts are private, consensual relationships in which each party has a clear and equal obligation to weigh
the potential benefits and risks of the agreement"). In Penntech, the "contract creditor" was a
labor union that sought to enforce a collective bargaining agreement - an indication that
courts deciding "contract" veil-piercing cases may be insensitive to variations in bargaining
power. See Barber, supra note 22, at 386; see also infra text accompanying notes 332-34
(explaining that collective bargaining agreements are not properly treated as ordinary
contracts).
315. See Hazen, The Decision to Incorporate, 58 NEB. L. REv. 627, 632 (1979).
316. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 618-19. Some commentators
applaud these omissions, suggesting that "distributional concerns" should be considered entirely irrelevant to veil-piercing questions. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24, at 106.
As with other problems of bargaining power, differences in the parties' level of sophistication
should also be taken into account. See Labadie Coal, 672 F.2d at 100 (quoting Barber, supra
note 29, at 386) (noting that an assumption that contract creditors "lack [of] sophistication is
equally tenable against the presumption that they knowingly assumed the risk of the corporation's undercapitalization"); see also Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 614-24 (1982) (analyzing the theory of unequal bargaining
power).
317. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 618; see also Krendl & Krendl,
supra note 23, at 33-34 & n.120 (suggesting that small businesses should not be generally
considered sufficiently sophisticated to have assumed the risk of corporate insolvency).
318. See Hackney & Benson, supra note 28, at 861; Gelb, Piercing the Corporate Veil
The UndercapitalizationFactor, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 13 (1982). One commentator
suggests in this regard that "[tihe crucial question is whether in the market, the injured party
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Somewhat surprisingly, commentators have disagreed as to
whether employees are sufficiently lacking in bargaining power to be
spared the harsh "assumption of risk" principle. Some neoclassical
economists suggest, rather fantastically, that employees bargain for
wage premiums to compensate for the risk of corporate default, by
means of collective bargaining agreements or (usually fictional) independent employment contracts.319 Most analysts, however, recognize
3 20
that employees are rarely powerful enough to protect themselves.

Of all creditors, "[e]mployees have the most severe informational
disabilities," because their involvement with the corporation is generally extremely narrow in scope, permitting no contact with the corporation's business dealings that would allow assessment of its financial position. 21 More important, unlike the supplier who may deal
with a hundred customers and thereby absorb the risk that a few of
them will default, most employees are dependent on a single corporation to sustain their livelihoods, and cannot diversify their claims at
all. 22 The consequences of a corporate employer's default will be
particularly devastating to workers in a depressed job market in
had the economic strength to bargain on the terms of the transaction pertaining to the credit
aspects, including a price adjustment to reflect the financial condition of the other party."
Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 618.
319. See Posner, The Rights of Creditorsof Affiliated Corporations,43 U. CHI. L. REV.
499, 506 (1976) (stating that "the wage rate can adjust to compensate the worker for the risk
of nonpayment" of wages and workers' compensation claims); Halpern, Trebilcock, &
Turnbull, supra note 313, at 128 (suggesting that workers will compensate for the risk of
corporate default in setting their wage rates); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24,
at 104 (arguing that "[e]mployees, consumers, trade creditors, and lenders are voluntary creditors" and that all of them may effectively demand compensation or security from corporations
or their shareholders in accordance with the risk). But cf. Musikiwama v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d
740, 749 (7th Cir. 1985)("[e]mployees are not compensated, ex ante, for the risk that their
employer might discriminate against them. . . . [B]y enacting the antidiscrimination laws,
Congress has already determined that employment discrimination should be eradicated and
that there should never be a risk of employment discrimination.").
320. See Hackney & Benson, supra note 28, at 863 (arguing that employees lack "the
bargaining power ... to be properly compensated or to insist that [corporate] obligation[s] be
secured or guaranteed"); Hamilton, supra note 28, at 984-85 n.20 (suggesting that
"[e]mployees often fall into" the class of contract creditors who "lack the bargaining power to
insist that the [corporate] obligation be guaranteed by a solvent person"); see also Manne,
supra note 30, at 263 (discussing the history of employee rights against insolvent
corporations).
321. Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 619. See Halpern, Trebilcock &
Turnbull, supra note 313 at 149 (suggesting that compared to other creditors, employees may
sometimes have unusually good access to information about the corporation, and that they
"can use this information in setting the terms and conditions of employment," but emphasizing
that information of this kind is likely to be available only to accounting and marketing
employees).
322. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 619; see also Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 313, at 149.
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which alternative employment opportunities are lacking. 328

Given their severe informational disabilities, and their overwhelming dependence on the corporations to which they supply their

labor, employees should properly be considered involuntary creditors.
Indeed, the typical claimants in labor law veil-piercing cases -

such

as the individual victims of NLRA unfair labor practices or invidious employment discrimination -

are most accurately considered

tort creditors of a sort, because their injuries are not the consequence
of consensual transactions.3 2 It has also been suggested that labor
claims like these are actually "public torts" and, accordingly, that

there is an unusually strong government interest in assuring their
32 5
correction.
When employees unionize for mutual protection, their bargaining power and information-gathering abilities are probably enhanced
to some degree. 328 Unionism emerged, after all, from workers' recognition that unity makes power and no "force on earth is weaker than
the feeble strength of one." Under the amended NLRA, however,
particularly as it has been interpreted in recent years, unions are
effectively deprived of viable economic weaponry and bargaining
323. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 619; Halpern, Trebilcock &
Turnbull, supra note 313, at 143. Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull contend that, in a perfect
market, variations in employees' marketability in the event of a default by their corporate
employer would be reflected in pay levels, with less marketable employees receiving a premium. Id.
Because the real world is highly imperfect, however, these commentators argue that employees' relative inability to absorb losses should permit at least partial relaxation of the limited liability rule with respect to their claims. Id. at 149-50.
324. In addition, many ERISA plaintiffs, such as multiemployer employee benefit funds,
are third parties whose relationships to corporate employers are fixed by negotiations between
outsiders, usually a union and the employer itself. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S.
322, 333-34 (1981) (explaining that ERISA trusts are legally separate from participating unions and employers).
325. See, e.g., NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S.
418, 424 (1968) ("A proceeding by the [NLRB] is not to adjudicate private rights but to
effectuate a public policy"); In re Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937, 965, enfd as
modified, 116 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1940) (citing NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938)) (characterizing NLRA unfair labor practices as
"public torts").
326. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24, at 105 (suggesting that unions may
understand the risks of certain corporate behavior better than individual employees); see also
J. O'REILLY. UNIONs' RIGHTS To COMPANY INFORMATION (rev. ed. 1987) (describing management's obligation under the NLRA to supply certain kinds of information to unions). In
some decidedly isolated contexts, unions may even come to achieve overwhelmingly greater
bargaining power than a particular employer. See, e.g., Operating Engineers Pension Trust v.
Giorgi, 788 F.2d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1986)(enforcing a collective bargaining agreement against
a small sub-contractor even though the sub-contractor may have relied on misrepresentations
made by the agent of a large union).
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27

Beyond this general lack of bargaining power, moreover, existing labor law doctrine imposes specific obstacles that prevent unions from negotiating to obtain protections such as shareholder guarantees of corporate obligations. Unlike commercial creditors, who
may freely choose not to do business with a corporation that refuses

to provide such protections, a union's attempt to cease doing business
with such a corporation - by initiating a strike or even by refusing
to conclude a collective bargaining agreement without safeguards of
this kind - could easily be enjoined.328 Similarly, a union is not
even permitted to demand that a subsidiary agree to extend the

terms of a collective bargaining agreement to its parent or to other
commonly owned entities, 29 or to cease its relationship with a par327. See Hogler, Critical Labor Law, Working-Class History, and the New Industrial
Relations (Book Review), 10 INDUs. REL. L.J. 116, 129 (1988) (noting that American labor
law has "created an inequality in bargaining power by limiting or proscribing unions' economic
weapons and the scope of subjects over which [unions] might bargain"); see also, e.g., Pattern
Makers League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985) (holding that under the NLRA unions may not
assure strike solidarity by disciplining strikebreaking members); First Nat'l Maintenance Co.
v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (holding that management has no NLRA obligation to bargain concerning most plant closing decisions); cf. Trans World Airlines v. International Fed. of
Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989) (holding that under the RLA, and the NLRA, management is not required to return economic strikers to their jobs according to seniority but may
retain senior positions for employees who crossed the picket line).
328. Under the NLRA, a union's proposal that shareholders guarantee corporate obligations would likely be considered a "permissive" subject of collective bargaining because it relates only indirectly to the "terms and conditions of employment." See NLRA §§ 8(a)(5),
8(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 8(d) (1988) (providing that NLRA bargaining obligations only
extend to the "terms and conditions of employment"); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958) (establishing the distinction between "mandatory" and
"permissive" bargaining subjects under the NLRA); cf. NLRB v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 542, 532 F.2d 902, 907 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072
(1977) (holding that a union's proposal to bind a parent to its subsidiary's collective bargaining agreement is a permissive bargaining subject). Because employers and unions are forbidden from insisting on the adoption of permissive terms or from unleashing economic weapons
to force their acceptance, any economic action to force a corporate employer to accede to such
a provision would be considered illegal and would likely prompt the NLRB to seek injunctive
relief under NLRA Section 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1988). A union's refusal to conclude an
agreement without shareholder guarantees would itself fall afoul of NLRA Section 8(b)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1988), see Operating Engineers, Local 542, 532 F.2d at 907, and could
also be enjoined under Section 10(j).
329. See D'Amico v. Painters & Allied Trades District Council No. 51, 120 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3473, 3478 (D. Md. 1985); OperatingEngineers, Local 542, 532 F.2d at 905-06. Such
a provision has been held to violate the NLRA's "hot cargo" provision, Section 8(e), 29
U.S.C. § 158(e) (1988). See Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and EmergingPossibilities,55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 111-19 (1988). Union conduct of this
kind is only permitted if it is found to constitute an attempt to preserve existing work for the
union's members. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); see
also R.B. Electric, Inc. v. IBEW Local 569, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2821, 2825 (S.D. Cal.
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ticular corporation
if the corporation becomes affiliated with a non33 0
union enterprise.
Labor law strictures also prohibit unions from using economic
weapons against the shareholders who own and control a particular

corporation. Only the corporation itself has a bargaining obligation.
A union could thus face injunction proceedings, for example, if it
picketed a parent corporation to attempt to force the parent to accept a subsidiary's collective bargaining agreement or to arbitrate a
particular grievance arising under such an agreement - even if the
grievance involved a parent-initiated decision to close the subsidiary's plant and sentence all the union's members to
3 31
unemployment.
Finally, under existing doctrine, it is inappropriate to treat unions' contract claims as conventional contract problems. Collective
bargaining agreements between unions and employers are considered
entirely different animals from ordinary commercial contracts; labor
agreements are not memorializations of dry business deals but "effort[s] to erect a system of industrial self-government. 33 2 Accordingly, the "same old common-law concepts which control" commercial contracts are inapplicable to labor contracts, 33 which instead
1985), aftd, 781 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986) (compelling an employer to arbitrate an alleged
violation of the "model" anti-double breasting clause struck down in D'Amico, on the ground
that an arbitrator might interpret the clause as a legitimate attempt at work preservation).
330. See Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 91 v. NLRB, 905 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(invalidating under Section 8(e) an "integrity clause" that granted the union the right to terminate a collective bargaining agreement if the signatory company acquired any ownership
interest in a non-union company).
331. See, e.g., Local 2208, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 285
N.L.R.B. 834 (1987) (holding that picketing for the purpose of coercing a parent company to
pressure its subsidiary to resolve a labor dispute is "secondary" in nature and therefore violative of NLRA Section 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988)); but see United Steelworkers,
288 N.L.R.B. 1190 (1988) (holding, based on Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), that union handbilling to urge a boycott
against a parent corporation and various subsidiaries does not violate Section 8(b)(4)). Picketing a parent corporation would also leave the union open to a damages action under LMRA
Section 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1988). The factual scenario suggested in the text, it should be
emphasized, has provided the setting for several LMRA veil-piercing decisions, in which the
courts held that the parent would escape liability because it assured that the closure decision
was made pursuant to the "ordinary" exercise of ownership control. See, e.g., United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. T.P. Property Corp., 583 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1978).
332. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960);
accord Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385 U.S. 157,
160-61 (1966).
333. Union Pacific, 385 U.S. at 160; see Darnel v. East, 573 F.2d 534, 537 (8th Cir.
1978) (stating that "collective bargaining agreements are not ordinary contracts and are not
governed by the common law concepts which govern private agreements"); cf.Southern Cal.
Retail Clerks Union v. Bjorklund, 728 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that "tradi-
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require the development of "a new common law - the common law
of a particular industry or of a particular plant. 3 3 4
Courts considering labor law veil-piercing cases have almost
never considered the special nature of employees' dealings with corporations.335 Although the plaintiffs in these cases present either tort
claims or essentially involuntary contract claims, federal courts and
agencies have consistently applied versions of state corporate law,
which is based on the paradigm of the voluntary credit contract.
Scholarly commentary demonstrates that such a rigid approach is
unjustified, especially in view of the labor laws' express policy of rectifying the imbalance of power between workers and corporate
employers. 36
2.

Justificationsfor the Limited Liability Rule

Courts and commentators have disagreed over the importance
of limited corporate liability. Although the doctrine is often lauded
with impassioned paeans - some have gone so far as to label it "the
greatest single discovery of modern man"3 7 - a number of more
hard-headed analysts have come to question its significance. 33 8 Limtional contract law does not apply in full force in suits brought under the LMRA and ERISA
to collect delinquent trust fund contributions.").
334. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 579; accord Union Pacific, 385 U.S. at 161.
335. One appellate decision, however, relied on a version of the assumption of risk argument in attempting to justify a more restrictive rule of shareholder liability under ERISA than
under the FLSA. See Massachusetts Laborers' Health & Welfare Fund v. Starrett Paving
Corp., 845 F.2d 23 (lst Cir. 1988). The effort revealed a dismaying unfamiliarity with the
realities of labor relations and labor law. The court of appeals suggested that employees may
have superior bargaining power against employers in their capacity as multiemployer pension
plan participants than in their capacity as individual employees with claims against their employer for unpaid wages, and that as plan participants they, or their unions, could properly be
expected to obtain shareholder guarantees through collective bargaining to protect their
ERISA rights. See id. at 26. The argument is decidedly inappropriate. First, the only bargaining party was the participants' union, which is legally independent of the plaintiff trust fund
which was seeking to vindicate its participants' rights. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S.
322, 334 (1981). Second, and perhaps more important, even if the trust could properly be
bound by the union's negotiations, it would be unreasonable for the court to expect shareholder
guarantees insofar as the NLRA bars unions from using economic weapons to secure such
guarantees. See supra note 328 and accompanying text. The court's offhand suggestion gave
no indication that it had considered the realities of the union's bargaining position.
336. For statements of this policy, see NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988), and NorrisLaGuardia Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
337. 1 W. FLETCHER. CYCLOPEDIA § 21 (1917) (quoting President Nicholas Murray
Butler of Columbia University); see also Cook, "Watered Stock" - Commissions - "Blue
Sky Laws"-Stock Without Par Value, 19 MICH. L. REv. 583 n.4 (1921) (quoting President
Charles Eliot of Harvard University describing limited liability as "the greatest legal innovation of the nineteenth century.").
338. See, e.g., Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4
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ited shareholder liability has usually been justified in simplistic

terms, particularly by courts, 3 9 but in recent years legal economists
have begun to develop a more sophisticated analysis of the purposes
40
3
and consequences of limited liability.

Historical studies have demonstrated that capitalist economies
in both the United States and Britain - have managed to thrive

even when investors were legally required to risk their personal assets when they purchased corporate stock.3 41 During the nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries, several different jurisdictions successfully adopted liability rules that made shareholders responsible for
all corporate debts or assessed liability in proportion to their ownership of the corporation.

42

Moreover, the historical evidence of limited liability's modest
importance makes sense in economic terms. Applying the reasoning
underlying the "assumption of risk" argument described above, commentators have contended that, in practice, the limited liability rule
has a neutral effect because credit markets will account for any variations in corporations' legal privileges and immunities. 43 More parDEL. J. CORP. L. 351 (1979).
339. See, e.g., DeBreceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, Inc., 828 F.2d 877, 879 (1st Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988) (ERISA context)(stating that "limited liability allows individuals to take a calculated risk when they engage in the investment and entrepreneurial ventures central to a capitalist economy"); Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (explaining that "the common purpose of... limited shareholder liability is to offer a
valuable incentive to business investment"); see also Johnson v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d
978, 980 (4th Cir. 1987) (ADEA context) (purporting to justify limited liability for corporate
parents by arguing that imposition of liability on the parent would harm individual investors
by reducing the value of their investment in the parent).
340. See, e.g., Halpern, Trebilcock, & Turnbull, supra note 313; Blumberg, Limited
Liability, supra note 43; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24; Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 313.
341. See, e.g., Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 612; Dodd, The Evolution
of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1351, 1378
(1948). Imposing broader shareholder liability does not mean abolishing the corporate entity,
because corporations provide many other important advantages such as perpetual life, transferability of ownership interests, and specialized management that does not require active participation from owners. See Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 338, at 357, 364 (citing A.
DEWING, I FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 14 (5th ed. 1953)). Similarly, refusing to
recognize the separation between parent and subsidiary for liability purposes does not necessarily require similar disregard in matters of jurisdiction and choice-of-law. See Sommer, The
Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 227, 259-73 (1990).
342. See, e.g., Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 626-29. Pro rata liability
has recently made something of a comeback, in academic discussion at least. See, e.g.,
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 313, at 1896 (proposing a pro rata liability rule in tort
cases); see also infra note 373 (discussing problems of pro rata liability in the labor context).
343. See Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 338, at 359-62. Meiners, Mofsky and
Tollison rest their argument on the Coase Theorem. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
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ticularly, because any loan transaction necessarily requires a creditor
to accept specific collateral and a specific rate of interest, creditors
will tend to negotiate around legal obstacles that impose particular
restrictions on loan terms, such as by charging unusually high interest rates if shareholder assets are to be kept beyond reach. As such,
investors must pay a premium for the privilege of limited liability,
and limited liability cannot be considered a business incentive in and
3 44
of itself.
Although the importance of limited liability is therefore decidedly questionable, a number of rationales have been advanced in its
defense. Almost all these arguments relate to advantages that limited liability provides to passive shareholders, especially those who
invest through the mechanism of stock markets. With respect to active shareholders who do not rely on stock markets to make their
investments - such as parent corporations or the owners of closely
held corporations - few rationales, if any, are persuasive.
First, the limited liability rule allows investors to stake a fixed
amount in an enterprise without risking all their assets. As such, limited liability encourages risk-taking, whether by.individual investors
who are willing to gamble a safely limited sum on an unknown enterprise, or by corporations that seek to expand into unfamiliar new
lines of business through the formation of subsidiaries.3 45 Limited
liability tends to shift the risks of these investments to creditors, a
result whose merits are questionable;3 46 where the risk-taking generates significant externalities, such as shifting costs to tort victims or
involuntary contract creditors, however, the risk-shifting consequences of the limited liability rule are clearly harmful.3 47 Overall,
therefore, this feature of a limited liability regime cannot be consid344. See Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 338, at 360-61. Under this analysis,
however, limited liability would continue to provide an advantage to shareholders with respect
to contracts made with weak or unsophisticated parties who are effectively forced to accept the
corporation's terms. Meiners, Mofsky, and Tollison avoid the problem of unsophisticated creditors by suggesting somewhat smugly that "[u]nder any liability rule, a creditor with poor
judgment is likely to be less profitable than more astute lenders." Id. at 361. In any event, the
limited liability rule is hardly worthy of preservation if it does no more than provide a mechanism by which investors may take advantage of the weak and unsophisticated.
345.
346.
risk-averse
at 501-02.

See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 616.
Posner applauds this shifting of risk to creditors, arguing that creditors may be less
and better capable of assessing risk than shareholders. See Posner, supra note 319,
Easterbrook and Fischel disagree, arguing that by deciding to extend credit rather

than acquire equity, creditors necessarily demonstrate risk aversion: shareholders will be the
last to receive payment in the event of corporate insolvency, while they stand to gain the most
from unexpectedly good corporate performance. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24, at
91.
347. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 616-18.
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ered to militate strongly in favor of its preservation, at least with
respect to involuntary creditors.
Second, because limited liability ensures that business failures
cannot inflict financial losses on shareholders beyond the amount of
their fixed investment in stock, the doctrine permits investors to
avoid actively scrutinizing and participating in corporate affairs.
Without limited liability, shareholders would be required to protect
themselves by closely monitoring management decisions to assure
that the corporation did not become insolvent and cause the diversion of shareholder assets to the corporation's creditors.3 41 Instead,
limited liability permits owners safely to remove themselves from
managerial decisions and to use the corporation as a passive investment, thereby fostering the development of efficient large enterprises
owned by a myriad of shareholders, entities whose potential liabilities exceed the amount any individual could pay.3 49 Limited liability
is therefore intimately connected with the separation of corporate
ownership and control, and its celebrated division of labor between
skilled investors and managers.350 By its terms, of course, this advantage of limited liability only affects passive shareholders.
Third, the limited liability rule enables investors to diversify
their portfolios, because their total possible liability from any one
investment will be fixed by the value of their stock.35' Disincentives
to diversification, on the other hand, would result in more concentrated and entrenched corporate ownership, and, in turn, would tend
to perpetuate the control of inefficient management. 352 Once again,
however, this advantage of limited liability is of concern only to the
348. See id. at 613-14. As Blumberg notes, however, even under a limited liability regime shareholders have a significant incentive to monitor managerial behavior so as to deter-

mine the performance of their investment. See id. at 614; but see Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison,
supra note 338, at 362-63 (arguing that shareholders lack such an incentive under the existing
regime because information concerning corporate performance, other than inside information

unobtainable even through monitoring, is already reflected in stock market prices).
349.

See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 612-13; P.

BLUMBERG,

supra

note 100, § 4.02.2, at 68.
350. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24, at 94.

351.

See, e.g., P.

BLUMBERG,

supra note 100, § 4.02.3, at 68-69. Diversification of in-

vestments is generally considered more efficient than concentration, because it allows investors

to spread their risks and permits firms to raise capital more easily. See, e.g., Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 24, at 96. The diversification rationale is less compelling when investors
hold sufficient assets that the failure of any single investment would not inflict catastrophe.
Because the contemporary United States capital market is dominated by extraordinarily well
endowed institutional investors, therefore, the diversification rationale cannot be considered to

provide an especially important reason to maintain the limited liability rule. See Blumberg,
Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 613.
352. See Manne, supra note 30, at 262-65.
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passive investor.
Fourth, without a limited liability rule, shareholders would be
required to monitor the relative wealth of other shareholders so as to
determine the likelihood that their own assets might be diverted to
satisfy the corporation's creditors.3 53 Because creditors would tend to
seek out the deeper shareholder pockets, the likelihood of such diversion would necessarily vary according to the wealth of different
shareholders. Under such circumstances, a wealthy investor, knowing
that her wealth would make her a likely candidate for creditor pursuit in the event of a corporate default, would presumably not be
willing to pay as much for corporate stock as a less wealthy individual who would probably escape creditor collection efforts. As a result, unless shareholders were to be held liable on a pro rata basis
rather than jointly and severally, 54 eliminating limited liability
would effectively preclude the existence of a single fixed share price
and would thereby render stock markets unworkable.355 Here too,
however, this advantage of limited liability is irrelevant with respect
to corporations whose shares are not traded on stock markets.
Fifth, commentators contend that the limited liability doctrine
may assist in the collection of corporate obligations, because without
such a rule, creditors might be forced to track down a large number
of scattered shareholders to secure a recovery.3 56 This argument is
illogical, because even if shareholders could be held liable, creditors
could continue to proceed against solvent corporations before attempting to round up their shareholders, whereas under the existing
353.

See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 614; P. BLUMBERG, supra note

100, Section 4.02.04, at 69-70. Meiners, Mofsky and Tollison downplay this argument, suggesting that in the absence of a limited liability rule creditors would rarely pursue all share-

holders, given the procedural difficulties of any such action. See Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison,
supra note 338, at 363. Unless the principle of joint and several liability were also discarded,

however, a creditor could choose to sue any shareholder she liked. Nonetheless, a shareholder
would still need to monitor other shareholders to determine whether her financial position and

susceptibility to jurisdiction rendered her a likely target for suit.
In this regard, Hansmann and Kraakman argue that additional monitoring would be far
less extensive if shareholders were held liable on a pro rata basis, because the possible consequences of inadequate monitoring would be limited to the monitor's percentage of ownership,
and thus known in advance. In any event, Hansmann & Kraakman suggest that a moderate

increase in shareholder attention would probably improve managerial performance. See
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 313, at 1906.

354. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 313, at 1903; see also infra note 373
(discussing the disadvantages of pro rata liability in the labor context).
355. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 313, at 130-31. Blumberg notes,
however, that stock markets flourished in England during the early modern era preceding the
introduction of limited liability. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 615.
356.

See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 615; P. BLUMBERG, supra note

100, at § 4.02.6, at 71-72.
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regime, creditors are effectively deprived of an alternative remedy if
the corporation proves incapable of satisfying their claims. 357 More
important, unless joint and several liability were also eliminated (as
has sometimes been proposed),358 creditors could pick and choose
their shareholder targets according to the facility of suit. Nonetheless, because the present limited liability regime usually renders
pointless creditor efforts to recover from shareholders, it may reduce
the costs of resolving legal disputes when corporations become
insolvent.3 59
Sixth, limited liability may reduce the transaction costs of credit
negotiations by effectively adding an important standard term to all
corporate credit contracts - a provision for shareholder immunity
whereas repeated negotiations to achieve this presumably desirable result would be inefficient.36 0 Moreover, it is much easier for a
sophisticated contract creditor to determine the financial stability of
a single corporation rather than myriad shareholders when it fixes
the terms for the extension of credit.3 61 Assessing the validity of this
argument requires an empirical assessment. If a significant proportion of credit contracts actually include shareholder guarantees, for
example, it is of little moment. 62 In any event, it is certainly not
persuasive with respect to involuntary creditors who, for one reason
or another, do not negotiate at all.
A number of commentators have concluded that these diverse
justifications for the limited liability rule are not persuasive in the
context of parent and subsidiary corporations and do not impose significant barriers to broader parental liability.3 63 First, limited liabil357. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 615.
358. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 313, at 1903.
359. See Note, Liability of Parent Corporations,supra note 27, at 988.
360. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 615-16; But see Meiners,
Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 338, at 364 (suggesting that if the limited liability rule were
abolished, contracts containing limited liability provisions "would quickly emerge as standard

forms costing only a few pennies to print and sign"). Moreover, insofar as shareholders already

"pay" for limited liability, see supra text accompanying notes 343-44, the limited liability rule

does not necessarily reduce transaction costs.
361.

See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 313, at 134-35.

362.

The argument is similarly unpersuasive in the parent-subsidiary context if, as Som-

mer asserts, creditors generally impose "de facto unitary organization" upon more complex
corporate family structures by making all affiliates liable for each other's obligations. Sommer,
supra note 341, at 234.
363. See, e.g., Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 313, at 130-31; Sommer,
supra note 341, at 259-73; Landers, supra note 47, at 621-22; P. BLUMBERG, supra note 100,
§ 5.01, at 95-96. But see Posner, supra note 319, at 506. Posner contends that, among other

things, elimination of the limited liability rule in the parent-subsidiary context would impose
additional costs upon subsidiaries' contract creditors, who would be required to investigate and
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ity's encouragement of parents' risk-taking is actually detrimental in
most instances. Corporations are significantly less risk-averse than
individuals and will generally invest in any enterprise with a positive
net present value, even those that impose a significant risk of creating devastating losses such as environmental disasters. 6 4 Indeed,
many subsidiaries are not operated with "profit-maximizing intent,"
but as part of a broader parental business strategy.3 65 As such, limited liability tends to encourage the formation of inefficient subsidiaries that generate immediate financial gains for the parent while
inflicting significant externalities.
Second, limited liability's facilitation of passive investment is irrelevant in the parent-subsidiary context, because parents necessarily
monitor their subsidiaries' performance through their ordinary exercise of control over the subsidiary. 66 In addition, investment diversification is not relevant here because parents form and operate subsidiaries as part of an active business strategy rather than as a
passive investment. Finally, because there are no other shareholders
for a parent to consider in determining the potential risk of veilpiercing to its own assets, and because subsidiaries' shares are almost
never publicly traded, concerns about a broader liability rule's effect
upon capital markets are also unfounded. 67
These rationales are equally unpersuasive in the context of close
corporations, and various commentators have therefore proposed
eliminating limited liability for the shareholders of such corporations. 66 Like parent corporations, the owners of close corporations
monitor the financial stability of the parent as well as the subsidiary, given that the parent's
assets would become available for the subsidiary's creditors in the event of the subsidiary's
default. See Posner, supra note 319, at 516-17.
364. See Note, Liability of Parent Corporations,supra note 27, at 989-90; see also
Landers, supra note 47, at 591 (suggesting that parent corporations have an incentive to create
inefficient subsidiaries that generate helpful losses that the parent may claim for tax purposes).
365. Sommer, supra note 341, at 232.
366. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 43, at 623 (noting that a parent is
"almost invariably engaged in [the subsidiary's] managerial functions of establishing policy,
determining the budget, providing administrative support, and participating in the [subsidiary's] decisionmaking").
367. See id. at 623-24. These arguments concerning parents and subsidiaries assume
that the parent holds a 100% ownership interest in the subsidiary. However, only about 72%
of subsidiaries are in fact wholly owned, however, according to a 1975 study. See id. at 626
(citing J. CURHAN. W. DAVIDSON & R. Sum. TRACING THE MULTINATIONALS 143 (1977)).
Alternative ownership structures among subsidiaries are likely to be joint ventures of one kind
or another, however, rather than involving a block of shares that is publicly traded and widely
held. As such, the principal arguments for limited liability appear equally invalid for nonwholly owned subsidiaries.
368. See, e.g., Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 313, at 148; see also Note,
Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?, 76 YALE
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have an exceptionally substantial incentive to undertake high-risk activities, because a small group of individuals will see the entire benefit of a successful gamble while creditors will bear all the risk.369
Second, because ownership and control are rarely separated in close
corporations, abolition of limited liability would not cause shareholders to mount expensive efforts to monitor managerial performance
and other corporate dealings that might affect the value of their investment, because their participation in management will already
generate this information.3 70 Third, because creditors may easily
monitor the financial position of a small number of shareholders to
determine the validity of their collateral for corporate debts, unlimited liability might be economically efficient.3 7 1 Fourth, shareholders
may easily learn about each other's financial position because the
shareholders are few in number and they all participate actively in
the ordinary mechanisms of corporate governance. Finally, concerns
about the effectiveness of the capital market are irrelevant, 3since
by
72
definition close corporations' shares are not publicly traded.
Corporate law scholarship demonstrates, therefore, that the limited liability doctrine provides no indispensable advantages to close
corporations or corporate subsidiaries, and that shareholder immunity brings their owners something of a windfall. Because there are
no theoretical obstacles to shareholder liability in these contexts, a
more labor-protective doctrine does not appear objectionable as a
L.J. 1190, 1198-201 (1967) (proposing a mechanism for shareholder liability in the close corporation context).
369. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 313, at 148. This incentive is
exacerbated among highly leveraged close corporations that were taken private amid the
merger-and-acquisition frenzy of the 1980's: "these firms, which have proportionately small
net assets and are under great pressure to maximize cash flow, have an unusually strong incen-

tive to engage in excessively risky behavior." Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 313, at
1881. Financing through debt, rather than equity, increases these incentives still further, for

unlike shareholders, secured debtholders will be paid ahead of tort claimants should the corporation go bankrupt as the result of its risky activities. See id. at 1884 (citing 11 U.S.C. Section
507 (1988)).
370. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24, at I I0.

371.

See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 313, at 135.

372. See id. at 148. As corporations become less closely held, distinctions between clas-

ses of shareholders might become appropriate. Under existing doctrine, for example, only those
shareholders that actively participate in the wrongdoing that leads to veil-piercing will suffer

personal liability. See, e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d 576, 579, 364 P.2d 473, 475 (1961)
(holding that when a veil is pierced, liability is only properly imposed on those shareholders
who "actively participate in the conduct of corporate affairs"). When undercapitalization is
only one of several factors taken into account in a veil-piercing determination, however, this
principle might allow passive shareholders with a substantial ownership interest to escape liability. See Gelb, supra note 318, at 19.
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matter of corporate law policy."'
B. A Reconceptualized Labor Law Veil-Piercing Doctrine
Federal courts and agencies considering labor law veil-piercing
cases have never made a serious attempt to determine whether the
doctrine of limited shareholder liability makes sense in the labor context. Instead, labor cases present an unduly rigid and simplistic account of veil-piercing law that ignores both contemporary corporate
373. Eliminating limited liability for publicly traded corporations, as Hansmann and
Kraakman have recently proposed, may not be warranted in the labor context. Hansmann and
Kraakman's argument is based on the paradigm of the corporation whose activities involve a
significant risk of inflicting catastophic economic disasters and thereby incurring massive damages far beyond any corporation's ability to pay. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 313,
at 1880. Working within this paradigm, Hansmann and Kraakman suggest that abolishing
limited liability for publicly-traded corporations would be appropriate - provided the prevailing rule of joint and several liability were abolished in favor of a pro rata principle. See Id. at
1896, 1903-06. Indeed, they contend that if publicly traded corporations retained the privilege
of limited liability while close corporations and subsidiaries did not, investors would effect
"partial or complete sales of risky subsidiaries to individual shareholders," thus reducing the
benefits of the liability reform while simultaneously "bring[ing] the additional costs of inefficient ownership structures." Id. at 1932.
The corporations that incur labor law liabilities, and the nature of those liabilities, are so
fundamentally different from the environmental risk-takers that Hansmann and Kraakman
describe that their proposal may not be valid in the labor context. Simply put, labor law violators are much smaller and the damages involved are much smaller. In addition, most labor law
liabilities - damages to a discriminatee, for example - are not foreseeable at the time the
corporation is formed, unlike the possible damages faced by a chemical subsidiary organized
for the sole purpose of undertaking risky activity.
As such, "going public" simply will not be a sensible evasion mechanism for the typical
labor law violator. The initial and ongoing costs of such a maneuver would not be justified for
a small business with no obvious liabilities looming on the horizon. On the other hand, a shift
to pro rata liability might severely impede creditor collection efforts, for small family corporations could very easily manipulate stock ownership to shield assets. (Hansmann and Kraakman's suggestion that maneuvers of this kind would be difficult to arrange and easy to defeat,
see id. at 1911-13, is again based on the environmental paradigm, where liabilities would be
massive and widespread and decidely more likely to secure judicial willingness to invalidate
chicaneries of ownership).
One labor law context in which undesirable liabilities would be foreseeable from the outset is that of double-breasting. If the law were reformed so that any closely-held or affiliated
corporation were bound to its affiliate's collective bargaining agreements, an investor could
only achieve its goal of double-breasting by forming a new corporation and offering at least
some of its shares for public sale. Taking this course would only make sense if the benefits of
operating a non-union division outweighed the costs of forming and operating a public company. Given the size of most entities that engage in double-breasting, it is unlikely that going
public to avoid liablity would become a common course of action. Although Hansmann and
Kraakman are dubious about the prospect of interstitial judical resolution of problems like
these, I suggest that it is preferable to "rely on the ability of the [courts] to deal with [those]
new situations in the light of what are called 'their own facts.'" 0. KAHN-FREUD, LABOUR
AND THE LAW 54 (2d ed. 1977). To the extent evasion develops into a significant problem, the
law should be reexamined and reformed.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol9/iss1/3

86

1991]

McLeod: Shareholders' Liability and Workers' Rights: Piercing the Corpora
Piercingthe Corporate Veil

law scholarship and the policies of federal labor statutes. As explained above, however, corporate law scholarship reveals that the
limited liability principle is largely irrelevant as an incentive to business investment and is primarily useful only as a regulator of the
market for publicly traded corporate stock. A broader rule of shareholder liability for non-traded corporations, such as subsidiaries and
close corporations, should therefore have no negative economic or
policy effect.
Rather than continuing to accept traditional state law doctrine
and the questionable assumptions upon which it is based, federal
courts and administrative agencies should embark on a revised analysis of the role of corporate fictions in federal labor law. In doing so,
they should seek to determine whether specialized federal veil-piercing rules are appropriate in labor cases and how such doctrines
should be tailored in different contexts to advance the purposes of
particular labor statutes. Their analysis should also recognize the
tenuous importance of limited liability and the irrelevance of state
corporate law interests in matters involving federal statutes.
1. The Necessity of Federal Decisional Rules in the Labor Law
Veil-Piercing Context
Application of the Supreme Court's three-part Kimbell Foods
choice-of-law analysis suggests that specialized and specifically federal veil-piercing rules are especially appropriate in labor cases.
First, federal interests militate strongly in favor of uniform federal
rules in labor matters. All the federal labor laws are intended to
regulate social problems of national dimension or major issues relating to interstate commerce. 374 The NLRA, for example, controls the
use of economic weapons that may disrupt the national economy,
and establishes the ground rules for collective bargaining that sets
the terms and conditions of employment for millions of workers.
Most of the federal labor statutes, moreover, impose a strong preemptive effect, such that state regulation of labor matters is substantially foreclosed. Given these special attributes of labor law, it is singularly inappropriate to apply ordinary state corporate law, which is
devised to deal with entirely unrelated problems such as business dis375
putes, to labor matters in which the states have no proper role.
Second, application of state law to labor law veil-piercing ques374. See Note, Piercingthe Veil, supra note 64, at 859; See also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).

375. See Refined Sugars, Inc. v. Local 807 Labor-Management Pension Fund, 632 F.
Supp. 630, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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tions would clearly frustrate specific objectives of federal law. Although the Kimbell Foods Court did not define or explain the term
"frustrate" as used in that decision, the two most readily available
interpretations strongly suggest that application of state corporate
law should be considered to frustrate labor law policies. The first of
these interpretations requires attention to the role of corporate entity
in the particular statutory framework.3 7 The federal labor laws
clearly place no weight on the corporate form: they establish no distinctions of any kind between the obligations of incorporated and unincorporated employers. State corporate law's distinction between
proprietors, who are personally liable for their businesses' obligations, and corporate shareholders, who are not, would therefore appear to interfere with enforcement of the uniform federal scheme.
The second interpretation of the term "frustration" is the meaning that has been applied in the statutory frustration cases. Under
this interpretation, the labor laws should be considered to have been
frustrated whenever a corporation is unable to satisfy a labor law
obligation and provide compensation to its victim. If state corporate
law assures such intolerable outcomes - as it inevitably will given
its general rigidity and its firm principle that corporate insolvency
does not create a basis for veil-piercing - then federal interests will
be frustrated. State corporate law would permit the shareholders of
insolvent corporations consistently to avoid labor law liability unless
they commit particular corporate law offenses - a result that frus3 77
trates federal labor policy.
Finally, application of federal veil-piercing rules in labor cases
would not disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.
The federal labor laws do not in any way implicate the formation,
regulation, or preservation of private corporations.3 7 8 They seek to
control only the relationships between employers and employees, not
employers and their owners. 7 9 The allocation of responsibilities between state and federal courts is such that federal courts have no
obligation to weigh state corporate law policies against federal labor
law policies: their only mission is to enforce the federal labor laws.
This division of responsibilities is particularly apparent in the con376. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text.
378. See In re Acushnet River Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987) (noting that federal veil-piercing rules do not interfere with commercial relationships predicated on
state law, because shareholders are only properly entitled to rely on state law insofar as it
involves internal corporate affairs).
379. Id.
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text of business regulation: the states imbue their corporations with
certain rights and entitlements and the federal government establishes the commercial relationship between the states.
As a policy matter, of course, it is appropriate for the federal
courts to pay attention to state interests, unless doing so would
thwart federal objectives. Both the statutory frustration doctrine and
prevailing principles of federal common law attempt to preserve this
balance. When interference appears, as in the labor law context, federal courts must give primacy to the federal interest, by requiring
that shareholders who are immune from responsibility for other corporate obligations ensure that their corporations satisfy their labor
law responsibilities.
As explained in Part II, most existing labor law veil-piercing
rules are nominally federal in nature, so that assessment of the appropriateness of federal decisional rules for labor law veil-piercing
problems might appear unnecessary or redundant. Nonetheless, existing labor law veil-piercing doctrines incorporate the assumptions
and restrictions of state corporate law so completely that they cannot
properly be considered truly federal doctrines..38 The NLRA "single
employer" doctrine, for example, is so tightly constrained by traditional state law conceptions of corporate entity, and so scrupulously
devoted to form rather than reality, that collective bargaining relationships and employees' unionization rights may be subverted almost at the employer's will with their current approach to veil-piercing, the federal courts have subordinated federal labor policy to state
corporate law to the same degree as they would if they had applied
state law without question.
2. Shaping A Reconceptualized Labor Law Veil-Piercing
Doctrine
The determination that uniform federal veil-piercing rules are
required when courts enforce federal labor statutes is essentially a
preliminary question. The more important problem arises in shaping
the substantive content of veil-piercing doctrines that are attuned to
the individual policies of the various labor statutes. These rules may
differ according to the particular policies and interests of different
statutes.
Nonetheless, I suggest a single basic guideline: corporate em380.

As several commentators have observed, federal labor law has consistently absorbed

assumptions from other areas of the law in a manner that deflects and deradicalizes labor law.
See Klare, supra note 101; J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
(1985).
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ployers should comply with the labor laws, and their shareholders
should be required to shoulder these obligations when the corporations fail to do so. The overriding policy, therefore, is that labor statutes should simply be obeyed. An exception seems appropriate for
the shareholders of publicly traded corporations, however, because
imposition of liability on these shareholders could have serious negative ramifications, as explained above. Detailed analysis suggests that
a per se rule of liability for other classes of corporate shareholders is
appropriate for all federal labor statutes, although the particular
statutory policies that suggest this result vary in different statutory
contexts.3 8'
This principle is essentially the same as that advanced in the
more broad-reaching "statutory frustration" cases. In those cases,
courts have held that Medicare requires that reimbursement payments must be made, and that corporate veils will not block this
mandate. ERISA's requirement that employee benefit contributions
be paid provides the clearest labor law analogy: here too, corporate
shields should not be permitted to permit employer nonpayment.
This principle is most easily applied when a labor statute imposes a monetary obligation on a corporate employer: victims of antiunion discrimination should receive NLRA backpay, victims of racial discrimination should receive Title VII backpay, and workers
illegally deprived of overtime premiums should receive FLSA compensation. When the veil-piercing question involves the applicability
of a collective bargaining agreement to a corporate affiliate, as in the
double-breasting context, the contract should simply be extended to
covered by the
include all employees performing work of the kind
382
affiliates.
corporate
by
employed
are
that
contract
381.

The policies underlying the labor laws are something less than unambiguous and

are certainly susceptible to competing interpretations. See Klare, supra note 101 (explaining
the ambiguity of the NLRA and the courts' "deradicalizing" interpretation).
382. Cf. Gorman, supra note 104, at 259-60 (contending that NLRA policy requires a
consistent prohibition on employers' formation of nonunion entities during the terms of collective bargaining agreements). On its surface, my proposal automatically to extend collective

bargaining agreements to corporate affiliates appears to create substantial labor law problems.
Although the employees of non-union affiliates could choose to decertify the signatory union
upon the agreement's expiration, the affiliates' employees would nonetheless be forced to work

under that agreement and to accept a limited association with the signatory union pending the
agreement's expiration. As amended, the NLRA protects both the right to choose unionization

and the "right" to decline it; this article proposes that the conflict between these two principles
be reconciled through the temporary compromise described above. The existing system, which

extends employers broad discretion to subvert employee choice, is intolerable. Several other
problems, whose resolution is beyond the scope of this article, might also arise. For example,

two affiliates might both be unionized, with each affiliate's employees working under a separate
collective bargaining agreement with a different union; in such circumstances, the problem
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The equation of noncompliance with statutory frustration is especially appropriate when violations of labor law are inherently intertwined with corporate employers' business difficulties. If particular kinds of labor law violations are usually only committed by
insolvent entities, traditional corporate law would permit systematic
avoidance of liability. Under any definition, such wholesale circumvention of legal burdens constitutes a frustration of statutory purpose
and policy.
ERISA withdrawal liability is only incurred, for example, when
an employer ceases its obligation to contribute to a multiemployer
pension plan. Although such a withdrawal may arise from a viable
employer's decision to discard its union obligations, many, perhaps
most, withdrawals are made when a corporate employer simply goes
out of business. 38 3 In other words, the statutory withdrawal liability
obligation does not ordinarily arise until the corporate employer has
placed itself in a position of insolvency such that it will, in all likelihood, be unable to satisfy the obligation. 84 Moreover, ERISA's basic policy of protecting benefit plans is especially pressing in the
withdrawal liability context, because only weak and underfunded
plans - those which would be hurt the most by corporate nonpayment - are entitled to assess withdrawal liability.
Under WARN, the situation is even more severe, because a
plant closing is perhaps the single most characteristic act of a failing
employer. Although a major corporation will remain solvent after
shutting down a single plant, in many instances WARN will become
a dead letter unless shareholders may be held accountable for violations that generally occur only when corporations fall on hard times.
Within these parameters, I now consider the policies of the particular labor statutes and attempt to determine whether these policies are best advanced by a broad rule of shareholder liability for
corporations whose shares are not publicly traded. In some instances,
the statutory text is explicit; in others legislative history provides the
clearest statements of policy. Courts have occasionally considered
statutory purpose in devising veil-piercing rules, but these analyses
are generally questionable and reveal excessive reliance on state law
could be treated in the same manner as a merger.

383. See, e.g., DeBreceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, 828 F.2d 877, 880 (Ist Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988).
384. Curiously, some courts have twisted this problem into an argument against broader

shareholder responsibility for withdrawal liability. See id. at 881 (contending that a broader
rule would make "personal liability for withdrawal payments ... a routine accompaniment to
corporate bankruptcy proceedings.").
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conceptions of the corporate entity.
The most striking feature of the federal labor statutes is the
total absence of any indication of congressional solicitude for corporations and their owners. No labor statute contains any exception for
incorporated entities or any suggestion that corporate law policies
should be balanced against labor law objectives. Several statutes
enumerate specific countervailing policies that are to be taken into
account in enforcement, but limited corporate liability is never found
on the list. In fact, the opposite is true: the labor laws express concern with the excessive power of employers that are organized as
corporate entities and reveal an intention to strengthen the position
of employees as against such powerful employers.
1. The NLRA
The NLRA's central policy is undoubtedly the preservation of
industrial peace. 385 Protecting employees' rights to organize and bargain, Congress found, tends to "safeguard commerce from injury,
impairment, or interruption" and to "remov[e] certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest" such as the employer unfair
labor practices Congress prohibited in the NLRA 88
When an employer's unfair labor practice is left unremedied as
the result of its perpetrator's reliance on the fiction of corporate separateness, interstate commerce is threatened in the same manner as
if Congress had never adopted the NLRA. An unremedied unfair
labor practice is permitted to fester, provoking the victimized workers and threatening interstate commerce in a manner Congress specifically identified as dangerous. If corporate fictions permit such a
result, the purpose and policy of the NLRA are clearly frustrated.
Further, the NLRA contains no indication that Congress intended to place weight on the corporate form. Although Congress
did specify, in the Taft-Hartley amendments, that various competing
interests - those of unions, employers, and individual employees should be taken into account and balanced against each other,38
nothing in the NLRA suggests that its policies and obligations
should somehow be tempered by the principles of state corporate
law.
Finally, one of the announced purposes of the NLRA is to rem385. See, e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261,271 (1964). This is not
necessarily a neutral goal. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 168, at 1565.
386. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Employer unfair labor practices are enumerated in NLRA Section 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988).
387. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
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edy the "inequality of bargaining power" between employer and employee - inequality that is particularly acute when the employer is
"organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association."388 In this regard at least, the NLRA suggests that corporate
employers are subject to stricter scrutiny, not special deference. This
statutory goal of rectifying the imbalance of power is surely undermined when employers take advantage of this inequality by hiding
behind corporate veils; as such, NLRA veil-piercing doctrine should
attempt to rectify these abuses.
Under prevailing state corporate law doctrine and labor law
veil-piercing rules that defer to it, however, unions' inability to bargain from a position of strength actually leaves them worse off than
ordinary business creditors, who may be able to secure shareholder
guarantees of corporate obligations. NLRA obligations are statutory
rather than contractual in nature, but this policy of strengthening
employee bargaining power should be considered in other labor law
contexts, particularly LMRA cases in which unions seek to obtain
the benefit of collective bargaining rights assured by the NLRA.
2. The LMRA
As with the NLRA, the most important policy of the LMRA is
the preservation of industrial peace. 389 By assuring that collective
bargaining agreements could be enforced in federal court, Congress
intended to establish a labor relations system that fixed the obligations of labor and management for a certain period of time rather
than subjecting labor-management relations to constant struggle and
flux. In particular, Congress intended to prevent disruptions of industrial peace that might arise through the use of economic weaponry to resolve interstitial labor conflicts such as employee
grievances. 9 °
If a contractual regime is to assure labor peace, however, it
must be perceived as fair; veil-piercing doctrines that allow corporate
fictions to defeat employee expectations can hardly be expected to
build harmonious labor-management relationships or to encourage
union acceptance of the contractual system. 391 Furthermore, as in
388.

Id.

389. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960).
390. See generally Stone, supra note 168. Although the LMRA itself did not establish a

substitute mechanism to resolve such matters, arbitration is now almost universally accepted
for this purpose. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.

391.

In recent years, for example, numerous labor leaders have called for the abolition

of the NLRA, arguing that its pro-employer bias renders it worse than nothing, and many
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the NLRA context, an unremedied LMRA violation presents the
same threat to industrial peace no matter what causes it to remain
unremedied. Shareholder immunity may therefore lead to industrial
lawlessness - a result directly contrary to the goals of the LMRA.
Surprisingly, courts have not considered these central LMRA
policies in fashioning LMRA veil-piercing doctrines. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has intimated that the only LMRA policy pertinent to veil-piercing is its emphasis on national uniformity in the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.39 2 Proceeding from
this interpretation, the court of appeals found that application of
traditional veil-piercing law would not interfere with LMRA policy. 393 However, the court completely ignored the underlying purpose
of the LMRA's attempt to ensure national uniformity. 94 It would
hardly advance labor peace, for example, to devise a consistent, uniform national rule that permitted employers to breach collective bargaining agreements at will while subjecting unions to mandatory punitive damages for their contract violations. Permitting shareholders
to escape their LMRA obligations with corporate shields does a similar disservice, despite the uniformity and consistency of a rule that
gives them such leeway. 95
major unions now avoid the NLRA's election procedures, citing similar abuses and failures.
392. See Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Eng'g, 605 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Ninth Circuit suggested rather weakly that this "overriding federal policy ...is best
effectuated if collective bargaining agreements are interpreted and enforced in a uniform manner." Id. at 1109.
393. Id. at 1111. The Seymour court suggested that because veil-piercing rules are only
important when corporations are insolvent, and because traditional rules provide for recovery
from undercapitalized corporations and those stripped by fraud, the common law doctrine
would be sufficient "inmost cases." Id. But the court did not consider what would happen in
cases other than "most" and whether a failure to permit shareholder recovery would frustrate
the LMRA. Id.
394. The Ninth Circuit's emphasis on the LMRA's formal, rather than substantive
goals, echoes the Supreme Court's division during the 1950s as to whether the LMRA merely
established federal jurisdiction in labor contract cases, but implied the continuing applicability
of state contract law, or whether the jurisdictional grant also included the power to shape
federal law concerning collective bargaining agreements. Compare Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) with Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955). The latter view, adopted in Lincoln Mills,
became and remains the law, of course.
395. See United Paperworkers International Union v. T.P. Property Corp., 583 F.2d 33,
36 (1st Cir. 1978) (confronting the question of whether the LMRA requires a general rule
binding parent corporations to arbitration clauses contained in their subsidiaries' collective
bargaining agreements, the First Circuit held that "[n]o such policy has yet been adopted by
Congress or the courts."). The court of appeals did not consider whether such a policy should
be adopted, or whether, regardless of the existence of explicit policies, the LMRA would be
frustrated without such a rule.
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3.

The Railway Labor Act

The Railway Labor Act is intended to advance a number of

congressional policies: prevention of disruptions to interstate commerce and industrial peace, protection of railroad and airline employees' right to organize, and development of orderly mechanisms
for the resolution of labor disputes. 9 ' In addition, the RLA was intended to strengthen the position of workers and their unions as

against railroad and airline employers.39 Accordingly, nothing in the
RLA evidences any intention to protect corporate law interests or

policies. As with other statutes relating to collective bargaining,
moreover, the RLA's goal of assuring labor peace is jeopardized if

unremedied RLA violations are permitted to fester because corporate shareholders successfully interpose the fiction of corporate
separateness.
4.

ERISA

ERISA's key purpose is to assure that employees' rights concerning employee benefit plans are protected. 98 In this regard,
ERISA expresses a clear policy that promised contributions should
be paid and promised benefits should be received.399 Legislative history demonstrates, moreover, that Congress considered that a broad

interpretation of ERISA is appropriate so as to provide "the maximum degree of protection for working men and women. ' 40 0 Like
other labor statutes, ERISA was also intended to rectify the imbal396. See 45 U.S.C. § 151a (2) (1988); see also Republic Airlines, Inc., 8 N.M.B. 49, 54
(1980) ("The purpose of the [RLA] is [to] foster stable labor relations in the railroad and
airline industries in order to minimize disruptions to interstate commerce.").
397. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 759 (1961).
398. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 889, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2918, 2919 ("The primary purpose of [the MPPAA
amendments to ERISA] is to protect retirees and workers ... against the loss of their pensions"); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001, 1001a, and 1001b (1988) (setting forth Congress' formal
statements of ERISA policy).
399. See ERISA § 515, 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (1988); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 374 (1980); see also Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
1986) (noting that ERISA's central purpose is "to ensure that employees [a]re not deprived of
promised benefits which they both expect[] and deserve[]"). For an especially clear explanation of ERISA's policies concerning the payment of contributions, see Upholsterer's Int'l
Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture, 720 F. 2d 1323, 1327-29 (7th Cir. 1990).
400. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4383 ("It is intended that the coverage of [ERISA] be construed
liberally to provide the maximum degree of protection for working men and women covered by
private retirement programs. Conversely, exemptions should be confined to their narrow
purpose.").
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ance of power between workers and employers.40 1 Finally, ERISA's
legislative history makes it "abundantly clear" that in passing
ERISA, "Congress was unconcerned with the actual corporate form
of a business. 40 2 In accordance with these policies, several courts
deciding ERISA cases have suggested that a corporation's noncompliance with ERISA requirements - such as fiduciary duties403 or
contribution obligations 40 4 - provides a sufficient basis for piercing
its veil.405
Surprisingly, other courts appear to ignore ERISA's basic policies or manage to derive supposed statutory policies that contravene
ERISA's apparent objectives. For example, although section 515 of
ERISA expresses an unambiguous policy that benefits contributions
should be paid, 40 6 some courts have diverted attention from this
mandate by arguing that assuring such payment through shareholder
liability would actually work against the policy of ERISA by discouraging corporate employers from participating in multiemployer
benefit funds.40 7 In reality, however, the threat of shareholder liability would merely prompt corporate employers to ensure that their
ERISA contributions were paid before their lenders' notes and suppliers' bills - an allocation of priorities that clearly serves congressional policy.
Other courts have performed a similar sleight-of-hand in considering the policies of ERISA's withdrawal liability scheme, which
seeks to hold employers accountable for their past acts with respect
to multiemployer pension funds. Imposing individual liability on the
401. Id., at 4850 (explaining Congress' view that ERISA is a law "which, like the National Labor Relations Act, the wage-hour laws and other labor standards laws, brings the
workers' interests up to parity with those of employers").
402. Robbins v. Pepsi-Cola Met. Bottling Co., 636 F. Supp. 641, 659 (N.D. I11.
1986);
see Alman, 801 F.2d at 3.
403. See Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, 829 F.2d 1209, 1221 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that "ERISA Section 406(b) prohibitions would be empty rhetoric if the corporate form
might ... easily shield those who profit from prohibited transactions"); see also ERISA Section 406(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (1988) (enumerating specific prohibited transactions that
may lead to liability for breach of fiduciary duty).
404. See Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Engineers Health & Welfare Plan v.
Hroch, 757 F.2d 184, 191 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil in deference to "the congressional policy reflected in sections 306(a) and 306(b) of
the [MPPAA] [29 U.S.C. §§ 1145 and 1132(g) (1988)] that employers make all of their
required contributions to pension and health and welfare funds").
405. See, e.g., Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 461 (7th Cir.
1991)("[t]he underlying congressional policy clearly favors the disregard of the corporate entity in cases where employees are denied their pension benefits"); Alman, 801 F.2d at 4.
406. See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
407. See, e.g., Rockney v. Blohorn, 877 F.2d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 1989); Scarbrough v.
Perez, 870 F.2d 1079, 1084 (6th Cir. 1989).
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shareholders of withdrawing corporate employers would appear to
discourage withdrawals, and thereby advance statutory policy, because employers would not be permitted to abandon the plan without
risking shareholder liability.40 8 Some courts have suggested, however, that the withdrawal liability system is actually intended to
grant employers incentives to enroll in multiemployer pension plans
in the future, so that a broad rule of shareholder liability would actually undermine ERISA policy by discouraging employers from enrolling and risking shareholder liability.40 9 In contrast, other courts
have suggested that the broad rules of intercorporate withdrawal liability actually encourage new employers to enroll in multiemployer
plans, because they may be sure that large conglomerates will not
abandon the plan and escape liability through the manipulation of
corporate fictions. 41 0 The same rationale applies to individual shareholder liability: responsible employers may safely enroll knowing
that other corporations will not rely on shareholder immunity to impose their unfunded liabilities upon the remaining participating
employers.
5. The Norris-LaGuardiaAct
The Norris-LaGuardia Act's statement of policy is somewhat
unusual, but it demonstrates a clear legislative purpose to reduce the
federal government's protection of employer interests. The Act declares that "prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid
of governmental authority to organize in the corporate and other
forms of ownership association" have led to a variety of improper
results, which the Act sought to rectify. 411 This express reference to
the dangers of corporate power and the impropriety of government
assistance to employers that are "organized in the corporate . . .
form[]" can hardly be read as an intent to further state corporate
412
law policy and to protect business investors.
6. Title VII and the ADEA
The congressional purposes underlying Title VII and the ADEA
are substantially identical. Title VII is designed to eliminate discrim408.

See DeBreceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, Inc., 828 F.2d 877, 880-81 (1st Cir. 1987),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988).
409. DeBreceni, 828 F.2d at 880; Connors v. P & M Coal Co., 801 F.2d 1373, 1376

(D.C. Cir. 1986).
410.
1986).
411.
412.

See Robbins v. Pepsi-Cola Met. Bottling Co., 636 F. Supp. 641, 659 (N.D. Il1.
Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
Id.
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ination in "employment based on race, color, religion, or national
origin, '413 and to eliminate practices, devices, or barriers that permit
such discrimination. 14 Similarly, the ADEA announces its policies
as the promotion of older persons' employment on the basis of ability
rather than age and the prohibition of arbitrary age discrimination
in employment.41 5
Like other labor statutes, neither Title VII nor the ADEA contains any indication that their mandates should be tempered by attention to state corporate law doctrine or the needs of business investors. 41 6 Indeed, both Title VII and the ADEA are particularly
deserving of an expansive interpretation because the victims of employment discrimination are often individuals with very little education or sophistication, and because eradicating discrimination is gen41 7
erally considered a social policy of the very highest order.
7. Other Labor Statutes
Other labor statutes also express unambiguous policies and
mandates, with no suggestion of solicitude for corporate investors.
The FLSA's statement of policy is unusually clear and specific. Congress identified various "labor conditions" that it considered "detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living" and
intended "to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate" these
conditions. 418 As with the NLRA, the FLSA's statement of policy
suggests that this basic goal should be balanced against other policies -

the preservation of employment and earning power -

but

says nothing about moderating the basic statutory aim so as to accommodate policies of corporate law.41 9
413. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S, CODE
CONG & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2401 ("The purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate, through the

utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on
race, color, religion, or national origin.").
414. See Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (analyzing the policies of Title VII); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (also analyzing the
policies of Title VII).
415. See ADEA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988); H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967), reprintedin 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2213, 2214 ("It is there-

fore the purpose of [the ADEA] to promote the employment of older persons based on their
ability.").

416. See H. R. REP.No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2213, 2223-24 (analyzing the ADEA's definition of the term "employer" without suggestion of any distinctions involving corporate entity).
417. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 100, § 14.06, at 508-09.
418.

FLSA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1988); see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109

(1940).
419. See FLSA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1988).
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The purpose of OSHA is to minimize work-related accidents

and illnesses.420 Once again, OSHA makes no reference to corporate
form, and neither the statute, nor its legislative history suggests that
its policies are to be compromised by attention to corporate law doc-

trine. 42 1 Like other labor laws, OSHA represents a balance between
competing interests -

workers' interest in workplace safety and em-

ployers' interest in unfettered management -

but nothing indicates

422
that corporate law policy should somehow be placed on the scale.

WARN provides no explicit statement of its purpose, but it
clearly seeks to protect employees from unannounced disruptions to
their employment. 423 Even more than most labor statutes, the legisla-

tive history suggests no special exception for corporate employers. 424
CONCLUSION

The entropy of the law is one of its defining qualities. The doctrine of limited shareholder liability has become so widely accepted
that calls for its elimination reek of heresy. Nonetheless, persuasive
analysis suggests that the existing law of corporate form relies on

unwarranted assumptions and often serves no useful policy goals. If
circumstances suggest that limiting shareholder liability may have

harmful consequences, therefore, the existing law of corporate entity
should not be maintained simply because it is there.

In the context of federal labor law, substantial reform is especially appropriate. Labor law deals with a complex and distinct set
of legal problems, and its existing veil-piercing doctrines already reflect a number of innovative adaptations. More important, labor law
expresses a range of societal values that cannot be reconciled with
420. See S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5177 ("The purpose of [OSHA] is to reduce the number and severity
of work-related injuries and illnesses which, despite current efforts of employers and government, are resulting in ever-increasing human misery and economic loss.").
421. See 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5202 (analyzing OSHA's definition
of the term "employer" without suggestion of any distinctions involving corporate entity).
422. See, e.g., Titanium Metals Corp. v. Usery, 579 F.2d 536, 543 (9th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (quoting LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF
1970. Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., at 435 (remarks of Senator Williams)) (noting that OSHA "is designed to
require 'a good faith effort to balance the need of workers to have a sa[f]e and healthy work
environment against the requirement of industry to function without undue interference.").
423. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1548, 2078.
424. See 1988 CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2079. The House Conference Report
indicates that the statutory term "employer" means "a business enterprise," and is to "be
deemed synonymous with the terms company, firm or business." As such, the term "employer"
should "consist of one or more sites of employment under common ownership or control." Id.
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the corporate law policies that led to the development of the limited
liability doctrine. Because corporate law policy has been grafted onto
labor law, existing veil-piercing doctrines have failed to assure that
the labor laws are properly enforced and their beneficiaries assured
satisfaction.
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